

BOYLE LECTURES, 1876.

# WHAT IS NATURAL THEOLOGY?

AN ATTEMPT TO ESTIMATE

THE CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE

OF

MANY WITNESSES TO 



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## PREFACE.

THE Lectures here published were in substance delivered as the Boyle Lectures of 1876. But, on the one hand, they have been since considerably enlarged, and in part rewritten for publication, in order to obviate the limitations imposed by homiletical delivery on the development of various parts of the argument: and, on the other, they contain what has long in principle engaged my best thought and study.

In considering (as a Boyle Lecturer is bound to do) the practical condition of the great controversy between Christianity and the various rival or antagonistic forms of thought, two considerations have forced themselves on my mind, which I have endeavoured to embody in the following pages.

The first is that, while it is necessary to deal with special attacks or difficulties, our great strength lies in the exhibition in all its fulness

of the positive evidence for the faith which is in us. We have no right to expect in this life to be able to answer every difficulty, and to dispel every shadow of doubt. But we may hope to find such substantial reason for believing in God, as shall enable us to look calmly on the doubts and difficulties necessarily besetting all the knowledge of this present life, and to find in them (in the true sense of a much abused word) "trials of faith," which may at once sober and strengthen it. To be, therefore, always engaged in dealing with the various objections, advanced from time to time from this side or that—many of which, if let alone, are found to destroy one another—tends to obscure the real strength of our position, frittering away the massive solidity of the positive evidence of Religion into a variety of detailed controversies, in which failure is dangerous, while success often yields but a barren and imperfect victory. It is probably better in general to take a less direct cognizance of objections, by observing especially the modifications, which they often introduce into our exhibition of positive truth, whether of doctrine or evidence, and by which they have again and again subverted "the more confirmation of the faith." As with the doctrine, so with the evidence of Religion, the thoughtful exposition,

of what it is, in the right proportion of its various parts, is frequently its best defence.

The second conviction is that the argument of Natural Theology suffers greatly from not being considered as a whole, in the combined force of various convergent lines of thought. Of course, it is only too certain that the attempt to be comprehensive constantly leads to superficiality; possibly it is incompatible, except in a few master-hands, with exhaustive treatment of any single part. But yet I venture to think that it is an attempt which ought to be made, both on theoretical and on practical grounds. Theoretically it alone represents the true position of the argument, as it accords with the complex being of man, and appeals to the soul by the various avenues of thought. Practically it brings out to us the only process of conviction, which can generally establish itself in the minds of those, who are not experts in this or that line of thought, but who desire to exercise the true function of "common sense," by judging of and combining the results which experts lay before the world, each from his own especial field of knowledge. After all, this is the method by which we actually study Nature or Humanity. Must it not have a right application to the higher knowledge of God? If at any time it has not

been sufficiently applied in Natural Theology, it is perhaps because the tremendous issues of the inquiry after God make the mind impatient of anything but immediate intuition, in any direction in which it may chance first to move. Such impatience although theoretically indefensible, is yet sufficiently powerful in practice to need constant warning that it demands the impossible.

The present series of Lectures attempts simply a sketch of the cumulative force of the various lines of Natural Theology. I trust hereafter to dwell on the relation of Revelation to Natural Theology as being "Supernatural not Preternatural;" and to attempt a similar sketch of the cumulative force of the positive Evidences of Christianity as such.

Believing that the principles which I have endeavoured to set forth are true—while I am deeply sensible of the defects of their treatment and of the responsibility attaching to all witness for God—I trust that, by His blessing, they may suggest thoughts, not wholly unfruitful for the purpose for which these Lectures were instituted.

A. B.

KING'S COLLEGE, LONDON,

*August, 1877.*

# LECTURE I.

## THE UNIVERSAL BELIEF IN GOD.

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- I.—THE CLAIM FOR THEOLOGY OF THE CHARACTER OF SCIENCE, NECESSARY FOR THE ULTIMATE INQUIRIES OF HUMAN THOUGHT.
  - II.—THE VARIOUS BRANCHES OF THE ARGUMENT.
  - III.—THE UNIVERSAL BELIEF IN GOD, AS EXEMPLIFIED IN THE RELIGIONS OF THE WORLD.
    - (a) THE PROGRESS THROUGH POLYTHEISM AND DUALISM TO MONOTHEISM.
    - (b) THE SELF-CONDEMNATION OF BUDDHIST NIHILISM.
  - IV.—THE UNIVERSAL BELIEF IN GOD EXEMPLIFIED IN LANGUAGE, AS AT ONCE INSTINCTIVE AND PERMANENT.
  - V.—THE METHOD OF THE GROWTH OF THIS BELIEF IN GOD, SIMILAR TO THE GROWTH OF ALL LAWS OF THOUGHT, INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL.
  - VI.—THE TRUE SENSE OF THE PHRASE NATURAL RELIGION.
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“At the mouth of two witnesses, or at the mouth of three witnesses, shall the matter be established.”—DEUT. xix. 15.

IN all Science there are two kinds of work, corresponding to the capacities of two different kinds of workers. There is, on the one hand,

the work devoted absolutely and exhaustively to one especial branch of science; with a view, first to a complete understanding of its theory, both in principle and in detail, and a complete practical mastery of all its powers; and next, if it may be, to some original research, which shall carry the banner of truth one stage onward in the path of conquest. There is, on the other hand, the work of combination and comparison of the various lines of science, so far as they have been already worked out, pausing thoughtfully to consider how they bear upon each other, either for mutual correction or mutual illustration, and what light they throw on that great problem of Being, which, whatever be the complexity of its parts, is in essence one. These two kinds of work, though practically all but inseparable, are yet perfectly distinct. The history of all science proves, perhaps that there are epochs of alternate predominance of each—epochs (as they have been called) of expansion and of verification—certainly that there are individuals capable of doing good work in one, yet incapable of active service, possibly even of appreciative judgment, in the other. Few, perhaps, are the minds, the leaders of each generation, in which the two powers are harmoniously combined. In that combination they reflect some-

thing of the Divine Mind, which first made all all things, each in its place and order, and then beheld all that He had made, and contemplating it as a whole, pronounced it to be "very good."

I. Now it is certainly as a part of true science, that a Boyle Lecturer is bound to regard theology. The founder of these lectures was, as we know, one of the original members in 1663 of the Royal Society of Literature and Science. He foresaw and rejoiced in the future advance of the science, both of nature and of man, in many directions. He knew, perhaps, the inherent tendency in each branch of scientific thought to usurp regions beyond its rightful empire—"to bear no brother," still more no superior, "near its throne." He desired that the old science of Theology—necessarily, if existent at all, the queen of sciences—should maintain its own proper ground, amidst all the growing claims, and the changeful aspects, of other forms of thought. Well he knew, as his own life shows,<sup>1</sup> at once by the knowledge of its

<sup>1</sup> In his will, referring to the Royal Society, he "wishes them a happy success in their laudable attempts to discover the true nature of the works of God," and prays "that they and all other searchers into physical truth may cordially refer their attainments to the glory of the great Author of Nature and to the comfort of mankind."—See

reality, and by the experience of its temporary loss, that religion is more than theology, that Christianity is not merely a science, but a life.<sup>2</sup> But still, as in his own works, so in the lecture-ships which he founded, he maintained the perpetual vitality of theological science.<sup>3</sup> What he

Birch's "Life of Robert Boyle," prefixed to the quarto edition of his works (London, 1772).

<sup>2</sup> There is a remarkable passage quoted by Maurice in his "First Boyle Lecture" from an autobiography of Boyle, under the name of *Philaretus*, which describes how on a visit to the Grande Chartreuse in his youth, "the devil, taking advantage of that deep raving melancholy befitting so sad a place, his humour, and the strange stories and pictures of Bruno, the father of the Order, suggested such strange and hideous thoughts, and such distracting doubts of some of the fundamentals of Christianity . . . that nothing but the forbiddingness of self-despatch hindered his acting it." The dark hour passed; "at last it pleased God, one day he had received the Sacrament, to restore unto him the withdrawn sense of His favour." But he adds he "derived from this anxiety the advantage of groundedness in religion," from being forced "to be seriously inquisitive of the very fundamentals of Christianity."—See Birch's "Life," p. 23.

<sup>3</sup> Among his works we find in vol. iv. pp. 1—66, a consideration of "the Excellency of Theology as compared with Natural Philosophy, as objects of Man's Study;" in vol. v. pp. 158—255, a "Free Inquiry into the vulgarly-received Notion of Nature" (as a substitute for our recognition of God, or as an intervener between us and Him); and in vol. v. pp. 508—550, "The Christian Virtuoso, showing that by being addicted to Experimental Philosophy a man is rather assisted than indisposed to be a good



called "Sermons," have, by force of propriety, assumed the name and character of Lectures, till at times we almost doubt whether they have a right still to claim their place in Church. He had no idea of relegating Christianity to the realms of feeling and practice. To his mind this would be to do either too little or too much—too little, if Christianity be false—too much, far too much, if it be true.

Surely, simply as a philosopher, he was right. Theology must aspire to the character of a science, if our recognition of God is to have any living power.

By the twofold light of internal consciousness and external observation, man discerns two worlds around him, to both of which in different degrees he belongs—the world material of things to which he is linked in body—the world spiritual of persons, in which he claims a place in virtue of his mind. In the knowledge of both he is not content, till crude instinct and practical familiarity have risen into science.

But yet he cannot possibly rest on the science, however exact, of these two as separate. For he

Christian," with "a Discourse on the distinction which represents certain things as above Reason, but not contrary to Reason."

knows that they are not separate, because practically they act and react on each other. Neither can he refuse to recognise them as distinct; for they resist all efforts, however daring and ingenious, to make them actually one, whether by materializing spirit or by spiritualizing matter. Distinct they are, yet not separate, neither producing, yet each implying, the other. What can this mean?

The conception of some power—call it what you will, Nature, Fate, God—over both, creating, ruling, uniting both, is an absolute necessity of thought. Yet the moment you grasp it, you enter upon the sphere of theology; earliest, no doubt, as modern philosophy declares, of human conceptions, in the “first thoughts” of simple intuition; perhaps put aside, at least from exclusive sway, by the “second thoughts” of metaphysical idea and physical observation; but inevitably recurring, both in theory and in fact, in those “third thoughts” of mature reflection, which, according to an almost invariable law of knowledge, have to correct and enlarge by the aid of the second thoughts the simple intuition of the first.

Take, indeed, what path you will, all science ends, as was long ago truly said, in mystery. Who can fathom the mystery of the ultimate

nature and origin of matter? <sup>4</sup> Who can lay his finger with unerring certainty on the essential characteristics and the genesis of spirit? Who, by searching, can so find out God, as to reduce the infinite within the comprehension of the finite intelligence? Yet in every line of thought, this necessary limitation of science does not prevent it from being, as far as it goes, true in theory and fruitful in result.

It is again true, that as we ascend in the scale of being—from the science of inorganic nature to the science of organic life, the science of humanity, the science of God—at each step we find that science becomes in its results less definite and measurable, and yet more subtle, more profound, nearer the heart of our life. At every step, more truly is human science rightly described, as “the knowing” in part “that which,” in respect of full comprehension, “passeth knowledge.” But yet not without a sense of a law, “setting all things one against another,” we observe that, as science thus becomes

<sup>4</sup> See a remarkable passage on this subject in the Bishop of Carlisle's “Oxford and Cambridge Sermons,” Sermon II. p. 47, and an interesting Appendix on some of the theories on the subject. He says truly that “it is possible to involve one-self in such a puzzle concerning the constitution of matter, as almost to be driven to take refuge in the eccentric supposition, that it does not exist at all.”

more complex, additional powers of ascertaining its first data are afforded to us. To the mere observation, which alone can operate in the physical sphere, is added, in the sphere of humanity, the witness of internal consciousness; and the twofold witness of observation and consciousness, striving upwards to God, is met, as men have always believed, by some distinct revelation of His very self, and (as we Christians believe) by His manifestation in the Person of the Lord Jesus Christ.

I follow, therefore, at once the principle on which these Lectures were founded, and the dictates of all sound reason, in claiming for theology the right to be treated as a science, as real as the science of nature and of man, although doubtless more difficult and mysterious than either; and, moreover, as at once infinitely more important than either to the true life of the soul, and as imperiously demanded by the necessity of harmonizing both. I hold such a claim absolutely necessary to any permanent and universal reality of religion itself. In an individual life, religion may exist as simply an inspiring sentiment and a practical power; even in the Church there may be times when inquiry into first principles seems to sleep. But for the race of man, and the whole life of humanity, a

power which shuns the test of reason, bidding men escape from thought into the cloudland of sentiment or the busy excitement of work, necessarily abdicates all claim to permanent supremacy over man.

II. Treating, therefore, Theology as a science, we may rightly discern in it that twofold division of intellectual labour, at which I have already glanced. It is possible, as many illustrious examples in this very Lectureship have shown, to take up some one line of theology, and so to work it out, as to make such work a landmark in the history of thought. It is possible, on the other hand, without attempting this original work, to survey the various lines of evidential theology, as worked out already, in order to form some conception of their relation to one another—to see whether they really converge to one common point, and whether their testimonies have those marks, at once of independence and coincidence, which have made men acknowledge as an universal rule of testimony, that “in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall be established.” It is to this latter branch of the work, that I propose, if God will, to devote the Lectures of this year. If it be, as probably it is, the humbler branch, yet perhaps it may be pleaded, that it suggests considerations, apt to be some-

what neglected in days of excessive division of intellectual labour. Certainly it may be urged, that, if its conclusion be in any way established, it is one which comes home with remarkable force to the minds of men in general; and therefore may be not unsuitable to a time in which speculation in theological subjects is diffused, in popular form, through the mass of educated and half-educated society.

Now, in the work proposed for these Lectures by their founder,<sup>5</sup> there is a threefold division. First, the truth of religion in general—that is the recognition of a personal God, having communion with man—is to be maintained against Atheism, whether in veiled or unveiled forms. Next, the need of some definite revelation, and of a permanent creed based upon it, is to be maintained against those whom the founder calls “Theists,” but who are popularly and less accurately known as Deists. Lastly, the essential and unique Truth of Christianity is to be maintained against the claims of other established religions of the world. Our opponents in the last two branches of the argument, are our

<sup>5</sup> The founder's will directs that “eight sermons should be preached every year for proving the Christian religion against notorious infidels, to wit, Atheists, Theists, Pagans, Jews, and Mahommedans.”

allies in the first. It is to the first that I would confine your attention now. I would ask you to consider the convergent force of the various lines of what is called Natural Theology, as bearing upon the truth which Deists, Pagans, Jews, Mohammedans hold in common with Christians with various degrees of fervour and certainty. The truth so sublimely embodied in the words, "Hear, O man, the Lord our God is One Lord," is no unfruitful faith. In proportion to the certainty with which it is held, will the inference be drawn, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and all thy mind, with all thy soul, and with all thy strength." Whatever other gulfs of division may sunder men from one another, there is none comparable to the fundamental opposition between the life where God is, and the life where He is not.

III. Now in regard to this fundamental principle, I would ask you to note that the foundation of these Lectures, while it directs the preacher to aim at "proving the Christian religion," evidently imposes on him the task, not of establishing its truth *de novo*, but of defending it against "any objections and difficulties which may be started."

In the true meaning of this direction, I trace the recognition of a great fact, of which the reality, indeed, cannot be doubted,

but the whole force may be, and often is overlooked—the fact that the belief in God is universally (if I may so express it) in possession of the ground of human thought. It is on the Atheist or Pantheist, rather than upon the Theist, that the *onus probandi* rests. He must account for the existence of this belief, which is undoubtedly as instinctive and wide-spread, and as apparently ineradicable, as the recognition of the existence of right and wrong, or as the consciousness of the freedom of human will. He will, indeed, and on his own premisses he reasonably may, deny the conclusiveness of the old axiom, that in man “nothing can be frustrate,”—that to every belief there must correspond an objective reality, and to every spiritual craving a satisfaction. For that axiom implies in the universe the design, the wisdom, the goodness of a Personal God.<sup>6</sup> But (I repeat) he has the judgment of mankind against him. Either he must leave men at peace in possession of this universal and natural belief, or he must show cause for expelling it from the throne in the realm of thought, which it has occupied from the beginning. How comes it there? It certainly is no answer to refer

<sup>6</sup> See Hooker, book i. chap. xi. 4. See Aristotle de Cœlo, ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἡ φύσις οὐδὲν μάτην ποιοῦσι.



its existence to an "inveterate tendency to personification." For the question immediately follows, "Whence came that inveterate tendency?" "An inveterate tendency" is another name for a natural law of thought. If the existence of such a law is not a *prima facie* argument of a corresponding truth, then all reasoning is at an end.

I am, indeed, not unaware that the fact itself has been questioned. No man can deny the existence of various forms of religion, covering the whole area of humanity both in space and time; but, just as in morality it is argued that the actual variations in the conceptions of what is right and what is wrong, discredit the belief in a power to recognise right and wrong in the abstract, so it is maintained in religion that the various forms of the idea of God are so many, so startling, so mutually antagonistic, that they may be held to destroy each other. I cannot think that, in either morality or religion, this view can possibly stand the light of investigation and serious thought.

Glance at the religions of the world, from the lowest Fetichism to the highest and purest Monotheism; you find this one element common to all—the belief in a personal power, a mind and a will, governing the world of things and

of men. Even if what we call the powers of nature be worshipped, the light, the heaven, the earth—the *Δῖος αἰθὴρ, Παμμήτωρ τε Γῆ*,—they are invariably personified; and be it observed that this personification rapidly passes through so many forms, that at last the conception of personality alone remains, and the original connexion is lost. As man becomes conscious of the inherent superiority of spirit in himself to the grandest forces of material nature, the recognition of a Divine personality increases in its definiteness, although it may clothe itself in attributes belonging to imperfect humanity.<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> This is surely obvious enough in the interesting researches into "Comparative Mythology" made of late years. See, for example, Max Müller's "Chips from a German Workshop," vol. ii. pp. 1—144. Thus the myths of ancient Greece are obviously traced to an origin in the personification of Physical Powers and metaphorical descriptions of Physical Phenomena. But in their development there is an equally obvious admixture of a true human element. The legend of the labours of Hercules may have as its germ the mythical description of the passage of the sun through the signs of the zodiac. But who, reading it in the full beauty of its development, can fail to see that it has become a spiritual history of the heroic soul, conquering nature, conquering self, and at last made perfect by death? To resolve all this, and other noble legends, into "sun-myths" seems almost an outrage on common sense. We might as well suppose the Zeus of Homer to be merely the sky, because the epithet *νεφέληγερέτα* refers to an older

As he comes to see that the supreme ruling power is something greater than physical force and humanity, he speaks of it, it may be, under vaguer and more mysterious names. But everywhere he personifies still. He may call it Nature, Law, a "Something not ourselves," but he speaks of it, he thinks of it, as an agent. According to the suggestive satire of the old Greek dramatist, he may dethrone Zeus, but the "vortex" of unknown law and force which he holds to be primeval, he turns, consciously or unconsciously, into a personal God.<sup>8</sup>

All the various corruptions of the religious idea fail utterly to destroy this fundamental element, this conception of a Personal Ruler. The faith, which the Epistle to the Hebrews describes, seems as instinctive as reason, conscience, affection themselves.<sup>9</sup> Man "endures personification of the Heaven. Personification has passed into Personality.

<sup>8</sup> Aristophanes, "The Clouds," 1454, *Δῖνος βασιλεύει τὸν Δῖ' ἐξεληλακώς*.

<sup>9</sup> It is remarkable that the definitions of Faith given (in Heb. xi. 1), *ἐλπίζομένων ὑπόστασις, πραγμάτων ἐλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων* (which perhaps in modern language is best described as the "realization of the Invisible"), is in itself applicable to the action of all the human faculties in the discovery of Truth, whether speculative, moral, or æsthetic. It is the peculiarly human attribute, essentially distinguishing us from the highest brute instinct, and lying on the threshold of all true science. It is only in v. 27

as seeing," though it may be through mists of doubt and distorting mirage of superstition, "Him who is invisible." The belief, moreover, that the Supreme Will, thus universally recognised, is guided by the wisdom and righteousness and love, which are the highest attributes of a spiritual nature, is equally universal, although it may be liable to greater obscuration and perversion. In the earlier and ruder stages of thought, that Will may be supposed to make the production of obedience and worship the one thing needful, and accordingly to hold prayer and sacrifice higher than purity and truth, or to supersede by personal favour towards individuals the universal dictates of righteousness. This idea belongs to the stage of thought, immature but surely not unnatural, which, as in childhood, finds its only virtue in the submission to wisdom and power greater than our own. Occasionally, again, men may, in their sense of confusion and contradiction in the world, actually attribute to the Supreme Power (or at least to supernatural powers) the faults, the blindness, the partiality, of which they are conscious in themselves. But these defects

where the action of faith is described as *ὁρᾶν*, not *τὸ δόρατον*, but *τὸν δόρατον*, that the differentia of Faith in its reference to a Personal object is introduced.

gradually clear up, especially as we advance towards Monotheism. The supreme personal will, in the creation of things, is recognised as acting by design; and in the government of men is acknowledged as guided by moral principles. When once progress is made in this direction, there are no steps backward. The truer and grander conception destroys all others. However imperfectly, the mind of man acknowledges a God, not only of power, but of wisdom and goodness.

But yet, if even the belief in a Personal will be accepted, the passage to Monotheism—explicit or implicit—seems but a question of time.

(a) Polytheism—the belief in many gods—is but a brief halting-place in thought. Begotten of the sense of multiplicity of power, it vanishes before the discovery of a unity underlying it. Examine what system of polytheism you will, Greek, Latin, Teutonic, you always come to one God,—it may be a Primal God, from whom all others proceed; it may be a Supreme God, to whom all others bow. The “gods many and lords many,” so long as they are thought of as divine, are only superhuman created beings. The Christian, who believes that there are such beings, and who sees no reason why the teach-

ing of the Old Testament, which attributes to them ministerial functions even in the physical sphere, should be mere metaphor,<sup>1</sup> will not fail to see in the errors of a real polytheism a substratum of distorted truth. But in that curious form of polytheism, to which the name of "Henotheism" or "Cathenotheism" has been given (itself probably a phase of transition towards the commoner forms), in which each deity is, in turn, represented as independent of the rest, as the only deity present to the mind of the worshipper at the time of his prayer (as in the religion of the Vedic poetry of India),<sup>2</sup> we see still more clearly that we have

<sup>1</sup> I refer not to poetical passages, but to such passages as Exod. xii. 23; 2 Sam. xxiv. 16; 2 Kings xix. 35. Round the simple idea has been woven a strange fantastic fabric of speculation and legend. But the idea itself is surely not *à priori* improbable; it is only the carrying out, in a higher degree, and in ways to us inconceivable, what we know of God's use of human agency in the realm of Nature; it is, at least, not inconsistent with those appearances of conflict and isolated imperfections, overruled to a general purpose, which Science believes itself to trace in the physical sphere.

<sup>2</sup> See Max Müller's "Chips from a German Workshop," vol. i. p. 27. In his Lecture on the Vedas the author shows that "Agni" (the fire), "Indra" (the day), "Varuna" (the sky), are alternately exalted as the Supreme Deity. "All the rest disappear for the moment . . . and He only stands in full light before the eyes of the worshipper." He adds, "The consciousness that all the

but πολλῶν ὀνομάτων μορφὴν μία ("One Person many-named"). There is but one Godhead. It only manifests each of its attributes successively under the name of a new god.

There may be a longer halt in Dualism in its various forms, that is, in the conception of two powers—it may be of spirit and matter—it may be (in a moral sense) of good and evil—making this world their battle-field, which springs out of the painful consciousness of the mystery of evil in the world. But examine again more closely, and we shall find not only that the God of Light is the true God, to whom the god of darkness is already inferior, and by whom he is destined to be overcome; but also that behind these two rival deities there rises in dim and shadowy majesty the vision of a yet older Being from whom both spring.<sup>3</sup>

deities are but different names of one and the same Godhead breaks forth here and there in the Vedas." See also the same author's "Lectures on the Science of Religion," Lect. ii. p. 141.

<sup>3</sup> See Hardwick's "Christ and other Masters," part iv. chap. iii. "Faint glimmerings of one only God—inert, indeed, if not impersonal, but still the primal cause of all things—are discernible here and there in the remains of Medo-Persian heathenism; and certainly such a dogma . . . is often traceable in the literature of the later Parsees." "The reign of the good principle, though subsequent in time, was represented as far mightier and more lasting than the reign of evil. Ahriman, the child of doubt, shall be hereafter superseded." In other words, the ancient

This solution of the mystery of the universe is therefore merely temporary and tentative. If it has recently been offered us, as a theory of modern thought, it is simply in despair of any successful search after a true and ultimate solution.<sup>4</sup>

Both these imperfect forms of thought give way. Monotheism prevails by the principle of the "survival of the fittest." First (as I believe), and original in an instinctive form, it emerges again full-grown, after the trial and failure of all these superstitions, which stop half-way between earth and heaven. At this moment, avowedly in Christianity, Judaism, and the Mohammedanism, which is but a wild offshoot from them, it prevails over full half the world, and over all the leading races of mankind; covertly it underlies the systems in which the worship of many gods still seems to prevail.

Persian could discern beneath the manifold contradictions of the actual world an aboriginal unity, could hear amid them all the promise of some blessed restoration.

<sup>4</sup> I allude, of course, to the speculations of Mr. Stuart Mill. In his "Autobiography" he mentions the common Dualistic hypothesis, as having commended itself to his father, but apparently also as meeting some sympathy from himself. In his "Essays on Theism" he inclines to the softened Dualism (known in the ancient Gnostic theories) of a supposed Creator (a "Demiurgus" in the old phraseology) limited in power by some external conditions, "laws" of matter or being.



(b) But one strange exception to this universal human belief presents itself in the Buddhism which has been called "the Religion of Despair," which (to quote the words of a chief authority on the subject)<sup>5</sup> "has no god; has not even the confused and vague notion of an universal Spirit in which the human soul may be absorbed. Nor does it admit Nature in the proper sense of the word. It cannot unite the human soul, which it does not even mention, with a God whom it ignores, nor with a Nature which it knows no better." Nothing certainly can be more completely negative than the Buddhist theory. There is hardly a point in modern Nihilism or Agnosticism, which is not anticipated in its dreary denial of the Being of God and of the true personality of man, in its recognition of continued flux and decay as the law of all being, of sorrow as the law of all conscious existence, and in its prospect of annihilation as the one supreme happiness of man. It is this utterly negative character, which prevents it from being a religion capable of uniting itself with mental activity, with nobleness of enterprise, with progress of humanity. It broods like a cloud over the stagnant and unprogressive civilization of Central

<sup>5</sup> Barthelémy St. Hilaire, quoted by Max Müller, "Chips from a German Workshop," vol. i.

Asia; in its own special home in Ceylon it awaits with folded hands the foreseen triumph of Christianity; it is the only religion which foretells its own absolute extinction in the hereafter.<sup>6</sup>

But, as a practical religion, it is not a little instructive to observe how piteously it struggles to escape from the dreary prison-house of negations into some forms of positive belief. I will not speak of the significant fact, that, side by side with the Buddhist temples, ignored and yet tolerated by their priests, there are shrines in which lower deities are worshipped, as at least having some real power over human life, with a half-hesitating worship.<sup>7</sup> But what shall we say

<sup>6</sup> The religion of Buddha (so he himself prophesied) is to vanish utterly in itself and in its effects through five stages of declension in 5000 years. See Spence Hardy's "Eastern Monachism," chap. xxv. He adds, "Not long ago the high priest of the Buddhists in Ceylon wrote to the monarch of Siam . . . that, unless he came forward liberally to support the cause of their common religion, it would soon be banished from the island by the efforts of Europeans to impress their own systems on the minds of the people." St. Hilaire says, "We are far from predicting for the Buddhism of Ceylon a speedy fall, or even a rapid decay: it is, however, certain that Christianity makes perpetually considerable conquests. The Buddhist priesthood does not seem to prepare for a regenerating struggle, nor to rekindle its zeal in the face of a formidable danger."—"Le Bouddha et sa Religion," part iii. chap. ii.

<sup>7</sup> See Spence Hardy's "Manual of Buddhism," chap. ii. sect. 3.

of the still more striking fact, that Buddha himself—as the incarnation of wisdom and righteousness and love in a Son of Man, on whom are accumulated attributes all but Divine—is practically made a god by the thousands who crowd his temples, and in the presence of his gigantic image pour out to “his memory” the homage of their offerings? “He who had left no place in the whole universe for a Divine Being was deified himself by the multitudes, who wanted a person whom they could worship, a king whom they might invoke, a friend before whom they could pour out their griefs.”<sup>8</sup> How singularly instructive it is, that, where no prayer may rise to God, the people prostrate themselves or bow before the image of Buddha, and declare that “they take refuge in Buddha, in the Law or Word, and in the Priesthood”—a refuge from “the fear of successive existences, from terrors of mind, from pains of body, and from the misery of the four hells!” How painfully significant of the reaction from atheism into superstition is the relic-worship of the tooth of Buddha, the remains

<sup>8</sup> Max Müller's “Chips from a German Workshop,” vol. i. p. 254.

<sup>9</sup> On all this subject see Spence Hardy's “*Eastern Monachism*,” chap. xix. There is a curious description of the Festival of the exhibition of the Tooth of Buddha in the Appendix to St. Hilaire's “*Le Bouddha et sa Religion*.”

of his body from the pyre, the very things that he used, and the impressions of his foot!

Nor is this wonderful; for in Buddha they see the very impersonation of that singularly lofty though ascetic morality, and that "enlightenment," penetrating into the secrets of the universe, which alone they leave existent amidst the wreck of all other beliefs. Strange, yet instructive, is the inconsistency in which they hold him to be non-existent, and yet put their trust in him. And even as to the Nirwana itself—whether the extinction which it expresses be the extinction of desire, or the extinction of conscious life—it would seem that, "except to a few hardened philosophers or ecstatic dreamers," it really wears the form of a half-seen paradise, all the sweeter because of the infinite gloom of their conception of this life. In it men hope still to be—

"From the burden of the flesh, from care and toil released,  
Where the wicked cease from troubling, the weary are at rest."

Even here, therefore, in the very home of what seems a formal atheism, we have the same witness of the soul of man to a Personal Power—something different from either a mere law and an universal all-pervading Spirit. Although with stammering lips and faltering tongue, we call

even Buddhism to join the great cloud of witnesses by whose direct testimony the belief in God is established.<sup>1</sup>

IV. Yet I cannot but add to this direct witness another form of universal testimony, striking from its very indirectness. I mean the testimony of human language. Take whatever language you will—provided that it has emerged from a mere rudimentary barbarism. Try to describe in it the system of the universe, and to refer to the Power, whatever it is, which is Primeval and Supreme, under which things exist, and men act and think. You will find it impossible to go through a dozen sentences without using terms which imply a personal power, ruling by mind, with purpose, and deliberate will.<sup>2</sup> When men, speaking of physical things, dwell on the powers, the laws, the processes of nature—whether in the most rigid scientific

<sup>1</sup> See Note at the end of the Lecture.

<sup>2</sup> The Duke of Argyll, in a Lecture on "Anthropomorphism in Theology," says with perfect truth, "There is the phraseology of those who, without any thought either of theological dogma or philosophical speculation, are, above all things, observers, and who describe the facts they see in whatever language appears most fully and most adequately to describe them. The language of such men is what Mr. Darwin's language almost always is—eminently teleological and anthropomorphic."—"Problems of Faith," p. 41 (Hodder and Stoughton, 1875).

terms, or in the rhapsodical fervour which supplies the place of religious enthusiasm—they must use phrases again and again, which either mean nothing at all, or mean in nature a God, veiled, imperfect, perhaps capricious, but a person still. When, especially in relation to the higher world of persons, they talk of the power of “Law,” how remarkable it is that this term of law—unhappily more ambiguously and vaguely used than any other—they have been forced to borrow from the political sphere, in which it means the declaration of a personal will, conceived in real thought, backed by a real efficient force. But for the personal associations which cling to it, it could never satisfy men for a moment, as an account either of the origin or the reason of things.<sup>3</sup> These facts, as facts, must be familiar to every one of us. They belong not to one age, or one language, but to all. They are the expression of that “Vox Populi,” which is, after all, the ultimate appeal in the simple decision of

<sup>3</sup> A “law,” in the sense in which the term is used in physics, is simply a formal statement of a regularly recurring fact or series of facts. Hence it describes modes of action, and refers actions to particular classes, but of the cause of action it tells nothing. Yet from the associations clinging to the word, the statement that physical phenomena are due to a law is constantly mistaken for an adequate statement of their cause.

the "Yes" or "No" on all great questions of human life. But surely it is impossible to overrate their significance, as implying that the conception of a personal God is an inherent law of all human thought. The wisest judges of evidence tell us, that the witness which most impresses the mind is the accidental, almost unconscious witness, which comes from many sides, and always speaks out of the abundance of the heart. It is just this kind of witness which we trace in human language on this great question.

There can be nothing new to any of us in this reference to the universal testimony of language to a God. But I cannot help thinking that we take it too much as a matter of course, and do not discern its full reality and significance. It is not only universal, but it is permanent. By its universality, it implies the existence of what is called a religious instinct. But this is not all. It is permanent. It belongs to language, not in its first rudimentary stage only, but in its progress towards perfection of expression, corresponding to growth in subtlety of thought. If men try to get rid of it in describing the conclusions of advanced science, they are reduced to a cumbrousness of expression all but intolerable; and even then the most carefully constructed lines of abstract expression fail to

keep out the irrepressible conceptions of Personality. This permanence, hardly to be questioned as a matter of fact, has its own meaning. It shows that this religious instinct, if in form it is modified, yet in essence stands unshaken before the awakening of thought; and, as the mind of man goes out along the various lines of thought, it goes ever with him, growing by degrees from a mere instinct into a rational principle, systematizing its conclusions, and harmonizing them with other forms of thought.

V. This universal testimony of mankind in both its main lines—the direct witness of the Religions, the indirect witness of the languages of the World—follows one and the same course. It begins with simple rudimentary conceptions; it gradually works them out into complete systems of thought, passing on the way through conflicting forms, of which the deepest and truest at last survives.

It is the neglect of this distinction between the first instinctive thoughts, and the “third thoughts” of full rational conception (so forcibly insisted on by Coleridge) which is the essential fallacy of the Comtist tabulation of those three different theoretical conditions, through which it supposes the human mind to pass in every branch of knowledge—the Theolo-



gical, the Metaphysical, and the (so called) Scientific or Positive. Surely it is obvious that these conditions are in no sense antagonistic to or exclusive of one another. The theological conception—that is the belief in God—with which we are concerned, may probably, in the first instance, present itself to the mind, as the sole necessary account, not only of the “Why,” but of the “How.” The analogy (that is) of our own individual action may be so rigidly pressed, as to lead to the idea of a direct and independent action of the Deity in every event, or on every individual being. So far it is imperfect, and needs the correction which it speedily receives. But the discovery of “Laws,” (that is) general methods of action, or of “Principles,” (that is) Attributes of a Supreme Mind, capable of being in part understood and reflected by man, as determining the Government of the World, in no sense interferes with the conception of a God, as the ultimate Cause of all things, of whose Will we have the expression in the Laws, alike of physical agency and of human life. On the contrary, this conception alone gives anything like completeness to the Metaphysical investigation. So, again, with regard to the “Positive” investigation, tabulation, and classification of facts, it is clear that it may dispel many crude,

metaphysical or theological conceptions; it may suggest caution, reticence, modesty, in all speculation of either type. Such has, indeed, been the result in all directions of the accumulation of the treasures of inductive science. But to attribute to it the power finally to supersede either is to contradict the very laws of human thought. In the name of true science, as well as true religion, the mind stubbornly rejects the attempt of the "Positive Philosophy" to impose on it the duty of "giving over the vain search after Absolute notions, the origin and destination of the Universe, and the causes of Phenomena."<sup>4</sup> There is a truer philosophy after all in the old description of the prerogative of human reason, as contrasted with brute instinct, that "*consequencia cernit, causas rerum videt . . . rebus præsentiis adjungit atque adnectit futuras.*"<sup>5</sup> The attempt to stifle the exercise of that prerogative must be vain, even when the soul contemplates only the universe. But it is still more vain, when the soul, becoming conscious of itself, asks the questions, "What am I?" "Whence came I?" "Whither am I going?" All experience shows, sometimes in grotesque or pathetic

<sup>4</sup> Comte, "Positive Philosophy" (translation by Harriet Martineau), chap. i.

<sup>5</sup> Cic. de Officiis, i. 4.

forms of extravagance, that if the soul cannot find God (or rather, as a Christian would say, "be found of God"), it will have some substitute for Him, to which it may pay the homage, not only of intellectual recognition, but of devotional *Cultus*.

Now this process of development from instinctive conceptions, through the corrections of observation and generalization, to ultimate rational principles, which we here attribute to religious faith, is certainly the process discernible in the growth of the great laws of all human thought, whether in the intellectual or moral sphere.

Consider the actual process of knowledge in relation to its two spheres—the *Ego* and the *Non Ego*—the little world within and the great world without.

The consciousness of Self—of a personal identity, of a will, of a reason, of a power of desire and action—is absolutely instinctive in the youngest child, or in the merest savage. Yet to "know self" clearly and definitely, was long ago declared to be the highest wisdom. All education, by teaching from without or by thought from within, is on one side, simply the drawing out into conscious energy the faculties, which lie (so to speak) in embryo in the first instinctive knowledge.

The recognition of the *Non Ego*—whether of the world of things or the world of persons around us—is, again, absolutely instinctive. Every student of philosophy has learnt that, since we know of that world simply by its impressions upon our consciousness, it is easy to contend that we have no certainty, except of the existence of those impressions, and that there may be no objective reality corresponding to them. But all such speculations are simply the playthings of philosophic subtlety. There is an instinctive assumption of the reality of the external world. It becomes a “form of thought” under which we begin to observe, to think, to feel towards that outer world, till out of this instinctive recognition grows up the whole fabric of scientific knowledge, physical and metaphysical. All education on this side is simply the thoughtful understanding of the various things and beings around us, in their true relations to us and to one another.

Nor is this otherwise in the moral sense, so far as it deals only with earth. The love of self and the love of our neighbour are its two great laws. Do we not see them both beginning in instinct, and both growing into settled and rational principles?

The love of self begins in the instinct of self-

preservation and self-gratification, and the delight in the exercise of activity and power. It ends in the deliberate recognition of self as a factor in God's universe, in the resolution accordingly to assert our own freedom, take up our own work, defend our own rights, and to seek, in this world and in the next, that individual perfection which is happiness. So developed it is, in spite of its intellectual and moral perversions, a fundamental law of humanity. No theory of life can ignore it, or depreciate it below its right level.

The love of our neighbour—or, to speak more fully, the “being true in love” towards men—is again (thank God!) absolutely instinctive, in the thrill of natural affection, and in the natural shame which crimsones the cheek in consciousness of falsehood or dishonesty. But out of that instinct it grows into the conception of a real spiritual unity, binding men together in various degrees of nearness, making it literally true that “if one member suffer all suffer with it,” bringing out (as Butler showed long ago, in his “Sermons on Human Nature,”) duty and social affection as inherent laws of humanity, coexisting with and dominating the love of self.

So it is that the great laws of human life assert themselves. All men feel the instinct, unless their nature be intellectually or morally

disorganized. In different degrees, seldom perhaps in any high and perfect degree, do they grasp the principle. But on that knowledge, half-instinctive, half-rational, they act, till the principle works itself practically into the very texture of their life.

It seems to me deeply significant to note here the exact analogy of the growth of the higher knowledge and love of God, as we gather it from this universal testimony of man. It shows it as an universal instinct in the minds of all men. It shows it worked out by the intellect, conscience, imagination, affections, till it systematizes itself in the religions of the world.

Nor does the analogy stop here. This process of development is not carried out by each mind for itself, nor does it run its full course in the mass of human minds. Men sometimes speak, scornfully or apologetically, of the fact that religion is in the great majority of men a sentiment, a practice, a doctrine received by tradition from the past, and learnt in each generation from the teaching of the few. We answer that we should be surprised if it were otherwise; and we should conclude, if it claimed a different character, that it was not a power destined to influence the mass of men and rule the destinies of the world. For we observe precisely the same fact in the other

great laws of humanity. As there are few men of science, few moral or metaphysical philosophers, in whom the development of the intellectual and moral powers is worked out systematically, so there are but few who can be original thinkers or profound students in theology. To the many religion is half-instinctive, half-thoughtful. It is known by its practical power to do the work, to meet the needs, to solve (so far as they are soluble) the mysteries of this world. That knowledge is enough to save the soul and to regenerate the life. It is the kind of knowledge which always rules humanity. Yet the more we ponder it, the further we can advance in it, and find, till time shall be no more, new "depths in the wisdom and the knowledge of God."

VI. There is then a truth in the old phrase, "Natural Religion." We Christians must hold it an erroneous phrase, if it opposes itself to Revealed Religion, as though Revelation from God were not a part of His dispensation to our race. We see, in fact, that what men generally call "Natural Religion," is mostly the diffused refraction of some Revealed Truth. All students of humanity must hold it a delusive phrase, when it leads men (as it led men of old) to attempt to draw out a formal creed of its

principles, disentangled from all connexion with the actual religions of the world. You may as well try to exhibit an ideal man, with no peculiarities of any existing race. But as what jurists called the Law of Nature was the common substance embodied in, and therefore underlying, the systems of various nations,<sup>6</sup> so there is a meaning in this phrase of "Natural Religion." It tells us that the main idea of religion—the relation of the human spirit to a personal God—is so deeply and widely natural, that without it you cannot satisfy the needs nor understand the history of man. It tells us, in the language of St. Paul on Mars' Hill, that, even in ignorant worship, men are simply obeying an irresistible law, which bids us "feel after and find" in conscious thought "Him who is" in fact "not far from any one of us," and "in whom," whether we know it or not, "we live and move and have our being."

How that instinct is worked out, modified, yet never destroyed, by the consideration of va-

<sup>6</sup> See Maine's "Ancient Law," chap. iii. "The *Jus Naturale*, or Law of Nature, is simply the *Jus Gentium*, or Law of Nations seen in the light of a peculiar theory." . . . "After Nature became a household word in the mouths of the Romans, the belief gradually prevailed among the Roman lawyers that the old *Jus Gentium* was in fact the last Code of Nature."



rious distinct lines of thought, we shall strive to see hereafter. Meanwhile I ask you to ponder thoroughly the significance of the fact itself. When the contriver of some material system of force or machinery can be sure that he has the forces of Physical Nature with him, he laughs all material obstacles and all objections of theory to scorn. When a statesman can say, "The law of human nature is on my side, and time itself will fight for me," he is little dismayed by opposition, however well organized and strong. If we, in declaring God as revealed in Jesus Christ, know that the belief in God is an inherent tendency in man's spiritual nature, we shall go on, troubled perhaps, but never cast down, by speculative difficulties of understanding, by moral perplexities of practice, even by the errors and imperfections in the preaching and life of Christianity itself. What we have to declare, we confess "passeth human knowledge" to discover, and "passeth knowledge" perfectly to comprehend. But we believe that, in true though in imperfect measure, men can know it, must know it, will know it; and so knowing, "be filled" up to the capacity of their finite nature, "with all the fulness of God."

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## NOTE (see p. 24).

Buddhism must be regarded as being a twofold protest, first, against the monstrosity and oppressiveness of the Brahminical system, in its wild mythology, its elaborate sacrifices, and its grotesque superstition; and next, against the artificial tyranny of caste, in reference alike to God and to man. Hence its negative and destructive character as a system of thought; hence the achievements, which (to use Max Müller's words) gave vitality to the preaching of Buddha—"the simplicity of the ceremonial, which he taught; the equality of all men, which he declared; the religious toleration, which he preached." As a solvent of the system, against which it desired to protest, it employed the terrible conception of an all but absolute Nihilism, in which the being of God, the individuality of the soul, the existence even in Nature of anything except a perpetual succession of phenomena, are all either denied or ignored. That solvent did its tremendous work; but, when the ground was cleared, the Buddhist philosophy could not fill the void, and yet that void proved intolerable to human creatures.

Accordingly, while in terms denying all personality and immortality of the soul, it admits, apparently from older religions, the idea of a Transmigration, in which, by a strange inconsistency, continuity of individual being appears to be denied (the soul at each birth being supposed to be a new soul), and yet the characteristics of each phase of existence are determined under the law of *Kharma* (or merit)—a sort of moral fate—by the conduct of the soul in the previous stage. Through these various stages the soul passes to Nirwana, which assumes the aspect of a rest after "life's fitful fever," so often recurrent in various phases. By this conception, rather of the nature of an excrescence on the system, it creates certain refuges, imperfect enough in theory, but probably powerful in prac-

tice, against its theoretical negation of continuous personality and responsibility in the soul.

Similarly its denial of God, still theoretically maintained, and sufficiently real to destroy vitality and progress in its system, is (as is described in the text) softened by the admission of lower forms of worship, producing in the minds of the people a virtual polytheism. Buddhism accordingly wears a very different aspect in the eyes of those who know it simply by study, and of those who judge of it by actual experience.

In Ceylon, where perhaps Buddhism exists in its purest form with least foreign admixture, the Buddhist temples themselves are crowded with votaries, whose offerings are made to the "memory of Buddha," with invocation of his protection, in the striking presence of the gigantic image representing him usually at rest; while at the same time there are other temples, ignored but tolerated by the Buddhist priests, in which the *Dévas* (subordinate deities, or rather *δαίμονες* in the old sense, having superhuman, but not truly divine attributes) are worshipped in almost every village in the Cingalese provinces of Ceylon. Mr. Spence Hardy in his "Manual of Buddhism" intimates an opinion that the whole Déwa system is an excrescence, borrowed from without, and certainly it fits but clumsily into the theory of Buddhism. But in any case we seem to trace here two different reactions against the nihilism of Buddhist theory. There is on the one hand a quasi worship of the historical Buddha, who is (not without grounds in the actual facts of his life and character) considered as their highest known type of intellectual and moral excellence, although undoubtedly of a sad, ascetic, all but despairing morality. His devotees exalt him virtually above all other beings; he is represented as so absolutely perfect as to have neither desire nor capacity of progress; and, accordingly, attributes of power and wisdom are heaped upon him, which are far too high for humanity to bear. There is, on the other hand, under the shadow of this tran-

scendental reverence, a comparatively vulgar and tangible worship of the Déwas, especially of the four great guardian Déwas, which glides practically into a kind of tolerated Polytheism. Moreover, under both aspects there exists in great privilege and power a priesthood, although in true Buddhism there ought to be neither priesthood nor sacrifice. To it is supposed to be confined the knowledge of the true secrets of life, and to it therefore is paid an almost unlimited deference.

In the Lamaism of Thibet—perhaps a less pure variety of Buddhism—the worship of the Bhuddha passes from reverence for a historical memory into a devotion to a living deity, transmigrating through a succession of human beings. “When the Talé Lama (the Grand Lama) dies, or, to speak Buddhist language, when he undergoes transmigration, they choose a child who is to continue the indestructible impersonation of the living Buddha.” “He is not only the political and religious sovereign of the Thibetians, but he is their visible god.”—(Huc, “Voyage dans le Thibet,” vol. ii., c. 6, p. 275, ed. 1850.) The election of the Talé Lama from among the *Chabérons*, or living Buddhas, through the drawing of a lot after six days of fasting and prayer by the chief of the Lamas, is described in the seventh chapter. The child thus chosen is worshipped as a present deity.

It is clear that in the Nihilism of the Buddhist theory man cannot live. Under the shadow which it casts there grows up a worship of humanity, although that humanity is declared to be cursed in the very fact of living; an idolatry of the enlightened, and especially of the great teacher of Nihilism; and a crowd of superstitions, seizing gladly on manifestations of supernatural power in the visible universe. M. St. Hilaire enlarges on the light thrown on modern nihilistic philosophies by Buddhism itself. It would not be difficult to apply to modern society, so far as it is influenced by such philosophies, the lessons drawn from these reactions against it.

## LECTURE II.

# THE METHOD OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

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I.—NATURAL THEOLOGY AN INDUCTIVE SCIENCE.

II.—THE KNOWLEDGE OF THINGS BY INDUCTION.

III.—THE KNOWLEDGE OF PERSONS—

(a) BY INDUCTION.

(b) BY SYMPATHY.

(c) BY FAITH.

IV.—THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD.

(a) BY INDUCTION, ASCENDING TO THE DIVINE MIND.

(b) BY KNOWLEDGE OF THAT MIND, THROUGH SYMPATHY,  
THE NECESSITY, AND DANGERS OF ANTHROPOMOR-  
PHISM.

(c) BY REVELATION, GENERAL AND SPECIAL.

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“That they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him, and find Him, though He be not far from every one of us.”—Acts xvii. 27.

It is one of the necessities, possibly one of the compensating advantages, of the system of the delivery at intervals of the steps of a connected argument, that each week the lecturer is driven

to present clearly, before his own mind, and the mind of his hearers, a short retrospect of the way already trodden. I accordingly remind you how in the last Lecture, after advancing for Theology the claim to be considered as a system of really scientific thought, I endeavoured to set before you the immense significance of the undoubted historical fact, that the belief in a Personal God is universally in almost complete possession of the ground of human thought, being witnessed to, directly by the Religions, indirectly by the Languages, of all nations. I reminded you that the method of its growth, from instinct through practice into systematic knowledge, placed it in the strictest analogy with the cognizance of those great laws of Truth and Right, which actually rule mankind. I pleaded for the truth implied in the right use of the old phrase "Natural Religion," that the conception of God is as really inherent in the nature of man, as those fundamental conceptions of Truth and Right, on which the whole fabrics of Science and Morality are built.

I. Now when we have thoroughly satisfied ourselves historically of the universal establishment of a belief in God, and drawn the all but irresistible inference that its existence implies some natural law in human thought, the question next

presents itself, "How, and by what law has it so established itself?" St. Paul, in the words of the text, speaking to the enlightened heathenism of Athens, declares (though under a characteristic difference of aspect) the same truth which he had proclaimed to the peasants of Lystra, that "God left not Himself without a witness." But of what character is this universal witness? The word "knowledge" is used in different senses; and, from want of right distinction between them, impossibility is often predicated of knowledge in general, when it ought to be predicated only of one particular kind of knowledge. Of what nature is the knowledge of God, thus attainable, and thus in various degrees attained, by man? Is it, on the one hand, a knowledge of demonstration, like the knowledge of a mathematical axiom? Is it, on the other, knowledge claiming what we call "moral certainty," like the knowledge which is gained by all Inductive Science?

Let me remind you that, although this question is of deep interest, yet the answer to it does not affect the claim of this knowledge to be a power at once ruling human thought, and inspiring human life. The controversies which have taken place on this subject, from the days of Clarke and Butler downwards, may be decided one way or the other, without affecting this

claim. If demonstrative certainty be the more unquestionable, yet it is moral certainty, which prevails far more widely in life as it actually is, and exercises a larger practical power over human action. It has been rightly described as "the guide of life."

The very title of these lectures virtually contains the answer which I venture to give to this question. For it speaks of the cumulative force of convergent evidences: and the very expression belongs to the field of Inductive Science; since no one ever seeks to accumulate evidence in support of an absolute mathematical demonstration. I cannot but hold that Natural Theology must be an Inductive Science from the very nature of the case.

If, indeed, the question were simply that which has been discussed again and again—whether the conception of the existence of a First Cause is, or is not, a necessary conception—we might answer otherwise. It is certain that the present condition of the universe has had a beginning in time; and that there must have been some First Cause, itself uncaused, seems to be demonstrable. So far as this we may go with those who would *à priori* demonstrate a God. If, again, it be urged that the existence in the human mind of the idea of Infinity proves



that there is an objective reality, an Infinite Being, corresponding to it, and that in that Being we must find the First Cause, I should not be prepared to deny the argument, though it would be difficult to secure for it universal acceptance.<sup>1</sup> But Natural Theology is not content with these abstract propositions. It inquires of what nature that First Cause is, and if that nature be Personal, what are its attributes. So inquiring, it enters the inductive sphere. For, even if it be contended that we must infer an original Will, because the one true Cause known by experience is Will, still we cannot be sure that there is no other cause conceivable. We have to inquire whether there are signs, which *à posteriori* may test the probability of this our inference.

Now, in all reasoning on *data*, demonstration seems to be possible, only when, as in Pure

<sup>1</sup> See Butler's "Analogy," part i. chap. vi. "We find within ourselves the idea of Infinity, that is, of Immensity and Eternity, impossible even in imagination, to be removed out of being. We seem to discern intuitively, that there must, and cannot but be somewhat, external to ourselves, answering to this idea, or the archetype of it. And from hence—for this abstract, as much as any other, requires a concrete—we conclude, that there is, and cannot but be, an Infinite and Immense Eternal Being existing, prior to all design contributing to His Existence, and exclusive of it." The passage is remarkable, as lying outside Butler's usual line of reasoning.

Mathematics and Logic, we create for ourselves the *data*, on which we reason; because then we know them completely in their actual essence, all that they are and all that they imply. But when we have to reason on *data* not so created by ourselves—on the things (for example) of nature, or on the human world around us—we cannot know them absolutely and completely; our knowledge is of certain properties in them, not of their origin or formation, not of the essential constitution, which makes them what they are. Hence in this sphere of thought, absolute demonstration, implying complete knowledge of the *data*, is impossible. Inductive reasoning, starting from observation of the properties of things, next inferring from such observation the laws which regulate them, and the causes from which they spring, and then from particular instances generalizing ultimate principles, is here the sole process of thought; and its results are convictions, at first only probable, and ascending at last to what we call “moral certainty.” If a man, knowing what the *data* are, and what are the steps of the deduction, denies the conclusion of a mathematical demonstration, we say that he is incapable of reasoning. If a man, after he has had laid before him all the evidences, by which a great law of Natural Science has

been ascertained to the satisfaction of the world, professes himself still unsatisfied—allows that it holds in fifty cases, but suggests that it might break down in the fifty-first—we do not call him 'unreasoning' but unreasonable. We imply that he resists a natural law of thought, but one of a wholly different kind.

II. It should be observed, however, that there is a difference in the method of our Induction, as applied to things, and as applied to persons; and also that Induction occupies a larger place in the means of our actual knowledge in the case of things.

(a) In the Science of things we have to rely ultimately on the Inductive processes of observation and generalization therefrom. Of course, in actually working out knowledge, we employ both the Inductive and Deductive processes, especially when we use in Physical Science (as in most cases we are now able to do) the processes of mathematical reasoning. But there always lies on the threshold of investigation the assumption of some law (such as the Laws of Motion in physical Astronomy), which is not established by mathematical demonstration, but suggested by observation, generalized by analogy, and verified by its accordance with hosts of independent facts. Accept that law as true;

then from it you may deduce mathematically an infinite number of consequences. Such deduction may (as in the discovery of our last planet) lead to fresh advances in knowledge, with which inductive processes have nothing to do. But the acceptance of the law itself is the ultimate basis; and it is (I repeat) established by reasoning, which ascends only to moral certainty. In the knowledge of things without us, this alone is found possible; but this is also perfectly sufficient, to be a foundation of the great fabric of theoretical Science and of practical life.

It is indeed true that at all times, and especially now, abstract speculation here claims its place. Science is fond of "passing beyond the experimental region," and busying itself with theories of what may be the ultimate physical constitution of matter and of force; and it may often show that its theories will account for a large class of phenomena. But here it has to confess itself speculation, or even imagination. It can only say 'So it may be,' though it is constantly tempted to over-dogmatic assertions, almost amounting to "So it is." The meeting-point between the deductions from its theories, and the results of patient induction from experimental knowledge of facts, is often very hard to find.

III. When, from the knowledge of things, we

pass to the knowledge of persons, then, in the first instance, the same law holds, with only this difference (highly important, but not affecting its character as an Inductive Science), that we know men partly by observation, partly by sympathy. This implies, in other words, an extension of our means of observation. Our thought can range not only over the great world of action without, but also over the little world of our own human consciousness within. If we ask ourselves how it is that we know any human being by our own unaided powers of knowledge, so as to know not merely what he does, but in some degree what he is, we shall find that we have to rely on both these processes of observation and sympathy.

(a) First, by observation, we notice how a man acts or endures under various circumstances, either the circumstances of common life, or the crucial tests of special trial, speculative or moral. We go through, in such observation, though mostly unconsciously, the various processes which Inductive Logic draws out elaborately in its well known rules. We come to conclusions as to his character—intellectual, that he is wise or foolish, intelligent or dull—moral, that he is true or false, indolent or energetic in duty, loving or cold-hearted. Then, gliding into a deductive

process of thought, we infer, with various degrees of certitude, that in the future he will act in such and such ways, determined by the qualities we think we have discovered in him; and on that inference we ourselves constantly act, risking on its correctness, perhaps little, perhaps our all. Now in all this we deal with the man just as we should deal with a material thing, either a substance or a force. So identical, in fact, is the process, that, by our inherent tendency to refer all events ultimately to agents, when we are speaking of the thing, we constantly use language strictly applicable to the person, and talk of the play of such a force, or of the behaviour of such a substance under particular tests.

(b) But in respect of the person, we have another means of knowledge, the power of sympathy. We extend the area of our observation, by turning our eyes from him to ourselves. We consider what are our own thoughts, emotions, principles, as springs of action; we are conscious of a will, capable of being impressed by those various springs of action, but also capable of acting (as we say) arbitrarily, without any conscious motive except will, or of choosing between the various directions, in which various motives solicit or press. We know, or we guess, how under his circumstances, we ourselves should act, speak,

or feel. "Put yourself in his place," is a recognised method of studying of human nature, fruitful of infinite results. Believing the person we observe to be, with whatever individual peculiarities of difference, a being like ourselves, we read his mind in our own. Deliberately or intuitively we draw our inferences concerning him; and the subtler insight of sympathy constantly aids or supersedes the coarser methods of mere observation. Nor are we deterred from pursuing this process, even when the person we contemplate is known to be greater, wiser, better than ourselves. Such knowledge induces caution and modesty in inference, teaching us to draw positive conclusions as to his nature from the points which we can understand, while we shrink from denying the existence of notions and principles in him, which we cannot understand. But it does not prevent our judgment by sympathy from being true, and fruitful of results.

(c) Still, even with this aid, our knowledge is not, and cannot be, demonstrative. We are yet within the lines of Inductive reasoning; and, in fact, although our powers of observation are thus reinforced, yet the subject at the same time increases, at least as much, in difficulty and intricacy. Science of human nature is quite as

real as science of material things; in itself and in its results it is unquestionably nobler and more important to us: but it is almost equally unquestionable that it is far vaguer, less definite in its rules, and less measurable in its results. In respect of absolute knowledge, each man is to his fellows (to use a well-worn phrase) "unknown and unknowable." All experience proves it; all literature declares it. That it is so, is a part at once of the dignity of human nature and the burden of human life.

If we would really know any Personal Being—what his actions really mean, what is the true object of his existence, what are the real attributes of his secret soul—both observation and sympathy are confessedly insufficient. But then there is introduced a new factor in the complex fabric of our knowledge, wholly unconnected in itself with Inductive reasoning, and subject to a different law. This factor is the Self-revelation of the person whom we contemplate. He must tell us what he is. Such revelation may confirm or contradict our previous Induction. According as it does so, we have less difficulty, or greater difficulty, in accepting it. Nor can we help scrutinizing his positive claims to our confidence, whether intellectual or moral, to see whether he is able and willing to



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tell the truth. We may even feel bound to cross-examine, on the *à priori* assumption of the law court that all evidence is likely to be defective in both these requisites. But it is clear that (so far as it is accepted) it gives us knowledge of a totally different kind from the other. If the man were perfect in wisdom, so as absolutely to know himself—perfect in truth, so as to be incapable of falsehood—then we should be said not to think, to conclude, to infer, but actually to know him, so far as our minds are capable of knowing, and so far as human language is capable of expressing the whole of a human character. The acceptance of this self-revelation with various degrees of faith is a necessary element in life. Perhaps it is not too much to say, that, with whatever reservations, it is in all cases our principal means of knowledge of persons. But wherever the nature of the person contemplated rises above our own, it becomes more essential than ever. It is then predominant, I may say all but exclusive of other means of knowledge. The father reveals himself to the child, the learned to the ignorant, the civilized man to the barbarian, the man of genius—the poet, the philosopher, the prophet—to humanity at large. Such revelation not only completes our knowledge of him, but often throws light on

our own observation, both of the great world without us, and the little world within. How often at the utterance of genius the mind leaps up in glad recognition of thoughts, complete in idea and vivid in beauty, which have floated, vague, imperfect, half formed, and half formless, before our own dimmer eyes!

It comes then, after all, to this, that for true knowledge of things and persons alike, absolute demonstration by our own power is impossible. In the science of things, we are content with Induction and Speculation; if we would know persons, we must add to the Laws of Induction and Speculation the Law of Faith.<sup>2</sup> Every day we do this; for if we did not, we could not live.

IV. Let us consider how these principles of knowledge bear upon that universal conception of a God, of which we have already spoken.

What is the process going on in the mind, when, from the vague instinct of God, which seems to be inherent in man as man, he passes

<sup>2</sup> I venture to refer here to three singularly able discourses by the Bishop of Peterborough, at Norwich, in 1875 (Hamilton and Adams), dealing with "Christianity and Scepticism," and "Christianity and Faith." His conclusion is, "Christianity offers a certainty, partly of reason, partly of faith, partly of experience" after faith. He shows decisively that such certainty is the Law of all human life, so far as it is in contact with personal being.

on to conscious thought? He begins in almost all cases (as we may see in the normal growth of the childish mind towards full maturity) by observation. In the process of that observation, no doubt, he carries with him, as an influence determining thought, the consciousness of himself, and of the effects which his actions produce every day. But still, as in the childhood of the individual mind, so in the earlier stages of the thought of humanity, the objects, consciously and distinctly contemplated, are without, not within. The epic poetry of external life and action precedes the lyric expression of internal thought and feeling. So he looks out on the two great worlds of things and persons. His first observation is that they are distinct in character, yet inseparable in their action and reaction on each other. First over the physical world, then more gradually over both worlds, he discovers that there are unseen powers that rule; in both he discovers what are called "Laws," reducing the infinite variety of objects and powers to combinations of a few great principles of elemental substance or force; of both, if not of the raw material of both, he concludes irresistibly that there must have been a beginning, and at that beginning some First Cause, itself to all human thought final and absolute.

What is that First Cause? It must be either material or spiritual, or compact of both; for, except as a halting-place of despair in the face of mystery, the mind will not accept the co-existence of two separate yet Eternal and self-existent principles. Which is it to be?

(a) The answer given depends in theory on the degree in which man recognises in himself a true personality—that is a will, acting with design and a principle—as an ultimate fact, incapable of being confused with any material force. Every philosophy or religion which is Atheistic, denies this independent existence, and consequently any immortality in the soul. But if we examine historically the character of the answer actually given, it seems that the course of the ancient Greek speculation, on the ruins of which St. Paul stood at Athens, illustrates with singular clearness the general process of human thought in the inquiry into the First Cause.

It had first, its crude, instinctive recognitions of a Divine Power, in the ordinary forms of the popular mythology, which, by their very permanence under strange superstitions and such presumptuous handling of the poets as shocked the gravity of Plato, showed a latent force of truth. Next to these came the more recondite

teaching of the Mysteries, apparently tending towards the recognition of one Supreme Power, perhaps a living God, perhaps a Soul of Nature. But to these succeeded the free thought of Philosophy; and what was its course?

First came the vague guesses of the Ionic School, as to some elemental substance. It is water, said one; it is air, said another; it is fire, said a third; it is no one substance, but earth in its complex variety, replied a fourth. Next succeeded the subtler answer of the Pythagorean School—"It depends on no elemental substance at all; it is number, that is, proportion in combination, harmony, or what we call 'Law.'"<sup>3</sup> Lastly arose Anaxagoras, and drew the inevitable conclusion, to which the Pythagorean answer pointed, "All was Chaos; but Mind came, and ordered all things in perfection."<sup>4</sup> How the chaotic All came into being,

<sup>3</sup> The mysticism of the Pythagoreans as to number is well known. (See Thirlwall's *History of Greece*, c. xii.) No doubt they often spoke, as if number had an objective reality as a basis of existence, or an energetic power of acting on the material of the universe. But it is difficult to believe that these were anything else than transcendental expressions of the simple idea (itself a great advance on the rough guesses of the Ionic school), that on combination and organization, as well as on material, the Kosmos depended.

<sup>4</sup> Ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα εἶτα Νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε. See Plato's *Phædo*, chaps. xvi. and xlv.

he did not inquire. It was enough for him, as yet, to grasp the belief that this world of mingled matter and spirit had its archetype in a Divine Mind. So far; at least, he felt after God and found Him; and although, if we may trust Plato,<sup>5</sup> his search was a hesitating and inconsistent one, falling back too much from his own grand principle on the many superficial notions which it should have superseded, yet its enunciation became a new starting-point in thought—the germ of a Theistic philosophy.

For here the thought of man arrives at a crucial point. If the ultimate cause be a Thing, either an elemental substance or pervading elemental force, or if it be simply a Law of proportion and harmony, the mind can go no further towards any discovery of its nature. That Cause, except in the bare fact of its existence, must remain unknown and unknowable; for simple observation and reasoning will take us no further; and the barren abstraction (like the *τὸ ὄν* of the Eleatic School) will exercise no influence on thought or life. It has been remarked,<sup>6</sup> with satire not undeserved, that it is

<sup>5</sup> I allude to the interesting sketch of his own early speculations as to Causation put into the mouth of Socrates in the latter part (probably the most purely Platonic part) of the "Phædo." See chaps. xlv.—xlvii.

<sup>6</sup> Kingsley's "Phaethon," p. 14.

a poor religion which exchanges the sublime opening of the sixth chapter of Deuteronomy for the declaration, "The Something our Nothing is One Something." It is impossible that a soul, which is conscious of itself, can rest on such a vague impersonal cause.

(b) But if man once accepts the doctrine of an Eternal Mind ordering all things, he will never be contented with the vague unreality of a diffused intelligence, "becoming in humanity conscious of itself," with (be it remarked), as inseparable from that consciousness, the sense (which under this hypothesis is a delusion) of personal individuality. Mind without personality is a thing to the ordinary man fairly inconceivable. Accordingly he ascends at once, naturally and inevitably, to the conception of a Divine Person. The moment he does this, there opens before him the other means of knowing God, by the knowledge of sympathy.

It cannot be too soon or too frankly acknowledged that, unless we start from the consciousness of our own personality—the consciousness of will, of purpose, of right, of love—no theology is possible. The purest Nihilism—the Nihilism of the Buddhist Theory—has by a true instinct fixed on the delusion of our own individual existence, as the first delusion to be got

rid of on the way to Atheism. The modern Atheistic philosophies, with equal sagacity, attack the same consciousness in us; now by making spirit a kind of matter, or a result of material organization; now by absorbing the individual soul into some great soul of the universe. But happily the sense that "I am I," remains utterly indestructible, both in the individual consciousness, and the collective witness of all human society, through the languages, laws, and institutions, without which that society cannot be maintained. It cannot be shaken, unless all reasoning, and even all sensation, is given up as utterly deceptive, and unless all human\* society is acknowledged to have stood through all the centuries on what is a mere delusion. That it is impossible for us to form a logical scheme for its reconciliation with the reign of Law, and with the unity of the whole creation, is perfectly true. Theorists, to whom perfect logical consistency is as the breath of life, accordingly shut their eyes to this unmanageable factor; they may fancy they have got rid of it, so long as they remain in their studious retirement; but the moment they cross the threshold of active life, it reappears. As Butler says, with grave irony,<sup>7</sup> whatever may be

<sup>7</sup> See the "Analogy," part i. chap. vi.



“the opinion of necessity,” as a theory, it is certain that in this world “we are treated,” by self, man, and God, “as if we were free.” In this respect, accordingly, the common sense of man is wiser than the philosopher, in refusing the most logical and coherent theory, which does not accept the whole of the strange but unmistakeable facts.

We need not be afraid of acknowledging that the belief in God and the consciousness of a true self must stand or fall together. They mutually imply, and in practice mutually strengthen each other. In fact, the union of the two beliefs alone explains the two undoubted facts of the reality and the limitation of human freedom. It is comparatively easy to conceive how a free will can exist, limited by the dispensation of a Supreme Will, and judged within the limits of capacity and opportunity ordained for it. But it is impossible to conceive how it can find any place at all in a system either purely material, or simply an embodiment of One pervading Spirit. Hence it is that, in proportion as man realizes his own personality, as distinct from, and in some sense superior to, the physical forces around him, and as incapable of submitting absolutely to the will of other human souls, he recognises the Supreme Power

as a real Person, capable of being known in part through sympathy, although, as to perfect comprehension, "passing all knowledge."

Thus, man is conscious in himself of will, guided by design, ruled by the conviction of righteousness, and the enthusiasm of love. Knowing these things to belong to the highest part of his own nature, he expects to find them not less, but more, in a nature higher than his. Through these forms of consciousness, distinct but hardly separable, he conceives the attributes of the One God.

First, he is conscious in himself that he can will; and that, except when he acts arbitrarily, for the sake of self-knowledge, or in the mere play of mind, he wills and acts with a purpose. In the possession of that will he is conscious of a power to mould the forms of matter, and to set in motion and direct the play of force. In the world around, he sees what appear to be vivid marks of design and power, acting with design like his own, though infinitely transcending his own. He infers, instantly and constantly, that the First Cause, being a Spirit, acted with design, and that for this design all matter, all force, all created spirits work.

Next, he is conscious of the majesty of right, as that which must guide his action, and the

growth of his soul to perfection; and behind that majesty, he sees the form of a retribution, which enforces its demands, and avenges any disobedience to them. Then he looks abroad into the world, both of things and persons, and thinks that he sees traces of a moral government, not perfect here, but implying tendencies to perfection. He concludes that the Divine Spirit is a moral Being like himself, though so infinitely above himself, that all the brightest graces in man are but faint reflections of the attributes of God; that His will is for righteousness; and that in His hand there is retribution for the here and the hereafter.

Lastly, he is conscious of love, recognising an unity which in various degrees binds man to man, rejoicing in the happiness, the goodness, the reciprocated love, of all spiritual beings. He looks on the world; he finds it full of what seem provisions for happiness and goodness of all created beings. He infers at once that God is Love, that it is of the essence of Deity to rejoice over all that is good, and to accept the offering of His creatures' love.

But all this (men say) is pure anthropomorphism, fashioning God in the likeness of man. Of course it is; of course it must be. The only spirit which man perfectly knows, is his own.

Through his own, he must infer what the attributes of spirit are.<sup>8</sup> He ought not to pretend that so he can fully and absolutely express the attributes of God, as they are in themselves, or as they might be in relation to other classes of creatures utterly unlike man. But he may believe that, so representing them, he is right so far as he goes; and that he expresses them as they really are, so far as they hold any relation to man and are intelligible to man.

"We are His offspring" (so spoke the Theistic philosophy of Greece). As we look on the face of the children, shall we not gain some glimpse of the glory of the Father?

It is true that anthropomorphism has always had its dangers.

In their instinctive desire of full comprehension, men constantly forget the distinction of

<sup>8</sup> It has been truly remarked by Dr. Abbott ("Through Nature to Christ," chap. xi.), in criticizing the phrase "the Eternal, which makes for righteousness," that according to the sense which we give to the word "makes," we may be "anthropomorphic," "zoomorphic," or "azoomorphic," but that we must be one of the three. "Supposing," he adds, "each of these three hypotheses to be dangerous, I should prefer the first as least dangerous." "Why should we be ashamed of anthropomorphism? Who would not twenty times sooner worship a man than worship a tendency?" Dr. Abbott will carry with him in this part of his book many who cannot accept his subsequent conclusions.

which we have spoken above. In various degrees they have supposed that through man God is perfectly known, whereas He can but be known imperfectly. Hence came that error, of which the idolatry denounced in the text is the grossest form, conceiving that God can be perfectly set forth, if not to the eye, at least to the mind, in conceptions embodying all the limitations and imperfections of the human spirit. At times, perplexed by that mystery of Evil—which is in all lines of thought the one great “offence,” against which in different degrees every soul at one time or another stumbles—men have either dared to find in God the attributes of the evil too well known in man; or, in recoil from that horrible blasphemy, have framed the wildest theories of rival Gods, of an intractable matter limiting the power of the Creator, and the like—theories which can be never said really to live, and which yet never absolutely die. Even when these grosser forms of error have been avoided, men have theorized or dogmatized, as if they could perfectly enter into the counsel of God, so as to say “This must be,” or “This cannot be,” as if they could even tell, not merely the great principles of God’s dispensations, but the methods by which they must be carried out.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Butler treats this “idle and not altogether innocent”

But these abuses do not destroy the true use. According to the old true saying, "Man reveals God." If, in all men but One, that Revelation be imperfect, yet it is true so far as it goes, and is the only knowledge possible to man.

By a right instinct, man has never ceased "to feel after God and find Him," by the united powers of observation and sympathy. His discoveries or his guesses he has recorded in the Religion, in the Philosophy, and in the Poetry, of all humanity. To put them aside for the notion of an ultimate material substance, or to be content with the recognition of "Law," which is no cause at all, we believe to be not an advance, but a retrogression in thought.

(c) But is this all? Shall we here break the analogy, which rules in the case of the knowledge of all other Personal Beings? Shall we suppose God to sit far off in majesty, passionless as some great Egyptian idol, while His creatures blindly, in toil, in doubt, and in pain, struggle up to Him? Or shall we believe that He in some way reveals Himself to man, stoops down to lighten the way of His children, and to draw them on to Him in heaven?

I need not say what answer Christianity gives presumption of human reason with well-deserved severity. See "Analogy," part i. Introduction.

to this great question. But we are concerned at present to inquire into the process by which the conception of God has established itself in human thought generally. Here the first thing which strikes the inquirer is this, that it is an error (however common parlance may excuse it) to regard the conception of a special Revelation of God as a thing distinct from, or opposed to "Natural Religion."<sup>1</sup> Rather we should hold it an integral part of that "Natural Religion;" for certainly all the religions of the world take it for granted that in "divers times and manners," God does reveal Himself to man, and that such Revelation, in the true sense of the word, is "natural," as an ordained element in the knowledge of God. Next, on a survey of the actual circumstances of the case, and an inquiry into the credibility of the universal

<sup>1</sup> It must, I think, be concluded that the tacit acceptance of this distinction at the hands of the Deists by most of our English Apologists places the Christian argument at much disadvantage. Butler's chapter on the "Importance of Christianity" ("Analogy," part ii. chap. i.) suffers much from the supposed necessity of drawing this hard and fast line. Christianity has to be regarded as "a republication of Natural Religion," and also as "containing an account of a dispensation of things not discoverable by reason," instead of being itself the completion of "Natural Religion," and in respect of its preparatory revelations "as old as the Creation."

tradition, the thought suggests itself, whether such Revelation is not required as an adequate cause of these circumstances—whether, in fact, if we reject the tradition as simply fabulous, and disbelieve the existence of any Revelation, we can sufficiently account for the unvaried and well assured belief in God, which so unquestionably pervades humanity. Nor can we in this inquiry forget, that, if there be a God, all analogy declares it to be in the highest degree probable that He would reveal Himself to man; and that accordingly the weight of antecedent improbability undoubtedly tells very heavily not against those who believe, but those who disbelieve any Revelation. Thus, in fact, to a believer in God the one question is, whether such Revelation is merely through the voice of God, speaking to each individual soul, or, whether over and above this, there have been special Revelations, given in extraordinary and miraculous clearness, to be the treasure not only of the individual receiver, but of all mankind, not of one generation only, but of the whole of time.

This question becomes an historical question. No believer in the latter alternative should be tempted to extenuate the power of the Revelation of God to each soul, not only giving (so to speak) the rough material of knowledge of Himself in



His works, but by a Divine Spirit acting directly upon the spirits of men, and writing (as Holy Scripture has it) the substance of His Will in their hearts. All religions contain (as I have said) the expression, more or less emphatic, of this truth; all English Deism, from the days of Lord Herbert of Cherbury downwards,<sup>2</sup> has implied or expressed it. God forbid that we who hold that there is "a Light of God, which lighteth every man," should ever forget it! We could not even deny that it might have pleased God so, and so only, to meet the gropings of His creatures after Him. If we choose to please ourselves by framing a world on hypothesis, we might possibly so account for an universal belief in God. The "*Vox Populi*"—the testimony of humanity, gradually forming and establishing itself—would then be to us the only "*Vox Dei*." But the true form of this question is whether He has so done.

Christianity expressly says that He has not. It declares that from the very beginning God has spoken to men by special Revelations, some of which (not necessarily all) are treasured up

<sup>2</sup> Like the Roman Jurists, who would find a code of that "Law of Nature" which underlies all other codes, Lord Herbert drew out the five *Notitiæ*, which he conceived to be engraved on the human soul.

for us in Holy Scripture, and all of which simply lead up to the perfect Revelation of Himself in the Lord Jesus Christ. To us the Vox Populi is not the only Vox Dei; clear over all, like the dominant note of some full harmony, rises the Vox Christi, and to it all other Voices of God serve but as under-tones.

For this last great assertion Christianity gives its special reasons, of which this is not the time to speak. At present it belongs to our subject to remind you that historically all human traditions point to special Revelations of God, with an unanimity in substance, and yet an infinite variety of tone and detail, which, on any other subject would be acknowledged as an indisputable evidence of some great ultimate fact. Wherever any religion has asserted and systematized dominion over the souls of men, the belief in such a Revelation is the very backbone of its power.

Nor can I omit to notice, in connexion with this historical tradition, that, if we examine how all other knowledge of Nature and Humanity is gained by man, we certainly do not find that it dawns, equally and freshly, on every individual soul. Each onward step is taken by the few leaders of mankind—"inspired men," as, by an unconscious testimony of language, we term

them—men who have (again the word is significant), and often believe that they have, “a mission.” The many have to sit at their feet to be taught, able at most to judge of what they cannot originate. Such teachings simply alter the whole face of the spiritual world. Long after the lives of great men are over, sometimes when their very names are forgotten, the truth which they declare becomes the treasure of Humanity, and each succeeding generation merely receives it and carries it on. Why should it be thought that in the highest of all teachings—the teaching of God—this law is broken, instead of assuming a higher and nobler form? Surely analogy pleads for the acceptance of the truth, that God did so speak to man “at sundry times and in divers manners by His prophets.” We grant that no analogy can represent to us what, by its very nature, can have no analogue, unless in the history of some other world—I mean the perfection and finality of the Revelation of God in Christ. But for special Revelations it does plead, as an integral part of Natural Religion, and as a chief cause of man’s universal belief in God.

Such certainly is the line of thought as to the knowledge of God, which St. Paul set forth at Athens. He appealed to their observation of

God's work, "making all men," "giving to them all things." We know well how their noblest and wisest philosophy had read this lesson. He appealed to the knowledge and sympathy of One "in whom we live and move and have our being," and of whom their own poets had said, "We are His offspring." Again we know how, perhaps above all people, the Greeks had in conception realized the Divine element in man, and had known God through it. But these two means of knowledge combined, he described as a "feeling after God" in the dark, an "ignorant worship" of One still "unknown." Therefore he crowned all with the direct revelation, "Him declare I unto you;" and he based that revelation on the authority of the risen Lord Jesus Christ. "Some" (we read) "mocked," as their successors mock still. Some put off the consideration of these deep matters till they should have investigated more obvious truths; so certain philosophies do still. Only a few came to him. But that teaching, mocked and neglected, proved itself a teaching which could really bring to the knowledge of men—the mass of simple and practical men whom the schools of philosophy despised—the truth of God, which their "sages would have died to learn." Why was this? Because, un-

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doubtedly, it had in it the supernatural power of the Son of God Himself, in His Word and in His Grace; but may we not add, Because, supernatural as it was, transcending human science, it yet accorded perfectly with the natural process of the knowledge of man, by its appeal to the Law of Induction to prepare the way, and to the Law of Faith to complete it? Those who sigh for the absolute demonstrative knowledge, which of any being other than ourselves is impossible, may turn from it in a proud despair, crying out, "God is unknown and unknowable." We are content to know God (be it said reverently) by the same kind of knowledge as that through which we can know man. That knowledge we find to be already a knowledge sufficient to live and die in—to give a new spring of life to our life, and to scatter by its brightness the shadow of death. For its perfection we are content to wait, till "we know, even as we are known," and exchange our vision "through a glass darkly," for the vision of "God as He is."

# LECTURE III.

## THE MANIFOLD CORD OF NATURAL THEOLOGY.

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- I.—THE MANIFOLD LINES OF THE INDUCTION OF GOD, CORRESPONDING TO THE DIFFERENT FACULTIES OF MAN.
  - II.—THE NECESSITY OF THEIR COMBINATION, FROM THE UNITY BOTH OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT.
  - III.—THE FORCE OF THEIR CONVERGENCE, FAR EXCEEDING THE MERE SUM OF THEIR SEPARATE FORCES.
    - (a) BOTH WHERE THEY AGREE,
    - (b) AND WHERE EACH SPEAKS ALONE.
  - IV.—EXAMINATION OF THE ACTUAL CONDITIONS OF THE REASONING.
    - (a) THE FORCE OF THIS CONVERGENCE.
    - (b) THE GREAT "OFFENCE" IN THE MYSTERY OF EVIL.
  - V.—THE NEED OF A REVELATION.
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"A threefold cord is not quickly broken."—ECCLES. iv. 12.

THE last lecture added to our first consideration of the undoubted fact, and the immense significance, of the universal belief in a Personal God, a brief inquiry into the process, by which

such knowledge of God has been attained in actual thought.

It seemed clear that the absolute demonstration, which characterizes mathematical and logical reasoning, was possible only when the data of our reasoning were absolutely created, and therefore absolutely known, by ourselves. Of any external Thing—a material substance, or a natural force—we can but judge by Induction; in the case of a Person we can first extend the machinery of our Induction by adding to external observation the insight of Sympathy; and then, if we would complete the whole process of knowledge, we must listen to his disclosure of himself, and so add to the Law of Induction the Law of Faith.

It is not hard to apply these principles of the method of knowledge to that knowledge of God which (as we have already seen) expresses itself in all the Religions and Languages of human kind. The first lecture dwelt on the true sense of the old term, "Natural Religion," as implying that the conception of God is as inherent in man's nature as the conception of freedom, of truth, or of right. We now claim that, instead of being distinguished from all "Revealed Religion," it should be taken, on the authority both of analogy and of tradition, to depend, not only on the induc-

tions of what is commonly called "Natural Theology," but on the Revelation by God of Himself, both to each individual and to the race of man as a whole.

From these introductory considerations we now pass on to examine the extent and the composition of this Induction, by which men "feel after God and find Him."

In each line of thought I take it for granted that it must follow that same well-known path of Inductive Reasoning, by which we arrive at the knowledge of the law of any physical force or the character of any personal being. First comes observation for ourselves, or teaching by others, of facts—whether these be the outward facts, of which our senses bear witness, or the inner facts, which we learn by our own consciousness to exist in ourselves, and conclude by analogy to exist, with whatever variations, in our fellow-men. Such observation (be it always remembered) is possible only under the guidance of certain ideas<sup>1</sup> or "forms of thought," through which the masses of isolated impressions group themselves in a coherent order. Then we pass,

<sup>1</sup> Of definite and formed knowledge, we accept the maxim, *Nihil est in intellectu, quod non prius in sensu*. Of the formative power we add the old caution, *Nisi intellectus ipse*.



in the next stage, to the enunciation of some general law or principle, suggested by these partial observations, after we have thrown off all accidental disturbing influences, and subjected the results of observation to crucial tests. It is at this stage (be it remarked) that the inventive or philosophical faculty intervenes, and here, therefore, especially the traces of original genius are found in the history of scientific progress.<sup>2</sup> Lastly, comes the process of Verification, by deduction from our assumed principle of the phenomena or actions, which should occur on the supposition of its truth, and by comparison of the results so obtained with independent observation in the field of Nature and Humanity.

This process seems essentially characteristic of Inductive Reasoning, be its subject what it may. As we apply it to secondary existences, material force or personal being, so we must apply it to seek out the ultimate existence in God. Such is the process (for example) by which men have so often arrived at the conception of a Great Designer of the universe, who made all things for a purpose, and for that purpose sustains them

<sup>2</sup> Thus, for example, in Physical Astronomy the perfection of the results of pure observation of many generations may be exhibited in "Kepler's Laws;" but it will be remembered how even the vigorous and enterprising mind of

day by day. It is (as has been well remarked) <sup>3</sup> a process as old as human thought itself, differing but in degree in the pages of Xenophon or of Paley, in the simple narrow reasoning of an intelligent peasant, or the large thoughtful observation of a philosopher.

This I take for granted. It is implied in the description of Natural Theology as an Inductive Science. But the especial points which, using the metaphorical language of the text, I desire to insist upon are three. First that, such being the characteristic method of Induction, there are various lines of thought along which it must proceed. Next, that the results of all must be combined, and each must be considered as designed for such combination. Lastly, that in this combination we must estimate not the mere aggregate sum, but the convergent force of the conclusions arrived at along each of these various lines. There is a "threefold cord;" it may not be untwisted; and the various strands combined will not be "quickly broken."

Kepler laboured in vain for the discovery of the principle underlying them. When the genius of Newton once discerned that principle, all was clear for the magnificent discoveries of the future. The history of this process in the various branches of Science is traced again and again by Whewell in the "History of the Inductive Sciences."

<sup>3</sup> Macaulay's Essay on Bacon.

The outline of this view I proceed to sketch out, designing to fill it up in the lectures which succeed.

I. Now, with regard to the first of these statements, but little need be said. It would seem only reasonable that, in relation to the ultimate problem of human life, obviously concerning man's being as a whole, every faculty of his nature, characteristic of that nature as such, should have its function of inquiry. If the practice of life cannot be carried on without the use of all these faculties, far less is this likely to be true of the inquiry into its foundation. But to verify this consideration, we turn to actual experience. In all our attempts to know and to judge of personal beings, it is almost a commonplace to observe, that the process of knowledge is seldom, if ever, carried out through the intellect alone: We do not really know what an individual is, nor can we judge of humanity at large, if we regard men coldly and critically, as we should contemplate material substances or lifeless machines, excluding all conceptions of moral relations to ourselves, and shrinking from every touch of sympathy or enthusiasm. We find that the purely intellectual knowledge—the so-called “knowledge of the world”—leads the clearest and most passionless intellects into errors

both speculative and practical, as to human nature, which far duller men of higher moral sense and more genial sympathy easily avoid. No man who depends absolutely upon it can ever be a true philosopher or a political leader of men. For it deals far too much with the outside of human nature; it disregards some, perhaps the most important, of the qualities which make men something more than machines. Accordingly it is a commonplace—familiar alike in literature and in practical experience—that “he knows best who loves best,” provided always that his love is not a mere sentiment, but a thoughtful principle, clothing the firm skeleton of duty with the warm flesh and blood of affection.

Now if, following the verdict of humanity at large, we believe God to be a Personal Being, we see at once that this principle must apply to the search after Him. Even if we accept that belief as a hypothesis worthy of investigation, we must try at any rate, whether there are any signs that this principle does apply. If it does apply—if (that is) the moral faculties of our nature imperiously claim their place in relation to the Supreme Power—then this very fact is an argument that the hypothesis is a true one.

My contention is that it does apply. Histori-

cally it has been applied in all ages; theoretical examination defends this historical practice, and asserts that it ought to be so applied. Not through one human faculty but through all, we feel after the ultimate Being. In the human spirit we distinguish various faculties. We speak of the Reason searching after Truth, of the Conscience recognising Right, of the Imagination having its intuition of Beauty, of the Affections in their natural tendency to recognise unity by love, and their morbid capacity of breaking unity by hatred. These principles of Truth, Right, Beauty, Unity, cannot be regarded as separate and absolute existences. They are supreme in the structure of the universe; they must be attributes of the One ultimate creative power, whatever it is. In it they are combined; hence unquestionably there follows at the least a very high probability, that, in the search after that Power, there must be a combined theology of the intellect, the conscience, the imagination, the affections. Each faculty has its own distinctive line of thought, and in that line is capable of working out a true Induction; but still all coexist, and of all account must be taken.

II. But I pass on to the next point. Do they coexist in complete separation, each working its conclusions out, utterly unaffected by the others,

in its own special sphere? Or do they so coexist as to bear upon and imply each other, so that to conceive of any one as isolated is to conceive of it imperfectly or wrongly?

It would have been impossible (I believe) for any one to have refused the latter alternative but for a confusion, which constantly meets us in various quarters, between distinction of thought and separation in fact. Distinct these various lines of argument may be; separate they cannot be. It is essential to my argument to recognise that each line of thought is, in the abstract, distinct, and in its process independent of the others. For on that distinctness the value of their coincidence in testimony depends. By an effort of the mind we can gain "dry light" through each, for the time regarding the rest as non-existent. But they are not intended to be separate in fact; each strand is elaborated in order that all may be twined together.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> It seems accordingly that there is such a thing as right "prejudice." I mean the constant recollection, while we are pursuing any line of reasoning, of known truths deducible from other forms of thought, which are touched by it, and the presumption, if they seem to be overthrown by it, that there may possibly be some flaw in the reasoning. A Physical philosopher would certainly examine any phenomena, seemingly strange and abnormal, with a prejudice in favour of the Law of Gravitation or of the Indestructibility of Force; and be very slow to accept any

In the phases of actual thought, and in the actions to which they lead, we observe that one or other faculty generally predominates; but the others coexist with it in real but secondary power, and their coexistence undoubtedly influences the predominant principle, just as different under-tones of harmony modify the impression made on the ear by the same leading note. Thus in the rigid intellectual processes of Science we have been rightly warned (as by Professor Tyndall) of the uses of imaginative Intuition. Under the æsthetic appreciation and the artistic reproduction of beauty, we have learnt from Mr. Ruskin to trace scientific laws of truth, and even "lamps" of moral principle. The most instinctive affection defends itself, if attacked, on grounds of reason—sometimes profoundly true, sometimes almost ludicrously or pathetically fanciful. The sternest and strongest Duty feels itself too weak, unless it calls to its aid the enthusiasm of affection. If it were possible to cultivate but one faculty, deadening and stunting all the rest, the result would be not only to appear witness against their universal application. If a purely physical line of reasoning apparently leads to an immoral or an Atheistic result, it is certainly equally reasonable for one who holds the Instinct of Right and the Instinct of God to be universal, to look upon it with a similar suspicion.

overthrow the balance of the soul, but to destroy all but one of the strands of the golden cord of knowledge, by which it is linked to the world of being without. Every one who has ever watched the play of his own mind on any subject will know how these various phases of thought, mingle with, at times even seem to confuse, each other. Every one who has studied human nature will be aware how the character of any man, as a whole, affects every single action of his mind, moral, intellectual, imaginative.

If we ask why this is so, the answer is simple enough. It is so, because the subject is one; it is so, because the object of thought is one.

It is so, because the subject—that is, the thinking soul—is one, whatever be the phases of its action. We talk of the Reason and Conscience, the Imagination and the Affections, as if they were distinct spiritual existences, and picture to ourselves a kind of mental drama, in which they act upon each other. It is convenient to do this; it is probably necessary for distinctness. But we must beware lest in the process we should glide into the Buddhist idea of the soul as composed of “groups”—material qualities, sensations, abstract ideas, tendencies, rational faculties—with no personality binding all together; and so allow the underlying unity of the soul practically



to escape us. After all, it is the same "I" who thinks and fancies, or resolves and loves. All these various lines of spiritual action start from the same source by the same impulse. They cannot but affect one another, presuppose each other, fit (so to speak) into each other, for the perfect action of the soul.

It is so, again, because the object contemplated is one. No single line of thought can approach it on all its sides. No one can yield perfect knowledge, even up to the standard of human capacity to know. If the object itself is to stand out in solid reality, the pictures of it from different points of view must be not looked at successively or in separation, but be superimposed and blended into one stereoscopic conception.

So, therefore, it must be in the Induction of of God. He (we believe) has made the soul for Himself in the perfect unity and variety of all its faculties. Each, as it seeks Him, must draw the others with it. The knowledge "which is life eternal" must pervade the whole being. First, because the reason, conscience, imagination, affection, are all really one, there must be an unity in the Natural Theology of which each claims its own peculiar share. Next, as they tend to Him, converging again after their divergence from their one source, is it not reasonable to think

that, while all see Him, each may catch some feature in the Divine Image, which is either invisible, or at least blurred and indistinct, to others?

Let us suppose that the Theology of the Reason leads to results, in themselves imperfect and ambiguous, is it not reasonable that the Theology of the Conscience should be called in to supply imperfection and to determine ambiguity? If the Moral Being, the Judge of the earth, of whom the Conscience tells us, seems far away from sinful men in His unapproachable purity, is it wrong to seek from the Theology of Love the assurance of His unity with men, weak, blind, sinful though they be? If many lines of thought converge accurately up to the very edge of Mystery, can we help believing that they meet somewhere behind the veil?

It is on this idea that I desire to lay especial stress. Every line of Natural Theology in itself not only is imperfect, but ought (if I may so express it) to be imperfect, because, even for the sake of the right balance and growth of our faculties, we ought not to pursue any one without implying the others. Each may have its rightful predominance at any time and for any particular mind. But predominance is one thing; exclusive isolation is another.

Perhaps it may seem as if this proposition needed no enforcement, and as if, when explicitly enunciated, it would be accepted by all. It may be so. But in practice I cannot help thinking that it is constantly neglected.

The plainer and more flagrant phase of this neglect is seen in the tendency to confine the mind to one line of Natural Theology, as if it alone deserved notice, as if it ought to be conclusive in itself, as if, supposing this not to be so, we have a right to dismiss the very idea of Natural Theology as worthless. We remember how Paley, in one of the best known and most admirable works on this subject, (within its own range and in relation to the knowledge of his time all but perfect) dwells, in the name of Natural Theology, on one line of thought only—the evidence of Design in Nature. We notice how others give up as inconclusive, and therefore as non-existent, all intellectual reasoning, content to find God through the “Categorical Imperative” of the Conscience. A recent work of singular force and interest (on the “Unseen Universe”) leads “from a purely physical basis” to God and immortality. All this is well, if the intention be to exhibit, in all the purity of its native force, the single argument which we think the strongest, or which

we understand best. There is perhaps some profit, certainly some pleasure, in turning the guns of the exclusive scientist upon himself. But it is not well, if, even for a moment, we forget that in so doing we are for special purposes artificially putting asunder what God has united in our nature.

Another form, less distinct, but in essence much the same, is found in Mr. Stuart Mill's "Essay on Theism."<sup>5</sup> Here all the lines of argument

<sup>5</sup> There are, indeed, other objections to Mr. Mill's treatment. It is to be noted that in the outset he holds it his duty "to maintain complete impartiality and to give a fair examination to both" the *à priori* and *à posteriori* methods of inquiry; but he adds in the same breath his conviction that one (the latter) "is in its nature scientific, the other not only unscientific, but condemned by science." Accordingly it is not surprising that, in spite of his excellent intentions, he utterly fails to do justice to the *à priori* argument from Causation, while he lays all stress on the actual evidences of Design, remarking (with a sense of relief) that in it "we have at last arrived at an argument of a really scientific character," and refusing to be driven from it by Evolution theories. The argument from "the general consent of mankind" is inadequately touched, with a curious notion, that a belief, if "native in the human mind," must be "independent of evidence" for its development, and that its degradation in the savage mind proves that there can be no common substratum in that mind and the mind of civilized man. The argument from Consciousness, speculative and moral, is again dismissed with a summariness, which would have been impossible in any mind not radically antagonistic to all Intuition. In fact the only

are recognised ; but each is separately examined, and, because held to be insufficient in itself, is summarily dismissed, instead of being allowed to leave behind its *residuum* of evidence, however imperfect, to be taken account of in subsequent investigations. It is not perhaps wonderful that at last that argument from Design, which alone is accepted, should be accepted with much hesitation, when it is thus considered in absolute isolation from the rest. For by this method it is required of each line of thought, that it should be separately conclusive, on pain of being put out of court with a calm severity as absolutely valueless.

Now, I contend that both these methods are virtually unscientific. For neither certainly represents the way in which we proceed in all other reasonings, whether in Inductive Science or in judgment of human testimony. If a Physicist desires to know the nature of a material substance, he does not confine himself to any one line of investigation, mechanical, chemical, or electrical, even if it chance to seem

line really worked out is the line of argument from Design, and in this a positive result is arrived at. But, even were it otherwise, I venture to think, for the reason given in the text, that the whole plan of this examination of each evidence in separation is radically unsound.

to him the fittest; he will combine all; if each, taken alone, be inconclusive, he will not dismiss it as unmeaning, or necessarily attribute inconclusiveness to the whole. If a critic desires to ascertain the genuineness of a book, it is mere pedantry to confine himself, either to the external evidence of testimony, or the internal evidence of language, style, or treatment. To each must be allowed its due weight; defect in one may be compensated by excess in the other. If the object be to ascertain a historical fact, or estimate a historical character, only the man, who has to support a foregone conclusion, will rely, either merely on what a man says for himself, or merely on what others say of him, either on the unsympathetic keenness of the enemy, or the insight of affection in the friend. When all are combined, then, and then only, do we hold the picture complete, at once in its lights and in its shadows. Now what is necessary in order to follow out adequately the lower and less difficult kinds of investigation, cannot be less necessary—and indeed, ought to be far more necessary—in the higher search after God. We claim that our conclusion should depend on the whole cord, not on any of the untwisted strands. It is in the highest degree unlikely that any one should be strong enough

to sustain it; for this would go far towards indicating that the others were useless.

III. I plead therefore for the combination of the various elements of Natural Theology against the arguments, which deal with one exclusively, or, if they recognise all, yet deal with each successively, as though it alone existed. But I must go further] still. We cannot be satisfied, even when the aggregate result is contemplated, if it be estimated as though it were but the sum of the results obtained by each. This is the third point—perhaps the most important of all—in examining the nature of the Theological Induction, on which I desire to lay especial stress.

For this principle of estimate appears to be infinitely below the truth. Its inadequacy is recognised in all reasonings on Evidence, whether the evidence of scientific conclusion or of personal testimony. Wherever we perceive the convergence of two independent lines of reasoning, or the coincidence of two obviously independent witnesses, the effect is so far more than double of the testimony of either, that from the merest presumption the mind darts at once to the assumption of a high probability. Suppose we bring in a third from a wholly different quarter. Is the result no more than triple of the original presumption? On the contrary, it

risers to a moral certainty, which men would be thought all but mad to question. If (for example) by estimating mechanically the specific gravity of any heavenly body, an astronomer had guessed that by its lightness it might well be a mass of incandescent hydrogen, who would consider this to be anything but the merest guess? But let the spectroscope be turned upon it, and disclose the lines in the spectrum, which correspond to the flame of hydrogen; then that mere guess assumes almost the character of an undoubted truth. When the critic, proceeding on strictly internal evidence, has shown the abstract probability of this or that correction of the text of an ancient author, men may hesitate still. But let even a single manuscript be discovered, which, perhaps against all others, contains his emendation, on the grounds not of criticism, but of simple historic testimony, then slight as the new authority is in itself, its appearance changes the whole aspect of things; what dwelt before in the cloudland of ingenious conjecture is placed at once on a solid ground. Nor is it otherwise in respect of personal testimony. No one supposes that the coincidence of two independent testimonies simply doubles the force of either. No one doubts that the convergence of many lines of circumstantial evidence, each per-



haps in itself weak, may forge an iron chain of cogency. A single witness, let it be as authentic as it may, is by the wise rule of law, held to be insufficient. But it is an accepted rule that "in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word shall be established."

This point is to my mind one of transcendent importance, and I cannot think that it has been as constantly and familiarly recognised as it deserves. But I must still observe further—what may at first sight appear almost paradoxical—that such coincidence, while it directly establishes the points in which these various testimonies agree, gives an indirect, yet very substantial confirmation to the points, on which each speaks alone. For it tends to prove in each the existence of correctness, solidity, veracity of testimony: and if these attributes be once established, we cannot but assume the high probability of their continuance, even when each witness treads his path alone. As a matter of fact, it is (I suppose) by the union of the coincidence of many evidences, and the independent witness of one single evidence, that Induction of Science, and establishment of facts by testimony, have really achieved their chief triumphs. When mechanical, chemical, electrical tests of a substance have so far coincided as to establish the accuracy of the

conclusions derived from each, no one need hesitate to add to the qualities of which all bear witness, those special qualities, which can be tested only by one of those lines of investigation, and to which necessarily there can be no multiplication of testimony. In those masterly summaries of the results of evidence, which come to us from the judicial bench, there are always elements, on which one witness only speaks, accepted because in other points, by coincidence with the rest, his accuracy and veracity have been tested and not found wanting.

Now it is for the full recognition of these principles in respect of the lines of Natural Theology that I especially plead. It may be possible to show that no single line taken alone leads even to moral certainty. It might be, though difficult, yet not absolutely impossible, to contend that the mere aggregate by addition of their results advances us but a little way. But, if proceeding, as they undoubtedly do, in partial or complete independence, they converge to common conclusions; then the argument of truth from that convergence is all but irresistible; and if, while thus coinciding in many points, each contributes one peculiar feature to the picture of the One Transcendant Object, then their former

coincidence bears indirect evidence to the truth of these isolated declarations.

IV. Now this is, as it seems to me, exactly the condition of things. The Theology of the Intellect has itself two independent branches—the argument from Causation, leading up to a First Cause, and the argument from the evidence of Design, leading up not to a First Cause only, but a Personal Creator. The two lines of witness have a close parallelism of idea; but each is perfectly distinct—the one looking back to the past, the other onward to the future. Suppose it be conceded that the first, considered alone, may leave us in doubt whether the First Cause be material or spiritual, or, at least, whether Personal or Impersonal. The investigation of the second comes in, at once to confirm the former reasoning as to the existence of some First Cause, and to decide the point on which that reasoning left us for a time in doubt. Is it not clear that thus, at once coincident with and supplementary to the other, its appearance far more than doubles the confidence which could be placed in either alone? But let us call another witness—the Theology of the Imagination—proceeding by a wholly different process from that of the Intellect, viz. by the synthesis of poetic or artistic intuition, instead of by the analysis of close gradual reasoning, and blend-

ing the cold light of understanding with the warm glow of affection. By this wholly different method it brings out to us the same truth, the conception of a First Cause and an All-wise Creator; while it adds a still stronger conviction that in the presentation to us of the beauty of creation mind deals with mind, and it suggests at least emotions not of wonder only but of adoration. Can we refuse to recognise here a powerful element of confirmation? By itself we may well hold a Theology of Imagination to be far too vague and shadowy for definite belief, too poetic for the wear and tear of life. But its very contrast of method gives force to the conviction, produced by its coincidence in conclusions with the firmer, harder lines of thought.

This group of witnesses is a group of much general similarity, though of special peculiarities in each. Many have held (with Butler) that in itself it is abundantly sufficient to establish the existence of "an Intelligent Author of Nature," and simply to leave to Moral Theology the task of discovering His moral attributes and relations to us. But if this conclusion be questioned, we examine that Moral Theology, as another witness of wholly distinct character from the former. We take up the Theology of the Conscience. We find how, proceeding by a wholly independent path,

the Conscience, by its witness of the Eternal existence of Right, and by its ineradicable foreboding of Retribution, leads us to a Supreme Being and to a Personal Being, so confirming at every point the results of the other two lines of thought. But then it adds a yet nobler feature, and shows how He who is the Supreme Cause and the All-wise Creator, is also the All-righteous Judge. Does it not set its seal with potent authority on the conclusions already drawn? Do not they, in their turn, throw a light on the truth of this Theology of Conscience, which tends still to confirm it, when it passes alone into the distinctly moral sphere? Yet even now this is not all. There is another twin witness in this second group. Among the Supreme powers which rule human life we recognise not only Reason and Conscience, but Love. That Love has its Theology. By its very nature incapable of fixing on any dead thing or abstract principle, it bears witness to the Personality of the Power which made and rules the world. By that same nature requiring goodness, real or supposed, in the object on which it rests, it adds its voice to the witness of Conscience to the goodness of the Creator and the King. Yet since it is in itself a recognition of unity, and of some degree of likeness, between the lover and the loved, it goes on still further to

recognise in the Majesty of an Eternal and All-righteous God the face of one who has a true spiritual unity with us, who is indeed not only a First Cause, a Creator, a Judge, but "Our Father which is in heaven." It is by this complex process—the same which mostly leads, in all Inductive Science, to moral certainty—that the soul of man feels after God. Only when you conceive of its various lines, not in mere aggregation, but in convergence, can you rightly estimate its force.

Let me remind you in passing that, in relation to the other Law of Natural Religion—the Law of Faith in some Revelation of God—this same principle has its place in estimating the evidences on which that Revelation is accepted. The lines of that evidence also are many, every one needing and implying the rest, all converging to one central result, and yet each conveying its own characteristic witness. Only when we consider them as a whole in their mutual relations, can we estimate the force of the conclusion, which has bowed Humanity at the feet of Jesus Christ—first, to cry, "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the Words of Eternal Life;" then, accepting these words, to go on, free from all weariness of doubt and toil of reasoning, "to know" in faith "the things which pass our knowledge." But

on this it is not yet the time to speak. There is a certain glimpse of appropriateness in the similarity of the processes, by which the two great elements of "Natural Religion," properly so called, establish their claims to our allegiance. But at present it will simply be my endeavour to work out in succeeding lectures the sketch here given of the relation of the lines of Natural Theology, in the mingled coincidence and independence which give to their testimony such all but irresistible force.

It does, I cannot deny, seem to me all but irresistible; I do not therefore wonder that, as we saw in the First Lecture, mankind at large has found it so. For certainly no such convergence can be pleaded for any other theory of the origin of things. Each has to choose its own ground, and decline to fight elsewhere. Materialistic Theories, for example, if they can claim any witness from external nature, have the consciousness of a spirit in man so strongly against them, that they are driven, first to discredit its testimony, and then to deny its existence. Pantheism, if it seem to account for the great world without, is met by the irreconcilable contradiction of the sense of individuality, especially in its moral aspects; till it is reduced to reckon that ineradicable consciousness as an inherent delu-

sion of the mind, to be silenced if it cannot be destroyed. Agnosticism, virtually atheistic, and indeed the only form in which Scientific Atheism can well exist, may possibly represent itself as innocent or tolerable before the bar of the pure Intellect ; but before the imperious demand of the Conscience for a basis of duty, and of the Affections for an object of love, it is forced to acknowledge itself as insufficient, in its pure negativeness, to supply a key to the meaning of life. The belief in God may at least claim that it is the only hypothesis, which can venture to recognise all the facts of life, and to appeal to all the faculties of the soul.

Of course, as Bishop Butler long ago warned us,<sup>6</sup> there must be, in all fairness, due weight given to a similar convergence, if such convergence can be traced, of difficulty and objection. But if we look at the facts, we shall find that there is but one quarter in which any shadow of this convergence can be traced. I mean the great mystery of Evil in all its branches—whether in physical suffering, apparent waste or failure, loathsomeness and decay, or in moral evil, both in guilt and degeneracy—seeming to imply imperfection in the Government of the world, and, whether it be punished or unpunished, equally throwing

<sup>6</sup> See Butler's "Analogy," part ii. chap. vi.



doubt upon the Perfect Love of the Creator. In that convergence of witness against the belief in God — strangely evaded, still more strangely accounted for, in many theories of philosophy and religion—we trace the one great difficulty in Natural Theology; sufficient, not indeed to overthrow, but certainly to obscure and impair its witness. In the presence of that mystery, human thought, as we have already said, halts for a time at Dualism in one or other of its forms. But necessarily dissatisfied with this, as a mode of thought unsatisfactory alike to the intellectual craving for unity and to the imperious assertion by the conscience of the inherent supremacy of righteousness, it stands in great degree at a loss, and cries out for some Revelation of God to decide this intolerable conflict.

V. For we do need here a Gospel from on high. No Revelation, which fails to grapple with this enemy, can be a religion for Humanity. There are two voices in the soul: one telling of sorrow, sin, unbelief; the other calling to joy, righteousness, faith. We should contend that, even in themselves, there is a victorious power in this latter voice, which the other may confuse but cannot drown. Still we cannot deny the conflict. Only from God Himself, speaking through man and to man, can come the truth which shall strike in

with authority, to silence the voice of evil, to sanction the utterance of good.

While, therefore, I seek to draw out the combined witness of these various lines of Natural Theology, I must again ask you at all times to bear in mind what is the degree of stress we actually lay upon them. The belief of the Christian, bringing out into clearness and living power the vague beliefs, hopes, speculations of humanity, always holds that man is not left wholly to this Law of Induction. We believe that, in actual fact, as an integral part of the system of the world, God has given His Special Revelation to men; and that this Revelation, not only meets these various lines of thought, coming out from the darkness up to which they converge, and binding all together "around the feet of God;" but especially and principally grapples with that great mystery of the existence of Evil which troubles alike every line of Natural Theology, and bids men doubt, sometimes the unity of the First Cause, sometimes the wisdom or power of the Creator, sometimes the righteousness of the Supreme Judge, or the love of the One Father. While, therefore, we delight to trace these reasonings and aspirations of the soul towards Heaven, its native home, we never for a moment suppose that this home keeps its gates

barred in an inhospitable coldness, till men struggle up, in darkness and pain, to burst them open. The gates of our Heavenly City stand open day and night, that through them the light of truth and the warmth of love may stream down to earth, and by a spiritual attraction draw the soul up to Heaven. In the famous lines of our great poet, John Milton, which tell how virtue

... Can teach the soul to climb  
Far above the starry chime,

we recognise what the noblest heathen philosophy has taught. But in the words which follow—

And if virtue feeble were,  
Heaven itself will stoop to her,

—we hail the utterance of the faith of the Christian.

Well it is for us to test the various strands of the threefold cord, not easily to be broken. But let us not hold that they are made by man's hand, or that man's own power must raise him up by their golden band. It is from Heaven that they came; it is from Heaven that the power still comes, which through them lays hold of the weakness of man, and brings him safe to the place appointed for him. The first idea is a noble dream; the last (thank God) has been found by thousands to be a blessed reality.

# LECTURE IV.

## THE THEOLOGY OF THE INTELLECT: CAUSATION.

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I.—THE INQUIRY INTO CAUSATION AN INTELLECTUAL NECESSITY.

- (a) ITS APPLICATION TO PHENOMENA OR EVENTS.
- (b) ITS APPLICATION TO THE SUBSTANCES OF THE UNIVERSE.

II.—THE INQUIRY INTO THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE IN ITS FOUR GREAT KINGDOMS.

- (a) THE CREATION OF FORM. THE FORCE OF THE ARGUMENT FROM THE ANALOGY BETWEEN THE WORKS OF ART AND NATURE, AND FROM THE POWER OF ART TO CO-OPERATE WITH NATURE.
- (b) THE CREATION OF SUBSTANCE, INCLUDING BOTH MIND AND MATTER, TRANSCENDING ALL EXPERIENCE.

III.—THE NATURE OF THE FIRST CAUSE. THE THEORIES OF

- (a) MATERIALISM.
- (b) PANTHEISM.
- (c) DUALISM.
- (d) THEISM.

V.—SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.

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“We understand that the worlds were framed by the

word of God, so that the things which are seen were not made of things which do appear."—HEB. xi. 3.

THE main argument of these Lectures has now been sketched in outline. First, in every line of thought there is a process of Induction, by which we work out into definite explicitness the instinctive sense, which I believe to be inherent in all humanity, of the Presence of God. Next, since under all variety the subject—the thinking mind—is one, and the great object of contemplation is one also, it would seem that these lines of thought cannot be, and ought not to be, regarded in isolation from each other; as in some reasonings for and against Natural Theology it is too much the habit to regard them. Thirdly, in virtue of the Law of Convergence, as we acknowledge it in pursuing scientific investigation, or in estimating human testimony, their combined effect is infinitely greater than the mere sum of their evidences; and accordingly, in virtue at once of their independence and coincidence, it tells with all the force of moral certainty, directly on the points in which all agree, indirectly even on the points on which each bears its separate testimony. In this respect the supreme knowledge of God stands in the closest analogy to all those leading forms of knowledge, speculative and moral, by which our human life is

guided and ruled. But we maintain, lastly, that this Induction of the human soul, striving up towards Heaven, is met by a distinct self-revelation of God Himself stooping to earth. For such is the belief which is suggested on the ground of analogy, supported by the testimony of universal tradition, and, as Christians hold, established by the convincing power of the signs, which lead us to the completion of such revelation in the manifestation of our Lord Jesus Christ.

This sketch it is the business of the succeeding lectures to work in its various parts.

I. We begin by considering, in some detail, the first of the great lines of Induction belonging to what I would call the Theology of the Intellect. This is the principle, technically known as the principle of *Ætiology*, or the study of the First Cause. Our object is to consider what are the conclusions to which it brings us—conclusions which, in accordance with the general conditions of human knowledge, we should expect to find imperfect in themselves, preparing and (so to speak) waiting for the coincidence of other lines of thought, in order to complete what may be imperfect, and to clear up what may involve some ambiguity.

What is this line of thought as viewed in

simple outline, keeping clear, so far as may be, of all intricacies of detail, and all subtleties of metaphysical controversy? <sup>1</sup>

Man finds himself in possession of two forms of consciousness. He is conscious of himself by reflection; he is conscious of a world around him by observation. Both these forms of consciousness coexist and act continually upon one another. Which first awakens it may seem too curious to inquire; but I can hardly doubt that it is the latter consciousness which (as the study of a child's mind shows) is first brought into anything like distinctness. Now, as soon as this is done—as soon as any object is distinctly contemplated—the mind asks two questions, What is it? How comes it to be?

The question, What is it? comes practically to mean, What are the qualities or properties, by which it impresses itself on my senses or my mind in the present? The question, How comes it to be? is virtually an inquiry into its history in the past, and its connexion with pre-existent objects.

<sup>1</sup> On the whole of this subject I would refer the reader to a singularly able, though somewhat difficult, Essay "On the Principle of Causation," by Canon Mozley, published in "Faith and Free Thought," by the Christian Evidence Society, in 1872.

It is with this latter inquiry that we are at present concerned. We need not, as yet, ask how it originates. It is sufficient for us that it is universal and inevitable. The notion, advanced in some modern systems, that we ought to be content with the inquiry into what is—simply tabulating and classifying our various forms of knowledge of its actual properties and relations—is too contradictory to this inevitable process of the human mind to maintain itself in any complete or ultimate system of thought.

But what is it which the mind perceives, whether it look outward by observation, or inward by reflection?

(a). No doubt our primary perceptions are of phenomena or events or sensations—changes in the condition of things without or within. Now of every event or phenomenon it is necessarily assumed that it is connected, by the relation of cause and effect, with events before it and after it. Such conception appears to be a “form of thought” which it is impossible to account for by referring it simply to observation, experience, and the like; for, in fact, it is under it that all observation and experience, which deserve the name, actually take place. Without it they would resolve themselves, as in an infant or an imbecile, into a mere series of unconnected im-



pressions. Our sensations, indeed, can tell us only of succession of events—antecedents and consequents. It is in virtue of a fundamental law of thought that, wherever we see invariable succession, we hold at once that there is necessary succession. The old fallacy, “Post hoc, ergo propter hoc,” shows at once that from mere succession we infer causal connexion; and yet that this connexion is something real, distinct from the succession which may take place without it.

Hence, whatever the event be—a natural phenomenon or the exhibition of human agency, a flash of lightning, or the waving of a sword—we infer at once that it had a cause. But whereas, in a natural phenomenon, we can only trace the line of Causation for a certain distance back, and know not how much farther it may extend, we can, in the case of human agency, arrive at a true cause—ultimate so far as our knowledge goes—in will; which may act (as every day it does act) without any motive whatever, simply because it does will, but which in any case acts as a conscious self-moving force.<sup>2</sup> Will is certainly a true cause of action, and it is the

<sup>2</sup> The old Greek definition (see Arist. Nic. Ethics, Book iii. chap. 1) of τὸ ἐκούσιον, as οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἶδότε, can hardly be made clearer, or more accordant with our own consciousness.

only one which we can be said to know. Undoubtedly we must hold that the myriads of human wills are under some Power, which guides and may overrule them. We know even by experience that, while each is free in itself, the results of human volition are subject to certain laws,<sup>3</sup> and may be within limits foreseen even by man. But we must still ask, what is the nature of this Supreme Power which impresses its laws upon human will? Now we are perfectly familiar with the power of one will over another—a power quite distinct from physical necessity—acting in three chief ways, viz. by appeal to reason and conscience producing free conviction, by the application of motives, and by the influence of personal ascendancy; and we can therefore, by infinite extension of these results of experience, conceive a Supreme Will guiding all other wills by a power absolutely different from that of physical compulsion. But while we know how will can direct and excite force, we are not familiar

<sup>3</sup> We must, of course, guard against the “fallacy of averages,” which, when it has proved that the results of human actions may be tabulated statistically, fancies that it has discovered their cause and eliminated free will. We may infer, no doubt, that they are under “a Law” in the true sense—that is, an expression of the Supreme will. But the assumption that it is a Law of the same kind as those which rule in the physical sphere, monstrous as it is, is yet unfortunately but too common.

with the power of physical forces to create and rule will; and therefore, since Causation of will has to be accounted for, we recoil from the idea of a Primal Physical Impulse, as the first mover in the great chain of events, which constitutes the history of the universe. Even if we are led to believe that there was a time when the power of created will did not exist on the earth, we have no right from this belief to infer the non-existence of all will as a primeval force. Our previous argument stands firm, based alike on reason and on experience.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> This false inference is not infrequent in materialistic argument. I venture to quote upon it a passage from the eloquent Hunterian Oration of 1877, by Sir James Paget:—

“Now I cannot doubt that in the doctrine of the correlation of physical and vital forces we are nearer to the truth than we were in the Hunterian doctrine, which held that life is something altogether alien and different from other forms or methods of activity; but to hold the correlation and mutual conversion of the forces does not determine the precedence of either the one or the other. If the vital and physical forces are mutually convertible, either may have preceded the other; the vital force may have preceded the physical, although life appeared late upon this planet, in any of the phenomena in which we can now study it; and even if we were to hold the possible conversion of physical or vital into mental force, into consciousness and will (though against this, what I believe to be my consciousness and will are utterly repugnant), yet this would not prove the precedence of the physical force.

“The opposite conversion can be as well or as ill traced.

The contemplation, then, of phenomena leads us irresistibly to a First Cause; and our experience, so far as we can carry it, gives no distinct evidence of a true cause, absolutely originating action, except in will. The consequence is that almost all language upon the subject, from whatever lips it proceeds, is driven irresistibly to imply

Mental forces may have preceded physical: mind may have existed before any of the properties of matter; and thus, even in the view of science, the first essence may have been a Being willing and knowing, and the prime source of all the forces whose operations we now trace. I believe there is not anything in science to disprove such a belief as this; but I doubt whether it be in the power of science yet to determine an order of precedence amongst the forces. I cannot imagine anything before a natural force except a supernatural will; and a belief of this kind is held by untutored minds as if it were instinctive knowledge. For man seems naturally prone to believe that, beyond all that there is in the world, there must be a mind, or minds, in the likeness in which his own is created, and with which he is in some kind of personal relation.

"But science cannot yet reach to the proof of these things, and, until it can reach to proof, science cannot rest, and must not rest; but the firm and self-guiding belief that a supernatural Will and Knowledge was, and is, and will be, rests on the whole and manifold evidences of the Christian faith.

"These may seem often opposed to what we believe true in science. Then let us wait. Time—or, if not time, eternity—will prove that science and the Christian theology are but two sides of truth, and that both sides are as yet only known in part."

Personality: In spite of all struggles to the contrary, "every tongue" has to "confess to God."

(b) But from the simple observation of phenomena, we pass to the inference of the existence of things and persons. How that inference takes place we are not here concerned to inquire. Every student of Berkeley's writings knows how difficult it is to prove the absolute existence of any material thing from that purely physical observation, which can reveal only impressions upon our senses, suggesting ideas to the mind. Every one who has looked at a stereoscope is aware how by combination of such impressions on the eye we are induced to infer a substance which does not exist. I believe myself that it is from the consciousness of being, underlying the phenomena of the little world within,<sup>5</sup> that we are led to conceive of a *substratum* underlying the phenomena of the great world without, and where that *substratum* is not

<sup>5</sup> "The operations of the mind may in some degree be spoken of as phenomena manifesting themselves to the internal sense or consciousness; but they never present themselves as a mere bundle of phenomena, but always in reference to that self which is the ground and origin of them. . . . We have arrived at something much more than a mere phenomenon, viz. at a being the ground of the phenomena."—Shaw "On Positivism," pp. 23. 25.

referable to living beings like ourselves, call it Matter and Force in the abstract. The constant tendency to personification in all such cases shows the origin of the process. But, however the inference takes place, it is universal. We look upon the universe, as a reality, not in raw chaotic material, but as a true Kosmos in form and order, in the co-existence and correlation of all its parts, and we ask, first whether there is a First Cause of Nature, and, if so, of what character is that First Cause.

II. In relation to the former inquiry, let me here remind you (to guard against an unfortunate ambiguity of the use of this word) that by Nature we mean, or ought to mean, the sum total of being cognisable by us, which, if we would understand it aright (so all Science warns us), we must consider in its entirety and its continuity. A student of what we unfortunately call Physical Science is a student of but one part of Nature. Mind is as much a real thing as Matter;<sup>6</sup> Will is as true a factor in the great world of Nature, as Electricity.

<sup>6</sup> This is the sense, for example, in which Butler uses the word "nature" in his "Analogy." In the discussion of the "supernatural" there is constantly an ambiguity, often an inconsistency, in the sense given to "the natural," which needs the most jealous scrutiny.

Now, as we survey these works of Nature, we find that they fall into certain distinct classes.

There is, first, a fundamental division, which, as yet, no Science can cross, between the things which have life, and the things which have not life. At this point there comes in a new power, entailing a partial break in the great principle of Convertibility of Force. Life, so far as we have yet seen, can be derived only from Life.

Then, within the realm of life, there comes another division, between the mere vegetative or animal life,<sup>7</sup> and the existence of Mind, Soul, Intelligence—call it what you will—of which we find rudimentary forms, gradually increasing in perfection through the animal world of Instinct, and, of which we find, so far as earth is concerned, the perfection in man, though we believe that man is but one in a hierarchy of

<sup>7</sup> I use this expression because (so far as merely organic life is concerned) it appears singularly difficult to draw any line of demarcation between the animal and vegetable kingdom. Thus Professor Bentley in his "Manual of Botany" (Introduction, pp. 3, 4), after pointing out general distinctions, in respect of (a) food, (b) powers of motion, (c) respiration, and (d) the composition of permanent tissues, between plants and animals, is forced to conclude that in our present state of knowledge it is, physiologically speaking, "impossible to give a complete and perfect definition of a plant, in contradistinction to what is to be regarded as an animal."

intelligent beings, surrounding the throne of God.

But here again—whatever Physiology may teach as to the connexion of our bodily structure with animal organizations—whatever analogies Psychology may trace between understanding and instinct—still between man and brute there is a great gulf fixed, marked by the peculiar power in man of intellectual progress, by the possession and elaboration of language, by the capacity of rising above the sphere of sense to contemplate the Invisible.<sup>8</sup> At this point again there is a break in the Convertibility of Force. As we cannot see any trace of convertibility of vegetative life into animal instinct; so we can see still less any vestige of power to raise instinct to the level

<sup>8</sup> It is here, as Coleridge showed in the "Aids to Reflection" (vol. i. pp. 168—183, ed. of 1848), that the true line is to be drawn between the Instinct, differing only in degree from what he called the "understanding" in man, and the Reason, which is the peculiarly human faculty. Hooker says truly, "Beasts are in sensible capacity as ripe as men themselves, perhaps more ripe . . . . The soul of man . . . hath, besides the faculty of growing to sensible knowledge which is common unto us with beasts, a farther ability, whereof in them is no show at all, the ability of reaching higher than unto sensible things" (Ecc. Pol., I. chap. vi. sects. 2, 3). The neglect of this distinction is remarkable in the reasonings of the Darwinian school, as to the derivation of Reason and Conscience from animal instincts.



of reason, to degrade reason hopelessly to the level of instinct. To refer life, intelligence, reason, vaguely to unknown "potentialities of matter" is simply to ignore lines of demarcation, which to our present knowledge are impassable. To talk of the genius of a Newton as latent in the light of the sun, or in some ring of cosmical vapour, seems like tracing the potentiality of a steam-engine simply to the properties of brass and iron, and the expansive power of steam.

Now that this 'our formed system of Nature had a beginning is certain, not only by reasoning of abstract thought, but by the discoveries of Inductive Science. That there was a time in our world, marked by the existence only of elementary inorganic substance is all but certain; that there may have been a nebulous period, before solid or liquid forms of material substance had their being, is highly probable. That, at a subsequent period life made its appearance in the world, in its various vegetable and animal forms is again known—whether by evolution from one monad, or by what are awkwardly called "acts of successive creation" we do not as yet inquire. That at a still later time man emerged, as he is—whether again by evolution or otherwise, we care not—is a certain

thing. Hence the instinct is clearly right, which asks of actual Nature, How it came to be? For it did come to be. It had a beginning; as even now we have probable indications to show that it will have an end.

Hence it would seem that the answer to the first inquiry is absolute. The universe had a beginning; it must have had a First Cause—a *Vis Creatrix* of some kind or other. It is contended with perfect truth, on the principle indicated in the old maxim, *Causa Causæ Causa Causati*, that in the conception of a true cause finality is involved, that "an infinite series of secondary causes does not make the cause," which "reason requires." As our old metaphysicians rightly urged, "that something must be self-existent and the original cause of all things will not bear much dispute."<sup>9</sup>

(a) But of what nature is that First Cause of the world as we see it? In pursuing this inquiry it is reasonable to look first to the class of things, of which it is easiest to give account. We see around a certain number of things of all kinds, which we call Works of Art; and of these we do actually know how they came to be what

<sup>9</sup> See Canon Mozley's "Essay," pp. 20, 32, with his interesting criticism on the merits of Clarke's "Demonstration of the Being of a God."

they are. In each such thing there is the raw material (the *ύλη*), and the form or structure (the *εἶδος*). Now how this raw material came into being we know not; in fact, the observation of Science teaches that, within the range of our knowledge, the sum total of matter is fixed, and the sum total of physical force (if latent and active force be taken together) is equally unchangeable. But the form or structure—that which makes each work of Art what it is—we do know to be simply due to human will and intelligence, moulding the forms of any special kind of matter, combining various kinds of matter together, directing the play of force, calling it from dormancy into life, or from living energy bidding it sink back into mere potentiality again. From the simplest manufacture of the savage to the highest work of civilized Art—the grandest building, the noblest sculpture, the most subtle and exquisite machine—the same principle is true. We know (as we say) how it was made. It is true that of the raw material we can give no account; it is with the structure that we are concerned, and of this the true cause lies in Mind and Will. Henceforward the fact that Mind does work upon matter, and can evoke and direct force, is a thing ascertained. Once ascertained, it cannot be, and ought not to be, forgotten. We engrave

it on our memory, as we pass from this class of things which we know to other classes more mysterious to us. For, when we have discovered a true cause, Science bids us take it with us in our further investigation, refusing to imagine new hypothetical causes, till we have tried this and found it wanting.

Now, when from the works of Art, we turn to the universe itself—the “works of Nature,” in that true and general sense referred to above—and inquire into the processes, by which in its various parts it comes to be what it actually is, we are struck at once by the fact that, within our knowledge, they wear the aspect of that superimposition on some raw material of form and structure, of which we ourselves in our measure are capable. In what we call inorganic substances, we find that all their infinite variety is due to the combination of but a few elements in various relations and proportions, under the action of a few known physical forces; and, moreover, by the known existence of things of very different properties, capable nevertheless of being resolved into the same elements, we are driven to the belief that, besides the laws of proportion and structure, which we can trace, there are invisible laws of molecular structure, by which these differences are determined. So far knowledge

and probable inference go. Speculation goes on, with more or less of arbitrary assumption,<sup>1</sup> to conjecture, that the final elements of matter may be all of one kind, may be perhaps simply centres of force; and that all the endless variety of Nature may depend on variety of structure of one kind of matter, and on variety of manifestation of but one Force.

Still more clearly the growth of organic life from the first simple cell is the assimilation of elemental substance under the law of some inherent structure. So it is in the growth of the rich, endless variety of vegetation from the simple food of the air, the moisture, and the soil. So it is in the still more wonderful growth of animal life by the absorption of substances, less rudimentary indeed, but still in themselves simple enough. Watch the marvellous process from the simple original protoplasm. See how

<sup>1</sup> We smile at the arbitrary inference of the old Greek philosophy, that the heavenly bodies must move in circles, because the works of Nature are perfect and "the circle is the most perfect figure." But, whenever the mind, passing from the solid ground of experience in physical subjects, delights in abstruse speculations as to the origin of things, we constantly find metaphysical assumptions of the same kind. There are "idols of the cave" everywhere. Mind will assert itself, perhaps abnormally, even while it professes to sit at the feet of Physical Power.

infinite variety of structure developes, we know not how or why, from what seems the same germ of life, and on what is apparently the same kind of assimilated food. The creative force of Nature here is, again in a far higher and subtler perfection, the addition to elemental matter of form and structure.

Pass next to the realm of mind. Is not the same law here manifest? All the fabric of human knowledge and morality is surely the assimilation, under the mental structure, which Kant calls the "forms of thought," of food derived from observation, from teaching, from instinctive self-perception. It is so in each several mind, as the Socratic process of interrogation so vividly shows.<sup>2</sup> It is so in the inherited knowledge of the race, gradually assimilating fresh food in each generation, and so growing from the simple instinctive notions of the savage to the complicated knowledge of high civilization. We note, moreover, here also that there are infinite variations of latent mental structure—individual, hereditary, national—and that the same mental and moral food is assimilated

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, the famous example in the "Menon," where Socrates, by judicious questions, draws from an ignorant but intelligent slave-boy the formal conclusion of a geometrical proposition.

accordingly in different degrees and different directions ; so that from precisely the same circumstances, natural and artificial, different forms of humanity actually grow up.

Hence, in respect of all those works of Nature, there is within our knowledge a distinct analogy between them and the works of Art. In fact, the whole process is the addition to matter or life or mind of form and structure. The analogy is not broken, because, in the works of Nature, this addition is made by processes to us unknown, and with a subtlety and beauty, which we can but clumsily imitate. And it is drawn closer by the fact that we ourselves, acting by intelligence and will, can actually, in different degrees, imitate and co-operate with these natural processes. Thus, for example, we can analyse inorganic substances, and then recombine them again with a known and predetermined effect. We study physical forces, mechanical, chemical, electrical ; and, again, we can combine them, and subject them to certain forms and structures of our own making, that they may serve our will. In less degree, but in very real degree, we can act upon organic life. There is hardly a vegetable product of the earth, which man cannot cultivate, and by cultivation modify, and, so far as human purposes and conceptions go, improve in

fruitfulness or beauty. In still less degree, but yet most truly, we can modify the structures and peculiar capacities of animal life. The very theory of evolution of species was suggested by the power of selection exercised by man. Lastly, even in the human soul itself, we know how, by the familiar but most mysterious power of habit in ourselves, we can make the deliberate act of to-day modify the mental and moral structure of to-morrow. We know how, by bringing what we call educating influences to bear on others, we can determine within limits the growth of the human soul in them. All this power of co-operation by the action of the human mind certainly makes the analogy between the works of Art and the works of Nature, I will not say more real, but certainly more vivid and practical.

What is the inference which men naturally draw, and historically have drawn?

(b) The first distinction which occurs to them is between the creation of the form and structure and the creation of the raw sub-stratum of being,—of matter, of life, of mind.

As to the first, they have seen that the action of mind and will in man is a true efficient cause—the only such cause actually known—undoubtedly producing effects similar to the



works of Nature, capable of actually co-operating within limits with the forces which produce them. As a well-known philosopher (Sir John Herschell) has said, "These works of Nature bear all the appearance of 'manufactured articles.'" Men have drawn, therefore, in all ages the inference that this cause—the operation of mind—is a true and a sufficient cause; they have refused to put it aside for any other which is merely supposed. They have not been alarmed or disquieted by foolish sarcasms against the notion of a "manufacturing God;" for they know that similarity does not exclude a transcendant superiority, removing Him far away from all the associations which can give any show of plausibility to such sarcasm. This unvarying and determined inference has surely a philosophical propriety and a definiteness of idea, which vague phrases of a *Vis Creatrix Naturæ*, of unknown potentialities, even of Evolution, if it be taken to describe a cause and not a mode of formation, ought not to displace.

But what of the substance itself? Here unquestionably analogy fails, and we enter a more mysterious region. What shall we say here?

First (again to use an old phrase) man is the "microcosm"—a little world in himself—and

any true theory of the great world must account for all that is contained in man. For in man there is the material composition, easily analysed into its parts—so much phosphorus, so much iron, so much carbon, and the like—analagous to the lowest inorganic kingdom of the universe. There is the lower vegetative or animal life, with its marvellous structure and assimilating power, uniting him in the closest bonds to the organic world. There is something corresponding to the animal instincts, belonging to that brute creation to which man is physiologically linked with a startling closeness—instincts which in those brute creatures he has power, within limits, to modify and enhance. But there is undoubtedly something more. Will, reason, conscience are distinct realities, which, though for their physical exercise they may require physical means, though, even for their own excitation, they may need to use the animal life and structure, fall certainly under a wholly different law of Causation. Who can study the relation of mind to body without seeing that in the complex being of man two wholly different orders of influence act—the one by physical contact, the other by the impression of ideas? For example, idiocy, temporary or permanent, is (we may suppose) accompanied

by some particular physical condition of the brain. But who does not know that this condition of the brain may be produced either by causes within the range of physical causation, such as a mechanical blow, or the physiological absorption of disease or poison (both being different forms of physical power), or by a wholly mental cause—some great joy or sorrow acting, not by contact, but by mental cognition, presented to, and acting upon, not the physical constitution, but the mind alone? Mind, as mind, is a distinct power, lying outside the chain of Physical Causation. As such, it must be accounted for in any theory of this world's origin.

III. Now since, this being the case, matter and force, life and mind, have all to be accounted for in any theory of the First Cause—what theories are presented to us? The First Cause must be either purely material, purely spiritual, or (in some way) compact of both. Let us look these various answers in the face.

(a) Pure Materialism, holding matter alone to be original, and mind either a development from it, or possibly a mere consequence of its organization—just as the calling out of an electric current is the consequence of the juxtaposition of certain material substances—fails, in

relation both to a *priori* idea and a *posteriori* experience, to give an adequate account of the world as it actually is. For the former conception of a development of mind from matter<sup>3</sup> not only shocks all our consciousness of radical difference between the mental and physical powers, but is shattered against the conclusion, derived from all our experience, so far as it has yet gone, that not even life can be developed from inorganic force, far less mind developed from vegetative life. The other theory (at least as old as Plato),<sup>4</sup> that mind is a consequence of material organization, at once contradicts that inner consciousness of a personal and independent being, which is our simplest and most ultimate consciousness; and again fails absolutely to account for the experience of that line of Causation above alluded to, in which

<sup>3</sup> Development, like most words of the kind, is often used with a latent reference to some external developing power. Now, of course, if there be a creative mind ruling and guiding this development, we can conceive how the created mind might be thus developed. But then the true cause is in the creating mind, not in the matter.

<sup>4</sup> See the "Phædo," chaps. 41—43, where the hypothesis that the soul is a kind of *ἀφροίτα* is considered. Socrates meets the hypothesis by the consciousness of the power of the soul over the body, and the fact that the soul itself is capable of having harmony or discord superinduced upon its objective existence.

mind, through the simple conception of ideas, so acts upon the body as to produce in it often functional, sometimes organic changes. The experience of ages has but strengthened indefinitely the protest of the dying Socrates against the notion that mind, which rules by a spiritual right, is but a function of the very matter which it thus rules.

Such pure Materialism accordingly seems incapable of maintaining any real empire over human thought. Whenever it endeavours to attain any real dominion, it glides inevitably into Pantheism. Attributing to matter "capacity of self-motion," "actual sense and perception," as older Materialists put it, or "unknown potentialities" of development, in the vaguer language of modern days, it simply "makes matter cease to be matter and become mind."<sup>5</sup> It breaks down, tacitly or avowedly, the distinctions established by daily experience, and

<sup>5</sup> See Canon Mozley's "Essay," pp. 36, 37, with the quotations there given from Hobbes and Tyndall. Mr. Thornton (in his "Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics," p. 226,) puts the alternative plainly,— "Either this matter must, whether under superior direction or not, have organized itself, or it must have been organized by some other agency." "If it organized itself, it cannot have been inert or lifeless, but must have been active and animate, and capable of volition."

escapes from the difficulty of an untenable claim by the process of presenting a new reality under an old name. No theory of a First Cause of the world as it is can exclude original mind. After all, the old question of the Psalmist recurs. The power "which planted the ear, shall it not hear?" The power which created the mind, shall it not think? Nothing is clearer within the range of our experience than that the higher power of mind constantly assumes dominion over the lower powers of physical force and life, and moulds them to its will. Why should we arbitrarily suppose that, when we pass the border, this law is immediately reversed?

(b) But then there are two different relations of mind to matter actually existing. There is the relation in which the human mind stands to the body with which it is linked, acting upon it, being reacted upon by it. There is the relation in which the human mind stands to extraneous matter and force, acting upon them to produce results distinctly analogous to the works of Nature. Which of these relations shall we take as the type of the operation of mind in the great world without?

The answer which accepts the first, is the answer of Pantheism — the vague conception of some Divine mind diffused through

the whole universe, as the soul to which the universe is the body, manifesting emanations from itself in what we call created minds, manifesting its derived power in what we call physical phenomena.<sup>6</sup> It is an answer, which from the beginning has expressed itself, not, indeed, in forms of thought practically and widely predominant, but in vague, half-philosophic, half-poetic ideas, colouring other forms of thought while they live, and superseding them when they lose vitality and power.

I hardly know that even in modern days it has advanced far beyond that Pythagorean expression of itself which we find in the famous lines of Virgil :—

“Principio cælum ac terras, camposque liquentes,  
Lucentemque globum Lunæ, Titaniaque astra,  
Spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus  
Mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet.  
Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitæque volantum,  
Et quæ marmoreo fert monstra sub æquore pontus.”

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<sup>6</sup> Pantheism has been described “as that speculative system, which reduces all existence, mental and material, to phenomenal modifications of one Eternal self-existing Substance, which is called by the name of God.” See article “Pantheism,” in “Cyclopædia Britannica,” by John Downes, M.A. (quoted in an interesting article on “Pantheism—from the Vedas to Spinoza,” in *Church Quarterly Review*, No. VII.).

“ Deum namque ire per omnes  
Terrasque tractusque maris cælumque profundum ;  
Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,  
Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas ;  
Scilicet huc reddi deinde ac resoluta referri  
Omnia, nec morti esse locum.” <sup>7</sup>

It has been truly remarked that Pantheistic speculation often hovers on the verge of a true Theism. If it regards the One Eternal Substance as Spirit, and believes its power unexhausted in the creation of the actual universe, it approaches at least, to that conception of an Eternal Mind above Nature, which must ultimately assume the character of a true Personality ; and it undoubtedly does not make the creature consubstantial with the Creator. This mode of thought is perhaps not sufficiently thorough and self-consistent to maintain itself in the abstract. But it frequently runs through many half-poetical representations of “ the plastic force of nature,” “ the potentialities of matter,” and the like, which seem rather to veil God from conscious thought, than formally to deny Him. It is well that such views should be tested. If they do not identify the creature with the Creator, or suppose God to be

<sup>7</sup> Virg. *Æn.* vi. 724—729 ; Georg. iv. 221—225. It will be observed how entirely all division between man and brute is broken down under this Pantheistic theory.



no greater than His visible works, they are not strictly Pantheistic, and may easily lead up to higher and truer belief in God.

But for purposes of criticism we must exclude these transitional forms of thought, and consider Pantheism in its strictest and completest sense as making the relation of God to the universe the same as the relation of the soul to the body.

This places it in direct contrast with the answer of a true Theism, accepting the other relation of mind to matter, and so rising to the belief in a Personal God, of whose hand the whole universe is the work.

(c) True, that as no observation tells of the absolute creation of matter or of force, and as in our experience the action of mind can manifest itself only through physical means, that answer is perplexed by doubt as to the relation of a supposed physical substratum to the Eternal Mind. Hence, as we have seen, in many forms of thought, there is the conception of a Dualism, a coexistence of an Eternal Matter and an Eternal Mind; and in this case almost necessarily the omnipotence of the creating Mind is supposed to be limited by some intractability of matter, to which all physical imperfection and suffering, and even moral evil, are referred.

The Demiurgus—the great workmaster in the old Gnostic theories, and in some modern revivals of them—is a kind of God, but a God imperfect either in power or in wisdom.

But this Dualism sins against the unity and finality which belongs to the very idea of Cause. It is therefore but a temporary position. Unless mind and matter be but one ultimate being, the imperious question forces itself on the mind, Which was the true original? Did Matter originate Mind? Did Mind originate Matter? Either we have to fall back on the pure Materialism, to the fatal difficulties of which we have already referred, or we must accept a pure Theism, unclogged by any material limitations.

(*d*) If, then, we will believe in a true God, we must face the belief in the creation of matter. Inconceivable indeed it is how this can be, because it transcends our whole experience, but surely not inconceivable that it may be. If we are driven to a theory, we may even embrace that conception at which Berkleyanism hints,—that matter has no objective existence, and that what we call material phenomena are simply impressions on our minds made by the Eternal Mind.<sup>8</sup> It may, indeed, be granted that this is

<sup>8</sup> See a vigorous and interesting development of a theory

a theory difficult to grasp definitely, possibly liable to merge itself in some of the half-formed developments of spiritual Pantheism to which I have already referred. Yet surely it is infinitely more reasonable than the theories of pure Materialism or materialistic Pantheism. But, after all, without venturing on any theory, if we are brought face to face with the alternative between original Mind and original Matter, our consciousness of the power of mind to mould and direct material forces, and to make each material thing what it is by structure and organization, makes it not difficult to take the last great step ; and, passing beyond the limits of experience (as in all ultimate theories we must pass), to refer the crude  $\psi\lambda\eta$  of the Universe to the same origin as the informing  $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\omicron\varsigma$ .

It seems to me therefore that we may dismiss both Pure Materialism and that Semi-Materialism which these dualistic theories involve. The final antagonism is between the grand theory of Pantheism and the pure Theism which declares not only that "the Earth was without form and void" till the moulding hand of the Creator passed over it, but also that "in

of this kind in Mr. Thornton's "Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics," chap. iv., on "Huxleyism."

the beginning God created out of nothing the Heaven and the Earth."

V. Such is the result of this line of Induction. The two alternatives present themselves—the Mind in Nature of the Pantheist—the Mind over Nature, as well as in Nature, of the believer in God. How fare these alternatives when brought face to face? Even if we confine ourselves to this line of thought, provided that in our Induction we turn our eyes inward, and recognise the reality of the facts of our own consciousness, I can hardly think that the strife between them is left quite undetermined. The consciousness of will and therefore of personality in ourselves is (as I have already urged) the surest of all forms of consciousness. It presents itself to us as a true cause of action, incapable of being resolved into any of the external influences which coexist with it. If we are deceived in believing that we have power to originate action by will—if it be but to move the finger this way or that—then all consciousness whatever is a delusion, and all reasoning upon it an absurdity. But this consciousness of personality in us, while it accepts gladly the belief in a Personal God over us and in us, "in whom we live and move and have our being," within the limits of whose Law our freedom

acts, under the influence of whose Spirit our will moves, yet repudiates as absolutely the conception of true Pantheism, that we have really no individuality, no personality—that what we fancy to be an individual spiritual self, is at most but an emanation shot out from the pervading Spirit, assuming for a time this inexplicable consciousness, not only of spiritual being, but of individuality, but destined as its highest wisdom to unlearn (with the Buddhist) its most certain intuition, and as its highest happiness to be absorbed again, and as an individual to cease to be. I do not at present speak of the argument from the moral sense of conscience, which absolutely repudiates the idea (maintained by all consistent Pantheism) that “evil is a lower form of good,” because attaching to the Divine Being itself, and the moral sense of love, which utterly refuses to fix on anything but true personality. I consider only the principle of Causation in itself. Even then, I urge, that, so long as the mind devotes itself entirely to the great world without, either of inanimate things, or even of persons, considered *en masse* as swayed by quasi-physical laws, the ideas of Pantheism may prevail, alike in the cold reasonings of Science, and in the glowing mysticism of Poetry. But when it turns back upon itself,

realizing its own actual power to will, to think, to feel—especially in these great crises of life, which show how this individuality can stand against physical force, against the voice of man, even against a Law which speaks in the name of God—then these Pantheistic dreams vanish like the visions of the night at the first glance of day. We feel a true personality in ourselves ; to a true Person alone can we bow.

Therefore, even if we had no other line of Natural Theology on which to dwell, I could not wonder that (as I said in my first Lecture) the thought of man, expressed in all the religions of the universe, and implied in all its languages, has chosen the alternative of Theism ; and, amidst all confusions and perversions, has still held firmly to the Personal God.

But my contention is that we ought not to stop here—that, contemporaneously with this line of thought, the conception of Design, on which we are next to dwell, the clear witness of Conscience, the glowing enthusiasm of Love, must be present to our minds ; and that by their presence they not only decide the great question of the Divine Personality, before which we are now pausing, but go on farther still to reveal to us, step by step, the attributes of the Living God. Of this I hope to speak hereafter. Meanwhile

I would urge you to let your minds range back in thought to the first origin of this great Universe of Matter and of Spiritual Being. Only, while as they move through all this wide and mysterious region of thought, let them keep fast hold of consciousness of the self which surveys it. Call up in succession all the various theories of Pantheistic self-evolving, self-distributing life, which are presented in the name of science. Thank those who present them for teaching—what the older Deists and some of the older defenders of Christianity too little regarded—the truth that this world is not a mere machine, once created, once started, and then left to work, with perhaps occasional interferences from the hand that made it; but that the *Vis Creatrix* is ever present and active, and that the Divine Power is inseparable from any particle of its composition and from any moment of life. But yet, if you would have a solid intelligible ground of thought, on which both the world without, and the little world within, may rest—ask yourselves whether anything has ever yet been found to take the place of the old simple teaching, which tells how “in the beginning God”—the God who is our Father—“created the heavens and the earth;” and then under the form of the six days’ creation, brings

home to us, step by step, the conviction, that in every fresh development of matter and force, of physical and spiritual life, His Providence and His Spirit rule. How far the Christian doctrine is from the bare Deistic conception, we know by the words of Him, who declared, "My Father worketh up to this very moment" in the outer sphere of Providence; and by the Apostolic teaching, which, in relation to the inner sphere of spirit, confesses that "in Him we live and move and have our being." But still, while all theories of the universe must hold one part of the text, that "the things which are seen"—the *τὸ βλεπόμενον*, the whole visible system—came not into being out of the things which do appear, it is the distinctive characteristic of the true faith of Theism—which has issues both of thought and life of unspeakable moment—that "the worlds were framed," not by the self-evolution of a mere "Soul of the Universe," but "by the word" of a living Personal God.



## LECTURE V.

# THE THEOLOGY OF THE INTELLECT: THE EVIDENCE OF DESIGN.

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I.—THE RELATION OF TELEOLOGY TO ETIOLOGY.

II.—THE ARGUMENT OF DESIGN APPLIED TO THE UNIVERSE AS A WHOLE. ITS POWER TO SUPPLY A GROUND OF UNITY BETWEEN THE VARIOUS KINGDOMS, AND THE WANT OF ANY ADEQUATE SUBSTITUTE FOR IT.

III.—THE ARGUMENT APPLIED TO SPECIAL PORTIONS OF THE UNIVERSE. THE RELATION OF THE KINGDOM OF ORGANIC LIFE TO THE KINGDOMS OF INORGANIC FORCE AND OF MIND. THE TRUE MEANING OF CONTRIVANCE AS "DESIGN UNDER LAW."

IV.—THE BEARING OF THE THEORY OF EVOLUTION ON TELEOLOGY, TO MODIFY, NOT TO DESTROY IT.

THE THREE SUCCESSIVE FORMS OF TELEOLOGICAL CONCEPTION.

THE EXISTENCE OF A LAW TEMPERING "THE STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE."

V.—THE OBJECTIONS FROM WASTE AND SUFFERING.

VI.—THE BEARING OF TELEOLOGY ON THE GREAT ALTERNATIVE OF THEISM AND PANTHEISM.

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"And God saw everything that He had made, and, behold, it was very good."—GEN. i. 31.

THE sketch of the first great line of the Theology of the Intellect has now been drawn, in our argument as to the existence and the nature of the First Cause. In this Induction certain points are clear. First, it is historically certain that this our universe, in its organization and structure, came into being in time, and therefore had a cause. Next, looking at its various kingdoms—first of physical force and matter, next, of animal life, and, lastly, of mind—and examining in each the processes by which it comes to be what it is, we find them to be processes bearing a very distinct analogy to the production of the works of Art, of which we actually know that it is due to the addition to raw material of form or structure dictated by human intelligence and will. Lastly, in contemplating the First Cause of the substance of the universe, we see that it must be such to account both for matter and for mind, and that no forms of Materialism supply such a cause.

So far our path is clear. But now from the two relations of Mind and Matter actually existing, there arise in this line of thought two theories of the First Cause—the Pantheistic idea of an *Anima Mundi*, an eternal compact of Mind and Matter, and the faith of a true Theism, acknowledging (after, perhaps, a brief halt in

some form of Dualism) a sole Eternal Mind, the Creator, as well as the moulder and director, of Heaven and Earth. These two answers stand face to face. All less decisive and ultimate theories are silenced in the presence of their conflict.

Now in testing their claims to our allegiance, it is impossible to ignore the fact that against the theory of Pantheism (even in the examination of Causation alone) the sense of individual personality in man protests with such power, that it has seldom or never really dominated the practical belief of the mass of men. But yet, if we confine ourselves to this line of thought, the strife might, perhaps, seem to be at best partially decided. It is my present object to lead you to consider what witness can be gained from other quarters, to supply imperfection and to determine ambiguity.

With this view I would next seek to trace the outline of the second branch of the Theology of the Intellect, in the study of Teleology—in the study, that is, of the evidence in Nature of Design and Purpose. The great ideas involved in it are expressed in the words of the text, recurring at each of the great epochs of creation, “God beheld all that He had made,” and, because it fulfilled His Divine purpose, “it was very good.”

I. It is plain that this line of thought is closely connected with the last. If we conceive any action of Mind as a First Cause in Creation, it is difficult, if not impossible, to avoid inferring at once the existence of purpose. It is true, that in our own experience the mind may act arbitrarily, without any purpose except the assertion of will; it may act capriciously, that is, by unconnected and temporary impulses of purpose; it may act blindly, producing indeed effects, but not foreseeing what these effects shall be. It is possible in the abstract to imagine mental action without any great pervading purpose. But all these phases of action are, except in things absolutely trivial, proofs of mental weakness, which we cannot attribute to a power by hypothesis perfect and supreme. It is not the Theist who talks of "freaks," and "blunders" of Nature. Hence, if we conceive an original Mind we mostly infer some original purpose. But certainly the converse is true. If we discern a glimpse of purpose, we infer unhesitatingly the existence of mind. Thus even speculators, who ignore or deny creative mind, glide into language implying it, whenever they speak, however vaguely, of contrivance or design. If they would avoid the natural inference, they urge that the discernment

of purpose is a delusion, mistaking our own subjective forms of thought for objective reality, which has impressed itself on the structure of language. For, if purpose be really traceable, the denial of a creative mind is impossible.

It follows, therefore, that the study of Teleology, examining the signs of Design in Creation—considered (as it may well be) independently of the investigation of original Causation—must bear very closely on the line of thought already followed; and, if it yields any fruit at all, may well be expected to correct and to elucidate the conclusions drawn from it.

This study appears to have two methods of application; first, to the universe as a whole; next, to certain parts, in which Design has its most apparent field of exercise.

II. Let us glance, first, at the universe as a whole, in those closely related but distinct spheres of Being, of which we have already spoken. We have to contemplate (it will be remembered) first, the inorganic world of matter and force, the framework of the universe, actually formed in times anterior to all else. We trace, next, the introduction into this world of the great force of “organic” life,—vegetative or animal life—so-called from its close connexion with inherent structure. We pass on, thirdly, to the new crea-

tion of Mind in its lower rudimentary forms in the brute creatures, as confined within the sphere of sensation. We end at last, with the formation of Mind in Humanity, as distinct from all other mind in its power to contemplate the Invisible, and in the wonderful results which follow from that power.

Now, as we have already seen, at each of these divisions there is an apparent break in that great law of the absolute convertibility of force, which runs like a thread of physical continuity through each kingdom. Life cannot, so far as we know, be produced from any of the forces which rule the inorganic world. Mind, even of the lower types, cannot be developed out of the mere vegetative life. Instinct cannot rise into reason, or reason sink into mere instinct.

The convertibility of force, indeed, remains (so to speak) available in one direction. For in each case the new power introduced has to use the pre-existent forces, in order to exercise its own energy. Life is dependent on the assimilation of material food, and on certain conditions of physical force; mind must act through an animal organisation, and in every action affects that organisation, and is affected by it. But there is no reciprocation. The new power is really new, incapable of production from

the old. Therefore, if we look at the universe purely in the connexion of cause and effect, there are what seem to us as breaks, utterly mysterious, in the great Unity of Being. Those breaks must somehow be bridged over. Both theory and experience declare it absolutely impossible to consider the universe except as a whole. The Kosmos is one empire, not a mere juxtaposition of separate provinces. As yet, there is one conception, which bridges them solidly over,—the conception of design. In spite of much bold speculation, hanging in the air, there is no other.

That the conception of Design supplies this unity it is impossible to doubt. There is a perfect simplicity and intelligibility in the idea of a purpose in the eternal Mind, running through creation as a whole; by which, first, the inorganic world was formed, and then, when it was fit to sustain organic life, that life was introduced; by which, next, the vegetation, clothing the bare inorganic framework with new richness and beauty, was made to serve for the sustenance of animal life, involving the existence of rudimentary forms of mind; by which, lastly, man was introduced into a world inorganic, vegetative, animate, fitted to be the scene of his higher spiritual being. Grant the existence of creative power—grant the actual unity of

creation as it now exists, and the fact that its lower spheres of existence subserve the higher—then the conception of this fore-determined order of Creation assumes at once the highest probability. Yet this is not all. For not only is this a belief, and so far as we know the only belief which gives any probable theory of unity to the great system of being; but the purpose of an intelligent will is known by experience to be a *vera causa*, of which we actually see every day that it can produce, in our little sphere of capacity, a similar order of results. In that “fellow-working with God,” by which man aids in the cultivation and peopling of the world, this succession of the inorganic, the vegetative, the animal, and the human is actually repeated. That at every point, from man’s deficiency in creative power, some fresh germ has to be sought for, makes no essential difference in the reality of this operation of human design. Hence both theory and experience show that we have in the supposition of a Divine purpose a true and efficient cause. Reason can hardly allow us to put it aside, till some adequate substitute for it be found.

What substitute has been offered us as yet?

There has been an attempt to obliterate the line of demarcation between the inorganic and



organic kingdoms, by theories of what is called *Abiogenesis*,<sup>1</sup> of the production of life from lifeless matter. But these theories, both in their early crude forms, and their more elaborate modern developments, have been, as yet, discredited utterly by the best scientific investigation. They are theories and nothing more.<sup>2</sup> Then, putting them aside, scientific teaching from high places has offered us a notion (confessed to be "wild"), of the introduction of organic life on the earth by the fall of some meteoric body, charged with the germs of such life from an unknown world, in which (by the way), unless it be wholly

<sup>1</sup> The name is now, I suppose, established; but surely it ought to be *Azoogenesis*.

<sup>2</sup> In the "Belfast Address" Professor Tyndall says, "Those to whom I refer as having studied the question, believing the evidence in favour of spontaneous generation to be vitiated by error, cannot accept it. . . . They frankly admit their inability to point to any satisfactory proof." It is significant that he says in the preceding page, "By an intellectual necessity I cross the boundary of the Experimental evidence, and discern in the Matter, which we in ignorance of its latent powers, and notwithstanding our professed reverence for its Creator, have covered with opprobrium, the promise and potency of intellectual life." What "opprobrium" there is in supposing matter to be incapable of self-motion, and what want of reverence to the Creator is implied in so doing, it is hard to imagine. But we deny the "intellectual necessity," which we think that the Professor has created for himself, and hesitate to accept his unverified discernment.

compact of organic life, *abiogenesis* must be possible, or else the difficulty is but shifted from our planet to the mysterious shores of the other.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See Sir W. Thomson's Address at Edinburgh in 1871 (p. 104 in the "Official Report") :—"Did grass and trees and flowers spring into existence in all the fulness of ripe beauty by a fiat of Creative power? or did vegetation from seed sown spread and multiply over the whole earth? . . . If a probable solution consistent with the ordinary course of nature can be found, we must not invent an abnormal Act of Creative Power. . . . Because we all confidently believe that there have been from time immemorial many worlds of life besides our own, we must regard it as probable in the highest degree that there are countless seed-bearing meteoric stones moving through space. . . . One such stone falling on the earth might, by what we blindly call natural causes, lead to its becoming covered with vegetation. . . . The hypothesis that life originated on this earth through moss-grown fragments from the remains of another world may seem wild and visionary; all I maintain is, that it is not unscientific." On this passage I would venture to remark, first, that the opening antithesis is at least questionable, for the "creative hypothesis" does not exclude the belief of gradual development from seed, or seeds, originally sown; next, that the meteoric hypothesis, even if true, simply puts back and does not solve the problem; and, lastly, that it is put forth without any corroborative experimental evidence, and that even the "confident belief" in other worlds of life cannot aspire to anything much higher than bare probability. But Sir W. Thomson's hypothesis is happily consistent with a profound belief in a true Creator of the Universe. "Overwhelmingly strong proofs of intelligent and benevolent Design lie all around us; and if ever perplexities, whether metaphysical or scientific, turn us away

There has been an attempt, again, to obliterate the other line of demarcation between the animal and the human creation, not only by emphasizing the close connexion (with but trivial marks of differentiation), between the bodily organisation of both, but by deriving man's spiritual nature from brute instincts, as if no difference of kind existed between those instincts and the abstract powers of mind. Against the principles of true Psychology,<sup>4</sup> and without a vestige of historical evidence, the human pedigree is traced, through links which cannot be found, to a race of ancestral apes. But no extent of scientific learning, no grasp of speculative ability, have given even probability to a theory, compared with which metaphysical cobwebs are as chains of adamant.<sup>5</sup>

from them for a time, they come back to us with irresistible force, showing to us through Nature the influence of a free will, and teaching us that all living beings depend on one ever-acting Creator and Ruler."

<sup>4</sup> It is no disrespect to Mr. Darwin to say that in his "Descent of Man" the psychology is as weak as the physiology is strong. The great fundamental distinction is ignored, between the power of abstract idea, on which all human progress depends, and the power of perception and deduction within the realm of sense, which is common to us with the brutes.

<sup>5</sup> I refer here only to ideas of development ignoring a Creative Mind ruling such development. Under the hypothesis of a Supreme mind, development is simply a mode

It is impossible not to honour the scientific instinct, which thus longs and labours for unity. It has already been rewarded by rich fruits of knowledge gathered on the way; it is far from impossible that in its own lines of thought it may find links of connexion, as yet undiscovered and inconceivable. If it should do so, I cannot see that the belief in Creative Design would be in any sense disproved in principle, though certainly some of its most striking evidences to us might be obscured. Suppose that *abiogenesis* were proved, suppose that the 'missing links' between man and brute were discovered. Still the question would remain, as to the Law or principle under which this unbroken progress took place. Still the discovery, perhaps within limits the imitation, of the process would be the privilege of the created mind of man, as man. Would it not still be reasonable to refer the process itself to a Mind creating or sustaining all things; even though we had lost some obvious signs of its presence? Just so the belief in God's moral government of the world, is strengthened by the belief in miracles, distinctly manifesting a moral purpose; yet it does not depend absolutely of creation, which certainly appears to be extensively realized in the natural system.

upon them. But in the meanwhile, why should we relinquish for all but desperate theories, the faith in what is undoubtedly a real and adequate cause for the order of creation, or driven from them, fall back on a needless confession of a wilful ignorance, delighting in the phrase "unknown and unknowable," as if it literally accepted the old proverb, "*Omne ignotum pro magnifico*"?

It seems reasonable that the consideration of Design should be thus looked upon in its relation to the sum of Being as a whole, before we proceed to consider it in any one of the subordinate kingdoms. If it show itself at what seem to us to be a great break in the line of Physical Continuity, we cannot but infer its pervading presence elsewhere; just as we infer the continuity of an electric current, if it heats platinum, or ignites gunpowder, at the points where the wire along which it moves is broken. There is a certain breadth and simplicity in the recognition of Design as needful to the very unity of the Kosmos, which has a power to convince, quite independent of any perplexity arising from intricacies of detail. When we pass to examine the subordinate kingdoms separately, we carry with us the conviction of the existence of Design in the

whole, to help us in the interpretation of significant features of the various parts.

III. Next, when we do thus examine any separate kingdom, it is of much importance still to consider each with an unceasing consciousness of its connexion with the others. Whatever design exists in Nature must concern it in the right gradation of all its parts. To discern the use of one member, we must, while we study it in detail, still remember its connexion with the whole body.

Thus, for example, it has been customary to consider the kingdom of Organic Life as the especial field for the investigation of Design, and to stake the whole principle of Teleology on the evidence yielded in this field, or even in one little nook of it. Nor is it difficult to see why men are tempted so to do. For since, as we have already seen, the creation of structure is the special function of Human Art, that sphere of Nature, in which all seems to depend upon structure, may naturally be chosen as yielding the closest analogies to the known works of an intelligent will.

But clearly such isolation is unsound. The kingdom of Organic Life lies on the frontier between the other two. There is the Inorganic world, in which we discern Matter and Force,

acting under certain formulas of regularity, which we call Laws. Survey that kingdom, as a whole, in the vastness of the Sidereal system, content with the vague general perception of it which alone is possible to us : or turn, if you will, a closer and minuter vision on this earth our habitation. You discover everywhere regularity of action of each force, and harmony in the actions of all, producing on the mind the impressions both of vastness and of beauty. In all this there is nothing to interfere with the idea of a designing and controlling Mind, and much to suggest it. The very term "Law" (as I have already reminded you), if we consider its origin, implies the belief in the impression on the Forces of this Inorganic world of the dictates of a Personal will ; and it is that belief, which alone makes the mind rest on the word Law, as if it implied a true cause. But still under Law the power of Design is veiled. Nature (in this narrow sense of the word) does not indeed deny God, but according to a well-known saying "conceals Him." Force under Law, moving with what seems a blind and ruthless regularity, is the veil ; and that veil, like the veil of Isis, is seldom lifted.

But, on the other side is the world of Mind and of its works, capable, as we know,

of directing and modifying Force, even Physical Force, at the command of Will. In that world we discern by careful investigation the existence of Laws, subtler, though not less real, than Laws of physical Regularity; but here Force under Design is the prominent and obvious conception. In the Inorganic world we see Law, and possibly infer Design; in the world of Mind, we see Design, and only with hesitation and difficulty infer Law. This power of Design, moreover, is not only a real, but an aggressive power. As the world grows older, the province of Physical Law, though it may be more clearly recognised, cannot advance; it is what it has always been. But the province of Design does advance day by day, as the human will increases its power to direct and combine physical forces, and to educate the innate forces of the mind. It plays each day a more important part in the drama of the Universe, and gradually supersedes (as has been well said) Natural by Human Selection.

Now let us remind ourselves of what seems too much forgotten—that whatever the Ruling Power of the Universe may be, it must claim both these agencies for its own. Of the Physical Force under Law all hold this obvious; but surely it is equally true of the action of Intelligent



Will. No doubt that action proceeds from an infinite number of proximate centres in the millions of free human creatures. But, still it must be one Factor, holding its appointed place, and swayed by the Supreme Power in the great order of the Universe. To suppose otherwise would be to outrage all the demands of philosophic thought by denying all unity of Government in that Universe; and moreover it would be to ignore the undoubted fact, that through the free actions of men, Laws of human Nature and Society are distinctly traceable, so that even by a finite intelligence those actions can be foreseen, reckoned on, overruled to preconceived ends. The power of design, though it be exercised through man, must be ultimately the gift and the attribute of the Power which made man. By an influence, no doubt, wholly different in its kind from the influence which sways physical powers, but equally real, it must be true that, whatever the creatures do, the Creative Power is the doer of it. If there is an unceasing and invariable stream in the course of the physical Universe, there is a great tide, moving by an attraction from above, which heaves up through all the surges of the troubled sea of Humanity, and, though each particle moves but in its own plane, sends its impulses over the face of the waters.

Now if we grasp firmly the existence of these two Powers, of Force under Law in the Inorganic realm, and of Force under Design in the realm of Mind, before we come back to the intermediate province of Organic Life, how wonderfully this previous knowledge throws a flood of light on the true meaning of the processes which we there discover !

The first word which rises to the lips of any one who surveys an organic structure—whatever his belief or unbelief may be—is the word “Contrivance.” Now what is “Contrivance ?” It is (as has been well shown <sup>6</sup>) the union of the two principles of Design and Law ; or, in other words, the application of general Forces to subserve deliberate purpose. It would be almost unnecessary to say (were it not for the continual repetition of an old fallacy from most unexpected quarters,<sup>7</sup>) that its existence argues

<sup>6</sup> See the Duke of Argyll’s “Reign of Law,” chap. iii. “What is contrivance, but that kind of arrangement by which the unchangeable demands of Law are met and satisfied ? . . . In Nature there is the most elaborate machinery to accomplish purpose through the instrumentality of means.”

<sup>7</sup> Even Mr. Stuart Mill says, “What is meant by design ? Contrivance ; the adaptation of means to end. But the necessity of contrivance is a consequence of the limitation of power” (“Essay on Theism,” part ii.). The necessity

special occasion by reference to a predetermined law, and possibly by the choice of a particular machinery, should fail to understand such action in the Creator.

Now this contrivance, being the union of Design and Law, is precisely that which we might expect to discover in the organic sphere, thus intermediate between the realm in which Force under Law is prominent, and the realm known to be ruled by Force under Design. When we do discover what seems exactly like the work of contrivance, this *a priori* probability of its existence is surely of no slight importance, in determining the interpretation which we shall give to these signs.

IV. Now what that interpretation has always been in days past, I need hardly say. Let any one examine, first, any single typical instance of organic structure, such as the human hand or the human eye; next any complete organism, such as the human body, in the mutual relation and action of all its parts; or, lastly, any great family of organic life, in the similarities and differences which characterize its various species. It is impossible for him, except by a constant effort of the mind, and by a weary struggle against the difficulties of language, to avoid the suggestion of ideas and words, which distinctly

argue the belief in an overruling Design. Our increasing knowledge only seems to increase this all but irresistible propensity, whether it show itself in the swift intuition of the poet, or in the slower and more deliberate conclusions of the philosopher.

But it has been frequently thought that in our own days, the discovery of Evolution as a dominant power in the organic sphere, has destroyed, or fatally weakened, this argument of Design. As a witness against the signs of the Presence of God, it has been welcomed exultantly on the one side; it has been naturally denounced, in anger or in terror, on the other. This latter attitude of what men call the "Theological mind" has been perhaps unreasonably ridiculed or denounced. There is "a drum scientific" as well as "a drum ecclesiastic." What is ominously introduced on one side, may not unreasonably be regarded with some jealousy on the other. Nor is all "prejudice," in the true sense of the word, unphilosophical. Those who believe on other grounds in the existence of a true God, may well say of any theory, which even seems to obscure His sovereignty over the world, and is hailed as so doing, that—whatever its array of evidence may be—whatever the underlying truth which it may

contain—yet it must have somewhere a fatal defect.

But already the time is come, when, looking to the latest form of this Evolution theory, two things seem clear to all those who have studied it most deeply. First, that the conception of Evolution in itself offers far the best hypothesis by which to account for many actual facts, and to extend the conceptions suggested by these facts into a general theory. Next, that many of the details (and especially the denial of all sudden developments) are liable to much correction, and that the investigations needful for such correction will need the work of many generations.

Looking at the conception on this almost acknowledged basis, let us consider what its effect really is on the principle of Teleology as such.

The conception of Design in Nature seems to have gone through three natural stages in human thought.

There is, first, the line of thought which has been worked out for generations, from the brief masterly sketch of the argument on the human body in Xenophon to the comprehensive and fascinating work of our own Paley, almost perfect within its own limits in lucidity and

coherency of logic. It regards each organ or each organism in itself and by itself. It traces the adaptation of the various parts and of the whole to the circumstances, the function, the happiness of the animal, or, in the case of man, to the subordination of the bodily to the spiritual life. It sees in all these an analogy to the adaptations of human design, at once real in kind and infinitely transcendant in degree; and it draws an inference of Creative Design, intelligible to the simplest, and impressive to the dullest mind.

But, as knowledge advances, it becomes impossible to regard each organism in and by itself. It is seen that such views, being necessarily partial, must constantly conflict with each other, just as the organisms which they regard come into mutual conflict. Moreover, it is observed, first that certain great laws of structure and organisation run through whole families of living beings; and next, that in any individual species there are, or may be, parts of their structure rudimentary and apparently useless, which, nevertheless, in another species receive development and attain to usefulness. And so the conception arose (which was forcibly and clearly worked out by a great living physiologist<sup>10</sup>) that on each great family of organic

<sup>10</sup> See "Owen on the Nature of Limbs" (1849).

life there was a general archetypal structure impressed, which in each species was varied, in minute and beautiful gradations, with a view to the function of that species in the world. It was a theory subtler, less direct and forcible, than the other; but, so far as I can see, it led up quite as certainly to the belief in a Designing Mind, and it even increased our conception of the beauty and symmetry of Design.

But, as knowledge again advanced, this theory also gave place to the conception of Evolution. Consider what that conception, as distinct from many speculations attached to it, really implies.<sup>1</sup> It starts with "the established fact, that all animals and plants produce more offspring than come to perfection. The lower the grade, the greater is the progeny." "Hence an intense struggle for existence." It observes, next, that "while the offspring of the same parents have a general family likeness," yet individuals "differ from their parents in certain elements of structure." In the struggle for existence "those who are best fitted must survive." So far it is on the solid ground of observed fact. It then advances

<sup>1</sup> I quote in the text from Henslow's "Evolution and Religion," part i. chap. ii. There is an admirable sketch of the main principles in Mr. Thornton's book, already quoted, "Old-Fashioned Ethics and Common-Sense Metaphysics," chap. v. sect. 2.

to two hypotheses, one of which is, as yet, imperfectly verified, the other incapable of actual verification. It holds that these victorious variations "become hereditary and intensified," and, on the ruin of less powerful varieties, create our established species. It supposes, next, all species of plants and animals to have sprung from a common parentage,<sup>2</sup> slowly through the ages differentiated into the infinite variety which we see, and preserved by the balance of individual variation and permanence of type. Both these hypotheses need verification; the former has already received it in part, and has in itself much probability: the latter is still a mere hypothesis.

Now it is abundantly clear that this Evolution theory materially alters our conception of the method of creative action in the organic world; and that, in fact, it places the action of the Supreme Power (so to speak) farther away from us, behind the veil of secondary causes.

<sup>2</sup> It is probably not essential to the theory to suppose that all life, in the various genera and species, sprang from a single monad, and travelled from some one birth-place. The conception of what used to be called "centres of creation" might be reconciled with it. The transition from inorganic matter to organic life may have taken place at different times and more places than one; and the original monad in each case may have had peculiarities dependent on the conditions of its origination.



But does it really alter our sense of the reality of that action? I venture to answer No.

For I note that of the first origin of Life itself, it gives no account, except that as yet its author strongly opposes the idea of its generation out of Inorganic Matter; and so forces us to face the idea of a distinct Creation.

I observe that, next, it gives no account whatever of the cause either of the origination of those diversities, which present the first germ of the differentiation of species, or of their coexistence with the general permanence of type.<sup>3</sup> Yet it is absurd to speak of chance; it is hardly more reasonable to use the vague pseudo-scientific phrases, which, professing to declare the cause of

<sup>3</sup> Mr. Thornton says (p. 239), with his usual vigour and plainness of speech, "What, then, is the cause? Unphilosophic people will most likely call it 'all chance,' getting sneered at for their pains, and justly too, as using words without meaning. But are not philosophers themselves doing much the same thing, and merely restating facts, which they profess to explain, when, like Mr. Lewes, they talk of the 'specific shape' assumed by an 'organic plasma' being 'always dependent on the polarity of its molecules,' 'or due to the operation of immanent properties,' or declare that in the process of Organic Evolution 'each stage determines its successor,' 'consensus of the whole impressing a peculiar direction on the development of parts, and the law of *Epigenesis* necessitating a serial development'?" Surely there is a little of the Aristophanic *Δῖνος* here.

this phenomenon, simply reiterate under another form the statement of its existence. Nor should we omit to notice (although this may not materially affect the argument) that it seems at least doubtful whether this variation is in all cases slight, needing the lapse of many generations to produce by accumulation a strongly marked difference. Experience, both of the effects occasionally caused by breeding, and of what we call monstrous births, seems to contradict any attempt to lay this down as an universal law. *Natura non facit saltum*<sup>4</sup> may be a good general rule, but cannot be pressed invariably. If exceptional cases be allowed, the hypotheses of Evolution and Successive Creation approach each other, and may possibly some day form parts of a still wider generalization. But, whether gradual or sudden, what is the cause of the variation? The supposition of an ordaining Will is a true cause—suggested by the actual intervention of human will in producing such variations by cultivation of plants and breeding of animals—although (as we might expect) infinitely transcending the narrow limits,

<sup>4</sup> Mr. Thornton irreverently terms it “a piece of proverbial philosophy as weak as the weakest of Mr. Tupper’s.” “That Nature,” he adds, “does sometimes make a leap, and a pretty long one, must be obvious to any visitor to the Museum of the Royal College of Surgeons” (p. 237).

with which human will has to content itself, especially in relation to the animal kingdom. There is no other that can be placed in rivalry with it.<sup>5</sup>

I observe, again, that this "struggle for existence" goes on in contact with an outer world of elemental force, of inorganic matter, of lower vegetable life. The "fittest" survives in virtue of its fitness. But how comes, first of all, this general fitness in the lower world to sustain and foster animal life, seeing that the one is not derived from the other? And, again, this superior fitness, developed in each individual and perpetuated in his descendants, has reference to this outer world of circumstance and of previous history, by which it is certainly not itself produced. Whence comes this peculiar superiority, not manifesting itself hap-hazard and temporarily, but under a law of permanence and continual increase? Again, I say, the presence of a supreme controlling Will we know to be a true cause. Where shall we find any other?

I confess that, taking this conception of the

<sup>5</sup> Suppose, for example, that the exquisite machinery of the ear or eye—favourite illustrations of the principle of Teleology—has been formed by a long series of development from some coarse rudimentary organ. Would the control of a Creative Mind be less needed than on the supposition of its being created at once in its present beauty of perfection?

process of Evolution, as if it covered the whole ground, it seems to me not a little instructive that its chief discoverer should have called it a "Natural Selection"—a phrase which in the very word "selection" implies mind, and which has no strict meaning, if "Nature" be impersonal.

But it is worth while to note in passing that this struggle for existence does not reign absolutely supreme, even in the realm of organic life. This realm, as on the one side it touches the inorganic world of general and pitiless force, so on the other borders on the higher realm of mind and humanity. In that higher realm there is indeed the counterpart of the struggle for existence in the fierce competition between individuals and races, under the impulse of self-preservation and the principle of self-love. But there is also a rival law, gradually asserting superiority as civilization advances. I mean the law of what we especially call "humanity," directly opposing and often conquering the other more cruel power—preserving the weak just for the sake of their weakness, and using victorious strength for the sake of the race, not for the sake of the individual. Now, first, this higher Law, belonging to the sphere of humanity, has its rudimentary indication within the realm of

animal life, as (for example) in the maternal instinct—impulsive, I grant, and capricious, but real—which makes the strong parent creature sacrifice itself for its weak offspring, and which our Lord Himself has hallowed by making it the type of His own love to His people. But this is not all. It is a wonderful but undoubted fact that in the case of animals, domesticated, and so by reflex influence of men raised above themselves, there are daily instances of fidelity, personal attachment to other animals or to men, acts of sacrifice for affection or for obedience, so like the acts of humanity, that we see how this higher law can be introduced by man into the sphere of animal life. Is it unreasonable, again, to think that what the created mind does in special cases every day, affords some analogy of the operation of a Divine Mind in the animal creation as a whole? The law, whatever it is, which governs organic life, includes this half-moral element, bearing the likeness of humanity, as well as the fierce struggle, which bears the semblance of the ruthlessness of physical force.

Therefore, I cannot see that this magnificent theory of Evolution, whatever its merits may be, really shakes the true basis of Teleology. It has always seemed to me that, as these conceptions of the creative method have gradually en-

larged themselves, the effect is not unlike that which is produced on our vision, when we increase the magnifying power of a telescope, without increasing the size of the object-glass, and, therefore, the quantity of light admitted. Each increase in magnitude recurring spreads the same light over a larger area, and thus diminishes its intensity. Our object-glass is the human mind; it can take in but a certain portion of the light of God's presence. It is the penalty of each wider and larger generalization of that presence, that the vividness of our vision of it shall be dimmed. But the whole light is still the same, and our eyes soon become used to the new circumstances of its diffusion. I believe, therefore, that the old inference of Design in Nature remains exactly the same in essence. The more we discover of the infinite variety in Nature, and, with this extension of discovery, trace more and more a tendency to unity in the origin of all things, and to simplicity in the great Forces which rule them, the more shall we be led irresistibly to the conception of an Infinite Creative Mind.

V. But there is still a disturbing element of thought. Perhaps, in contemplating creation, the question rises in our minds, "To what purpose is this waste?"—so many rudimentary

forms, so many imperfect existences, and (what is ultimately a result of this, where it is not produced by human sin) so much physical suffering and death? It is a natural thought; it has been urged of late with great force.<sup>6</sup> But yet it is clear that, in contemplating the work of any power greater than ourselves, our knowledge must be partial; and therefore while it may assert, because assertion may be partial, it may not deny, because all denial is universal.<sup>7</sup> In many things we can see design accomplished; there we can draw our conclusions. But we cannot always say, where the design, which we think we trace, is not accomplished, that in these cases no purpose whatever is subserved—any more than our dog or horse, because he often understands our purpose where we need his co-operation, could tell the purpose which governs our life as a whole.<sup>8</sup> The system of

<sup>6</sup> As, for example, in Mr. Stuart Mill's "Essay on Nature."

<sup>7</sup> Butler has pointed this out with his usual force and gravity in his "Analogy," part i. chap. vii., "On the government of God as a scheme imperfectly comprehended." In the fifth chapter he notices the "waste" of seeds referred to below.

<sup>8</sup> This truth was the most instructive lesson gathered from the controversy some years ago, initiated by Dr. Whewell's "Plurality of Worlds." His main object was apparently, first, to warn men of the slightness of the positive evidence, by which they arrived at conclusions on

nature seems bound together by a two-fold complexity. Many things subserve one result; each thing subserves many. This complexity, which we can but very imperfectly imitate, makes it singularly difficult either to judge of any one field of being in isolation, or to say of any one thing that it is fruitless, because it does not yield what seems to us its natural fruit. In some cases we actually know that we must not say this. A seed of wheat is intended, we should say, to grow, and if it be given scope, it will grow accordingly. Are all the millions of such seeds wasted, which never grow, because they feed the whole race of men?<sup>9</sup> In other cases we are led indirectly to a similar conclusion. Again and again, when men have this great subject; next, to protest against the false reasoning on "Final Causes," which, assuming the true premisses, that in all Creation God's glory must be shown, and that in our world it is shown most in His rational creatures, draws the erroneous inference, that in this way, and in this only, can it be fully manifested in the other bodies of our planetary system.

<sup>9</sup> See the "Reign of Law," chap. iv. "The intention with which a grain of wheat is so constituted as to be capable to producing another wheat plant, is not the less of the nature of Purpose, because it co-exists with another intention, that the same grain should be capable of sustaining the powers and enjoyments of Life in the body and soul of Man. . . . Yet the seeds of corn, which, as seeds, are destroyed, when they are converted into bread, may in that aspect be represented and regarded as failures."



foolishly and cruelly interfered in the sphere of animal life, by destroying some insignificant race of creatures, unexpected uses of that race in the order of creation have been brought out for the first time by experience of the effects of their loss. Even of the dread mystery of physical suffering, we know that such suffering has its uses in the sphere of humanity ; can we be sure that it has no purpose elsewhere ? The condition of the brute creation, and their capacities of happiness and suffering, are simply unknown to us. We cannot reason upon them, nor need we attempt to meddle with such reasoning. St. Paul speaks of the groaning and travailing of creation as a whole ; he does not encourage us to suppose that it is utterly fruitless, except in the one case of humanity. Christianity refuses on this great subject to disconnect the lower world from the history of man. Surely this doctrine is, to say the least, not destitute of probability, in an age which insists so strongly on unity in creation.

Even if, in many cases, we are in the dark, let us confess our ignorance, but let us not suffer what we do not know to rob us of the reasonable inference from what we do know. The question "To what purpose this waste?" in the Gospel, even had it been asked sincerely,

yet assumed that one view of use embraced the whole possibility of usefulness; and it was rebuked accordingly by a larger conception of that which was fit to show forth the glory of God, and be the future lesson of mankind. Possibly to other forms of the same question our Lord's words in reply suggest the principle of the true answer. The one question is, whether the contemplation of Creation as a whole leads to the inference of wisdom and goodness in the Supreme Power, or whether on the whole it seems confused, purposeless, cruel. To that question all human literature supplies the answer. The "offences" are exceptional: therefore, although they perplex and disquiet us in proportion to our higher conception of what is implied in the belief in a God, they can be borne. They may be, in the strictest sense, "trials of faith;" to some, perhaps, the chief trials of faith; out of which the faith may emerge in greater strength, as well as greater humility.

VI. Such is a brief sketch of the great argument of Teleology. It remains to consider its relation to the argument of Causation.

Clearly they occupy much common ground in their results, although the observations on which they rest are independent of each other,

the one from the present inferring the past, the other discovering in the past anticipation of the present. So far as this is the case, the one simply strengthens the other, without introducing any new step in the argument.

But what says Teleology on the great question between Theism and Pantheism, with which the consideration of Causation alone leaves us face to face? Any ultimate theory of the origin of the universe must (as we have seen) account both for Mind and Matter, and can hardly accept the idea of their co-ordinate independent self-existence. But what shall we hold to be the true relation of Mind to Matter? Shall we liken it to the relation of the soul to the body, suggesting the theory of Pantheism, or the relation of the mind in man to external matter on which he works, suggesting the belief in a Personal God?

Let us look first to argument from the analogy of our own experience. Certainly, so far as our experience goes, Mind united necessarily to matter in humanity has only the power, and that not an absolute power, to use and mould it in the present, without any capacity of preparing it, organizing it, combining various elements in it, for a long series of changes extending far into the future. Mind,

on the other hand, dealing with matter extraneous to itself and incapable of reacting upon it, can do this, and does it every day, to an extent limited only by its own faculties, and in forms capable of all but endless variety. It is true that in man the action of mind on external matter can be carried on only through an internal material organization; but still the power of extension and development of its action does not depend on any improvement of that material organization. The living and progressive element in it is mental; the bodily instrumentality remaining fixed, and not partaking of the capacity of progress, remains as an adjunct, with which there is comparatively little difficulty in conceiving that Mind in other and higher Beings might dispense. So far, therefore, as analogy may be drawn from our human experience, the conclusions of Teleology incline us most distinctly to accept the conception of a mind above the universe, not a mind necessarily united to it, and incapable of transcending it.

But this argument, although it has undoubtedly exercised much power over the common reason of mankind, may be put aside as inconclusive, because objection may be taken to pressing human analogies too far. Let us then consider broadly the fact that the whole relation

implied in Design belongs to mind and to mind alone. The relation of cause and effect in Nature carries our thoughts back to an actual history of the past, exhibited in the external sphere, with connexions which may be physical only, and of which we speak under the vague term of "Laws"—a term borrowed, indeed, from the realm of Mind, but yet emptied of its distinctive significance. On the other hand, the relation of what we call means and ends looks on to the future. The connexion which it establishes between things is one purely mental—so purely mental, that within our own experience it may never be actually realized in fact, though it may be formed perfectly and distinctly in mind. We are conscious every day, on the one hand, of effects of our own actions, undoubted in fact, yet unforeseen in our mind; and on the other, of ends carefully designed in mind, yet unattained in fact. Hence, in relation to the system of the universe, it is clear that the idea of Design represents it as existing potentially in the Creative Mind, before it was realized in fact. This carries with it the inevitable inference that the Creative Mind existed in sole absolute being before the world was; and that the Will of that Supreme Mind, guided by the creative idea, was the actual

Cause of the universe, in its matter as well as its form.

Hence it is that in all times Teleology is the delight of the Theist, the abomination of the Pantheist. It leads irresistibly to a Creative Mind, distinct from its work, that is, to a true Personal God. Of the character of that Mind, being itself a purely intellectual conception, it can infer only the intellectual attributes of a supreme wisdom, wielding a supreme power. It borrows from other forms of our consciousness, when in practice it infers benevolence or righteousness. But in its own sphere its inference rises to the belief in that Wisdom and Power as Infinite, so far as we can conceive Infinity—that is, as immeasurably transcending all that we can realize and all that we can imagine. Let the most be made of the irregularities, the apparent failures, the waste of energy in conflict, the consequent suffering, in Nature—still these are but exceptions, so completely swallowed up in the evidence of the rule, that, if they are real, they can but weaken the argument very slightly, and the doubt whether they are real grows at every step as we pursue it. Under whatever theory of the First Cause men study Nature in its entirety, by the intuition of the poet, or by the induction of the

philosopher, their minds are pervaded by the thought of Infinity. The cry "What is man?" rises to their lips in the presence of the mighty universe. But if once the conception of Design be admitted, then, whether we gaze on the vastness of the starlit heavens, with the faintest conception of what it really means, or through the microscope study the infinite delicacy and beauty of minuteness of an organism which it alone can make visible to us, the vague cry of bewilderment changes into the higher strain of adoration—"O the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and the knowledge of God!"

We must not for a moment forget, even now, that there are other witnesses still to be called from the moral side of our being, not only to tell their own story of the moral attributes of God, but to strengthen the conviction of His eternal Personality. Only by an effort can we keep their voices from mingling with those tones of witness, which we have been considering; for as I have already reminded you, the soul in all its parts is one. But even now, the conclusion of a Personal Creator, to which the consideration of Causation leads us with some hesitation, is infinitely strengthened by these glimpses of Design and Purpose. The brief and sublime sim-

plicity of the narrative from which the text is taken, while it speaks with a certainty far beyond the results of our Induction, is gladly welcomed as the clear expression of what the soul for itself has dimly seen.

In the spirit of the great Psalm of Creation (Ps. civ.), which we have sung to-day (Whitsunday), we survey the wondrous order of the universe; we discover everywhere not only power of Causation, but Design in all its wisdom and beauty; and we recognise, not an *Anima mundi*, impersonal and impalpable, but a God "who sees all that He has made and beholds it as very good." Then, although the moral attributes, which awaken our deepest wonder and thanksgiving, are yet uncontemplated, what can we do but burst into the exclamation of the Psalmist? "Praise the Lord, O my soul! O Lord my God, Thou art become exceeding glorious; Thou art clothed in majesty and honour!"



# LECTURE VI.

## THE THEOLOGY OF THE IMAGINATION.

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- I.—THE POSITION AND VALUE OF THE IMAGINATION.
  - II.—THE FUNCTION OF THE IMAGINATION IN THE PERCEPTION OF BEAUTY.
  - III.—THE BEAUTY IN INANIMATE NATURE OF
    - (a) PERFECTION.
    - (b) GRANDEUR.
  - IV.—THE PECULIAR AND HIGHER BEAUTY OF LIFE AND MIND.
  - V.—THE PERCEPTION OF BEAUTY IN NATURE A REVELATION OF MIND—POLYTHEISTIC, PANTHEISTIC, THEISTIC.
  - VI.—THE WITNESS OF IMAGINATION TO A TRUE GOD, BY
    - (a) ITS RESTING ON PERSONALITY.
    - (b) ITS POWER TO IDEALIZE.
    - (c) ITS POWER TO CREATE.
  - VII.—THE FUNCTION OF THE THEOLOGY OF THE IMAGINATION.
    - (a) AS A LINK BETWEEN OTHER BRANCHES OF THEOLOGY.
    - (b) AS HAVING INTRINSIC POWER OF ITS OWN.
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“Thine eyes shall see the King in His glory: they shall behold the land very far away.”—Isa. xxxiii. 17.

Hitherto we have traced out two lines of the Theology of the Intellect, distinct, yet nearly inseparable. The simple consideration of the line of Causation had led us up to the great antagonism, in which Pantheism and Theism stand in deadly opposition to each other. From this consideration we turned next to that conception of Design, which so emphatically intervenes in the controversy on the side of the faith in a Creative Mind. We saw first, how that conception, and it alone, gave unity of Idea to the Universe, carrying on the line of continuity through the great breaks, which otherwise are to us absolutely impassable. We saw next, how, in considering the evidence of Design in the world, as a whole, the existence of the realm of created mind, in which design and will obviously rule, threw an unquestionable light of interpretation over the realm of matter. Then, proceeding to the world of Organic Life—the chosen battle-field of Teleology—we inquired into the true sense of the “contrivance,” which it so manifestly appears to show; we asked how far the new theory of Evolution, even accepted as absolutely true, affected the old time-honoured Teleological argument; we glanced at the significance of the apparent “waste,” which that theory has brought out into special prominence.

And, lastly, we examined the ground of the all but invariable opinion which makes Teleology the handmaid of Faith in a true Personal God; and draws the inference of the Psalmist, "O Lord! in wisdom hast Thou made them all. Thou art clothed with majesty and honour!"

(I.) From these two lines of intellectual witness, so closely related to each other, it will be hereafter our most important duty to turn to the two great lines of Moral Theology—the Theology of the Conscience, and the Theology of the Affections—which appear to be similarly related to each other, and which certainly are wholly distinct in character from those already traced out.

But, before doing so, it is well to refer to a line of witness to God, subordinate, but not unimportant—the Theology of the Imagination, to which the text appeals. It naturally presents itself at this point in the argument, because the Imagination, while most intimately connected with the understanding, possessing, indeed, in itself a substantially intellectual character, is nevertheless a kind of link between the power of pure intellectual thought, and the moral elements of our nature, especially the element of affection. It has much of the light of the one, much also of the earnestness and glow of the

other; and perhaps its chief power and value depend on this intermediate position between the two great factors of our human nature. Certainly every one who has ever gazed on a glorious scene in Nature, or listened to a grand strain of music, will remember how, so long as it possessed his soul, it at once stimulated in him a play of intellect—half-passive, half-unconscious, in “thoughts beyond his thought”—and also kindled moral emotions—perhaps of resolution and enthusiasm, perhaps of humility, sadness, submission—now firing the eye with a new light, now quenching that fire in tears.

There are reasons why it should especially claim our consideration in these days, because (whatever we may think of the comparison of this age with ages gone by, in respect of the bright particular stars of solitary greatness,) no one can well doubt that a sense of the power of Imagination, and of the value of all that feeds it, is diffused through Society to an extent rarely, if ever, equalled in earlier times. The popular admiration of natural scenery, especially in its sublimer and more terrible aspects—the passion for Art, and above all other Art the music which is the poetry of the people—the deliberate recognition of the sense of beauty, as an integral factor in all high civilization, not unconnected

even with its moral aspects—the cordial enlistment of all that can suggest beauty in the service of Religion—all these influences are telling on the thought of our times, to disclose and to exalt the power of Imagination. The very spirit of the age, therefore, suggests that, in tracing out the lines of Natural Theology, the Theology of the Imagination should not be passed by. We need not suppose that this Theology of the Imagination belongs to the cloud-land of unreality. If it claimed to be our sole or even our chief guide, we might indeed, fear lest it should lead us into those shadowy realms. Those who expel Religion from the working-day of understanding to the “dim religious light” of Imagination, and call upon us to be thankful that it is allowed to linger there, appear simply to bring back the old intellectual and æsthetic Paganism, which made (as was well said by Dr. Arnold) the consciousness of God little more than the feeling with which we contemplate a glorious sunset. But while in the name of all that is solid and practical, we indignantly resist this æsthetic usurpation, and resolve to trace by aid of the intellect and conscience the firm massive skeleton of Truth, which Imagination and Affection may clothe in living flesh and blood, yet we must not carry

our indignation so far, as to ignore the claim of the Imagination to a certain province of the Religious kingdom. God made the mind in all its aspects; in all its aspects it must turn to Him, "to behold the King" of Kings, not only in His Wisdom and His Righteousness, but also "in His Beauty."

II. I speak of Beauty: for, without attempting to define the subtle processes of imagination, I venture to think that there are three leading principles of its action tolerably clear. First, we may say broadly that, as the Intellect discerns Truth, as the Conscience discerns Right, so the Imagination properly discerns Beauty. Next, without discussing the abstract nature of this principle of Beauty, it seems obvious that, while it is closely allied to truth, fitness, power, righteousness, yet it is something distinct from them all—incapable, perhaps, of existing where they are not, but surely not unfrequently absent where they are present. Lastly, few (in these days at any rate) will doubt that the sense of Beauty in man is, like the sense of truth and the sense of right, universal and irresistible in itself, yet singularly variable and fallible in its applications; and that, although it begins in a kind of instinct, and in the mass of men is developed chiefly by practice and in detail, yet

that it has its own true philosophical laws, more subtle, yet not less real, than those which are discerned by the intellect and the conscience. All these things have been recognised in the Art and literature of all ages; but in our own time they have been brought out with singular clearness, and they have created that movement of manifold *Æstheticism*, in the midst of which we are living now.<sup>1</sup> It is hardly necessary to do more than recall them to the educated mind. I appeal to your own consciousness. Whether you contemplate nature or humanity—whether you dwell in the inner world of your own fancy, or accept impressions from the minds of others,—you cannot help taking it for granted that there is such a principle as the principle of Beauty, conspicuous by its presence or by its absence, and refusing to be confounded with any other principle. You cannot help recognising it as a factor in the happiness and purity of life. You cannot but be aware, even if you yourselves understand it not, that it involves, not mere in-

<sup>1</sup> It is almost superfluous to refer to the debt of gratitude which we owe above all to Mr. Ruskin in this matter. Many of us will remember the first reading of "*Modern Painters*" as a new epoch in appreciation of the meaning of Art, raising it far above the technical rules of experts and the arbitrary maxims of connoisseurs, and showing it firmly based on the rock of universal principle.

stinct or individual taste, but determinate laws, on obedience to which depend the loveliness of Nature and the perfection of human Art.

To consider, then, the Theology of the Imagination, is, therefore, to estimate the revelation of God in the beauty of Nature—taking care, as before, to consider Nature in the fulness of its true sense, including the provinces of matter, of life, and of mind, not as separate, but as bearing upon one another at every point. “Nature” (it has been said) “has two revelations—that of Use and that of Beauty.”<sup>2</sup> In the study of design the intellect searches thoughtfully into the former; the Theology of the Imagination gazes on the latter, with much of thoughtfulness, with much also of emotion.

III. What are the chief impressions, then, of Beauty, which Nature makes upon the mind, first in the world of things, and then in the higher world of persons? Perhaps in the world of inanimate things, as soon as the perception of Beauty becomes a true mental perception, the two impressions most obvious and most forcible are the beauty of perfection, and the beauty of

<sup>2</sup> I quote from the Sermon on “Nature,” in Canon Mozley’s “University Sermons” (perhaps one of the most remarkable portions of that remarkable volume,) to which I am throughout this Lecture considerably indebted.



grandeur. There are indeed sensations of beauty (as, for example, in the richness or delicacy of colour) which are almost entirely sensuous, not wholly unlike the pleasure derived through the palate from strength or refinement of flavour. No idea seems to be as yet awakened in the mind. The soul is possessed or (as men say) "drunk with beauty," and that is all. But as soon as thought is roused to action, then the two ideas of perfection and grandeur are suggested at once.

Now the sense of the beauty of perfection has necessarily relation to an idea of some unity of construction and purpose in each several thing, which is either clearly discerned by the mind, or, perhaps more often, taken for granted, although not perfectly comprehended. It is distinct from the sense of usefulness ; but of all the impressions of beauty most closely allied with it. To it perhaps belongs the sense of beauty of form and of composition, whether the more obvious beauty which we discern in regular symmetry, or the subtler beauty of that less obvious and freer obedience to a law of unity, which we term picturesqueness. There is here a beauty in perfect simplicity, and a subtler beauty in harmony, both of form and colour—a harmony which, as in music, is often enhanced by the apparent discords of strong contrast. In both is involved

the conception of the relation of various things, or various parts of a thing, to some unity which makes it what it is. There is a certain beauty in the perfection even of mechanical fitness of the various parts of a structure to work together, especially if they work with ease and swiftness to one result. Hence it is that while the investigations of material Science always tend to analysis, that is, to the separation of the whole into its various parts, the æsthetic conception of the poet or the artist mostly tends in the opposite direction to synthesis. It resists this analytical process ; its idea is to grasp each thing as a whole, and to show that in the whole there is more than the aggregate of its parts. Possibly it is in virtue of its power to aid this conception of the whole, without obtrusion of divisions, and without disproportion of various parts, that, according to the old proverb,—

“Distance lends enchantment to the view.”

To quote again eloquent words,—“To another the poet leaves search and analysis ; he is content to look and to look only ; he stands, like a watcher or a sentinel, gazing on earth, sea, and sky ; upon the vast assembled imagery, upon the rich majestic representation on the canvas.”<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See Mozley's “Sermons,” p. 125 (2nd edit.).

If ever this attitude of soul gives way to the analytical spirit, pulling the conception to pieces, in hope perhaps of finding the secret of beauty, the power of the imagination is gone. The man is in the condition which Wordsworth describes,—

“The primrose by the river’s brim,  
A yellow primrose ’tis to him,  
And it is nothing more.”

Each element is torn from its place, and by the very disruption its significance is gone.

In this form of the sense of beauty there is an exquisite but calm and well-balanced pleasure. Nothing of awe, perhaps little of enthusiasm, mingles with it. The mind is all the while sensible of its own power, to discern, to appreciate, even in some degree to judge, the beauty presented to it. It is far otherwise in the other form of the sense of beauty in the material world—the impression of grandeur, whether of scale or of power. The beauty of perfection is wholly independent of scale; we can recognise it at least as much by the microscope in the infinitely little, as by the telescope in the infinitely vast. But there is a wholly different sense of beauty in the perception of grandeur. It may be the grandeur of vastness, whether of gigantic simplicity or of that complex harmony of many

parts, which grows upon us, when the eye from below ranges over mountain ridges to some snowy peak, or from above over a great panorama stretching away illimitably into the distance. It may be the grandeur of power, which every man knows well, who has ever listened to the blast of the wind or the roar of an avalanche, felt the dull thrill of an earthquake, or watched the irresistible violence of a stormy sea.

In all these cases there is a strange delight, which strikes even the most frivolous, in the consciousness of our own insignificance, in the sense of awe, breathing from the grandeur in which, as we say, "we are lost;" in the unexpected, and, as it seems at first sight, the unreasonable, sense of repose, attending upon this sense of our helplessness and littleness. The beauty of grandeur is like the beauty of perfection, in that it resists analysis, and conceives that which it contemplates as a whole. The two impressions, indeed, may be closely allied, for grandeur often depends not only on scale, but on the true relation of the parts of a thing to the whole. But it adds, as of its own, the sense of infinity, and the contrast of this infinity with the littleness of man.

Perhaps connected with this sense of grandeur is the sense of the beauty of mystery, in that

which is dimly or imperfectly perceived, so as to suggest the idea of something underlying what we see, or extending beyond the range of our vision—of which we simply know that it is, though how it is and what it is we know not. It is perhaps more to partial knowledge than to complete ignorance that we may rightly apply the old saying, *Omne ignotum pro mag-nifico*. If once we see all, or think that we see all—nothing being left to the fantastic power of imagination—every one who is familiar either with architectural magnificence, or even with the vastness of mountain scenery, knows how the highest sense of grandeur passes away.

Now in some sense these two perceptions of Beauty are complementary to each other. The sense of perfection in structure and purpose is a mental action, implying the recognition of ideas embodied in the world of things, belonging to a mind like our own. Perhaps even here the sense of Beauty is most vividly kindled in the mind, when this recognition is felt to be imperfect, throwing the mind on the consciousness of ideas embracing but transcending our own. But the sense of grandeur passes beyond this indirect consciousness of our own inferiority. Its essence lies in the belief that the Mind, which we thus contemplate, infinitely transcends

our own power even to comprehend it. In the former we feel ourselves, in the latter we lose ourselves, before a Supreme Mind.

IV. But great as is the sense of beauty in these lower regions of the world of things, there is a still higher and more exquisite sense of beauty as we approach personality, through all the regions of life. In the beauty of merely inanimate nature there is a certain oppressiveness, unless by faith or imagination we can discern a soul in it. Even in the lower world of things, the sense of beauty largely depends on the sense of change, movement, life, whether real or fancied life. All poetry delights in the attribution of this fancied life—to the play of the clouds, the whispers of the wind, the “twinkling smile” or the “wild laugh” of the ocean,<sup>4</sup> the mystic echoes of the mountain.<sup>5</sup> Per-

<sup>4</sup> The ἀνήριθμον γέλασμα, usually translated by the former of these phrases. Mr. Hawker, of Morwenstow, taught by his experience of our south-western coast, ingeniously suggests the latter. (See Mr. Baring-Gould's “Life of Hawker.”)

<sup>5</sup> In the “Christian Year” (*Second Sunday after Trinity*), Keble speaks of the indications to the imagination, not only of life, but of love, as the causes of our delight in the sights and sounds of Nature. But this is surely only a part of the whole. The sense of freedom, play, and the like, corresponding to the individuality of human nature, is as much a ground for this delight as the sense of Love, which belongs to the unity of that same nature.

haps one reason why Music appeals more powerfully than painting or sculpture to the mass of men, is that it has in it this constant play of change and animation. But in real life, there is a beauty quite distinct and peculiar. We feel it even in the contemplation of the constant freshness and luxuriance of vegetative life. In this—whether in the intense beauty of the tropical forest, or in the homelier and gentler beauty of our own scenery—we find a constant and satisfying feast, appealing in some way to our sympathy far more than the contemplation of the noblest inanimate grandeur. We feel it more deeply still when we turn to the animal life, in which we trace some shadows of freedom, mind, and will,<sup>6</sup> and which accord-

<sup>6</sup> Very strikingly is the intensity of the sense of beauty in this sphere recognised in a well-known passage of Coleridge's "Ancient Mariner," as melting an ice-bound heart:—

"O happy living things! no tongue  
 Their beauty might declare;  
 A spring of love gush'd from my heart,  
 And I bless'd them unaware.  
 Sure my kind saint took pity on me,  
 And I bless'd them unaware.  
 The self-same moment I could pray;  
 And from my neck so free  
 The Albatross fell off, and sank  
 Like lead into the sea."—(Part IV.)

ingly has power to awaken sympathy as well as delight. But the highest beauty belongs by all confession to "the human form divine." We trace it even in the grace and strength and energy of the body, instinct with life. We trace it far more in the play of feeling and thought, in the countless varieties of momentary or habitual expression which pass over the face. The beauty of perfection is seen perhaps most clearly in organic structure; but there it is also lit up by a new and higher beauty, when we recognise it as a living structure. Life in its lower and its higher forms has a special beauty of its own.

But we must take one more step, for which the last has prepared us, and speak of the supreme sense of Beauty, which belongs to the contemplation of Mind. The recognition in any being even of the power of intellect, in its keen intuition, its comprehensive grasp of reasoning, its subtle powers of discovery and creation, tells on the imagination; but it is especially the moral element of strong righteousness, unsullied purity, unwearied love, which carries with it (independently of the emotions of wonder, approbation, sympathy), an impression of nobleness and beauty immeasurably beyond any other. If ever we speak of "beauty of character,"



we refer to moral character ; if we trace beauty of expression in the face, it is not so much in the cold light of intellect, as in the enthusiastic glow of earnestness and love. It is because in man the mind and soul look through the face, that we recognise in human beauty something higher than proportion, symmetry, and even life.

Thus, by a law of its own, the imagination refuses to pause in the world of things, or in the fleshly vestibule of the temple of personality. It goes on and on ; and when it has reached the inner shrine, the light there seen is thrown back on the earlier objects of contemplation. The sense of beauty in unity and perfection, in grandeur above and beyond us, in the glow and play of life, is seen to have been really stimulated by a half conscious sense of mind, behind them and underlying them all.

This seems to be involved in the undoubted tendency by which, even in the world of things, the imagination is irresistibly driven to personify. That tendency is familiar to us in all poetry, conscious or unconscious—in the poetry which lies diffused (so to speak) in capacity through all humanity, and the poetry which flashes out in concentrated energy from the minds of the artistic leaders of mankind. But what does the tendency itself mean ? Surely its first

obvious meaning is that the recognition of life and mind is essential to the highest conception of beauty. Surely, if we look deeper, we shall see in it the perception by the Imagination of all that the intellect by another method discovers of that unity of Nature and that law of development in it, in virtue of which the study of the lower kingdoms of Nature becomes a stepping-stone to the study of personal being.

There are, indeed, minds and circumstances, in which this natural order of thought is broken, because men are so deeply sensible of the presence of what is evil, or even of what is mean, grotesque, ungraceful, in their own souls and in the condition of the world, that they turn back from humanity in disgust, seeking (often in vain) to forget it altogether in the contemplation of Nature. Here we observe, that, directly or indirectly, the same disturbing element crosses this line of Theology, which makes itself felt far more painfully in the moral sphere. But, whenever this takes place, then, if there is no recognition of a living God in Nature, the effect is one of utter disquietude and discontent, restlessness or despondent dreariness of soul; the right tendency of the mind being checked, it falls naturally into a morbid condition, sometimes maddened by the contrast

between man and Nature, sometimes throwing the dark shadows of humanity upon Nature itself.<sup>7</sup> If there be a recognition of God, there

<sup>7</sup> I cannot refrain from quoting Canon Mozley's eloquent description of the tone of this kind of poetry:—

“Take the more striking and conspicuous case of the great Atheistic poets, and what is the issue of a religion of natural beauty here? First discord, and then despair. On the one side is their astonishing insight into the glory of the external world; they dive into the very heart of it, and are as absorbed in the vision of beauty before their eyes as if they were prophets whose minds had been attuned by the Divine Creator Himself into sympathetic union with His Creation; such is the power of the Sight upon them; on the other hand is the very spirit of blasphemy; so that one moment they adore like the cherubim, in the next they cry out like the vexed demoniacs, and say,—‘What have we to do with Thee, Thou God of heaven and earth?’ How are we to account for this madness, for this dreadful schism in the minds of these men, which splits them, as it were, in two beings? The cause of this discord in their own spirits was, that they themselves cut nature into two, and took its beauty separated from its law.”

“They came straight from the scene without, which fascinated and enraptured them, to look upon a dark struggle within, which scandalized them; and they had not a single reason in their minds—I will not say to account for this yoke of weakness and misery, for nobody can do that,—but for submitting to it. They were like men who were obliged to turn away from some smiling and luxuriant landscape to look within the bars of a frightful dungeon. The inner man was simply a dreadful enigma to them; the strife within, which the apostle describes, was regarded in the light of an insupportable grievance, and of a crime in the constitution of things.”

is, indeed, rest in Him; yet still, since "it is not good for man to be alone," even in His Presence, there is in the mind a certain tone of plaintiveness and half-perplexity, making itself felt, as at least an under-current of thought, inclined, in the sense of the discord of humanity, to forget that there is still in it a higher and richer harmony, than the simpler music of Nature can supply.<sup>8</sup> In either case the right order is broken—in the former case hopelessly and fundamentally—in the latter only in its secondary relations, and therefore without destruction of a sure and certain hope of a restitution of all things.

V. Such, as it seems, is the natural course of the recognition of beauty in the system of Nature as a whole, surveyed in its perfect gradation from matter to life, from mere life to spiritual being. It remains now to inquire what is the aid which it gives the mind, in its inquiry into the First Cause and the secret of existence.

It is unquestionably a Revelation of Mind in Nature, wholly distinct from that Revelation, which comes from the perception of Design for

<sup>8</sup> I have ventured (see "St. James's Lectures," Second Series, Lect. iv. pp. 81, 82) to trace something of this tone in the Christian Year, so far as it contemplates humanity apart from Christ, in the world and not in the Church.

purposes of usefulness, although certainly in different degrees of closeness related to it. The formation of design and the creation of beauty are familiar to us as distinct mental actions. The human mind, while it recognises and creates what we call usefulness—which is the proper adaptation of each thing or each being to perform the particular task assigned to it by design—yet holds the sense and the creation of Beauty to be a perfectly distinct thing, good in itself, of which it is idle to ask whether it is useful, whether (that is) it subserves any other purpose. A thing is beautiful, and that is enough to make it “a joy for ever.” But it has been truly said that in some sense the creation of beauty still more absolutely belongs to the sphere of mind than the creation of usefulness. For, while this usefulness is wrought out, mostly through physical machinery or through agents, of whom it matters not whether they are conscious or no, the creation of Beauty is effective only when it works on minds able to contemplate it. It is a real power in the history of the world, only because it speaks to mind, and it is hard to conceive how anything but mind can presuppose mind. Where beauty is unseen by man, imagination delights to conceive it visible to “purer sprites;” faith falls

back on the higher conception of the contemplation of it by the Eternal Mind of Him who "saw all that He had made, and, behold, it was very good." If no other joy is yielded by beauty, yet the "Lord shall rejoice in His works."<sup>9</sup>

Hence it is that, in fact, whenever Beauty is discerned in Nature—since the very perception of Beauty is closely connected with ideas which are purely mental, and is excited chiefly by beings of life and mind—the soul of man infers a creative mind by a swift direct intuition, outstripping the slower steps of reasoning. Yet who shall say that such Intuition depends not on an inherent Law of Thought, or that because it is swifter, therefore it is less true, than the more gradual conclusion of Reason?

But we observe that this Intuition of Mind in Nature has assumed various forms.

<sup>9</sup> See Mozley's "Sermons," pp. 126, 127. "There is this remarkable difference between useful contrivance and beauty as evidence of an intelligent cause, that contrivance has a complete end and account of itself without any reference to the understanding of man. . . . It is enough if it works; and it is not necessary for its use that it should be seen. But it is essential to the very sense and meaning of beauty that it should be seen; and inasmuch as it is visible to reason alone, we have thus in the very structure of nature a recognition of reason and an address to reason; wholly unaccountable, unless there is a higher Reason or Mind to make it. For what but reason can address reason?"

There was once the old Polytheism—the “Creed outworn,” except where it lingers in the legends of fairyland or ghostland—which peopled the world with gods of each power of Nature, and saw the beauty of what were virtually secondary and created minds through all the forms of physical loveliness. But such belief was but a preparatory stage of faith. It vanished before the discovery of Unity in Nature, and the impossibility of finally resting on anything but unity in thought. The Imagination sought for some One Presence in Nature. In all the religious poetry of the world—the earliest form of poetic utterance—it ascended, explicitly or implicitly, to One God, sometimes directly, sometimes through that curious phase of “Henotheism” at which we glanced in the first lecture.<sup>1</sup>

But here, also, the same alternative presents itself between the two great antagonists. Against the clear vision of the King in His beauty there rises up the bright but bewildering mist of the Pantheistic theories, which half personify an Impersonal Soul of the Universe, and hold the beauty of Nature to be the beauty of that Soul looking through the face. Largely that vein of thought runs through all the poetry of the world. Perhaps it is not so much by

<sup>1</sup> See p. 18.

Imagination as by the intense moral sense of Personality in ourselves that it is to be resisted.

VI. (a) But yet even Imagination does bear witness against it. At one form of that witness we have already glanced, in the refusal of the Imagination to rest in the world of things or of mere animal life. It recognises in the human mind, in virtue of its personality, and of the intellect, conscience, will, which belong to personality, a beauty higher than all physical beauty, utterly refusing to be lost in it, capable in measure of creating it, incapable of being created by it. But wherever human Personality is recognised as an actual fact, Pantheism is impossible. Accordingly, the poetry of humanity—epic, lyric, dramatic—is the corrective of the poetry and art of the physical world. Nor can we fail to see that it predominates over it. The poetry which loses man in Nature, despises him as insignificant and short-lived, or represents his personality as overborne by external influences of race or circumstance, never reaches the highest standard. One touch of the intenser poetry of human nature scatters its vague, shadowy beauty, just as one ray of sunlight scatters the mists of the early morning.

(b) But there is a far clearer witness against the Pantheistic hypothesis in that irresistible



law of thought, by which Imagination is led, first to idealize, then to recreate.

To idealize is to conceive of principles of beauty, imperfectly manifested in what we see of Nature or humanity, but capable of being grasped in idea by the human mind itself. Such idealization is familiar to us as the very principle of the highest art. A great painter, if representing an existing scene, will all but inevitably embody in its beauties what the study of surrounding Nature, as a whole, has impressed upon his mind;<sup>2</sup> if painting a human face, he will give it, not this or that momentary expression, but the impress of its fundamental character. This is much, but Art dares to go even further. A sculptor, who would produce a perfect statue, studies, indeed, his model; yet who believes the Apollo Belvedere to be copied absolutely from any living man? A great dramatic poet concentrates in his conception of a single character, and in the few short hours of a play, ideas which unveil all human nature, and gather up all the great elements of human life. Yet who could fancy Hamlet merely copied from some

<sup>2</sup> See Ruskin's "Modern Painters," part v. chap. ii. vol. iv., on "Turnerian Topography," comparing his ideal picture of the "Pass of Faido" with the actual picture which a photograph, for example, would present.

living man of Shakespeare's day? Mere realism has its use; good realism may be better than bad idealism. But realism belongs only to the lower ranks of art, and appeals to the mind which can pierce no deeper than the eye.

But yet there is a wonderful height of meaning in this action of the imagination. It involves the assertion for the human mind of an essential superiority to the physical universe in all its grandeur and beauty, and even to the world of humanity in its visible and actual manifestations. It is the claim of a power to discern laws, principles, ideas, underlying both these worlds; to understand how these might be developed into capacities of beauty and glory as yet unseen; to distinguish, therefore, between these ideas, which belong essentially to mind, and the actual manifestations of them in the region of experience. Either that claim is the wildest dream, or the soul, which claims this power, is incapable of being merged in a mere soul of this universe. Yet this tendency is undoubtedly an inherent law of human thought. We have been rightly warned that it has its place under the cold dry light of scientific thought, as well as in the glow and colour of poetry.

(c) Yet even with this the Imagination is not content. The very name of "imagination" or

"phantasy" asserts its power to create. How significant it is that the title of "Art," which properly denotes all attempt at creation, should have been peculiarly attached by common consent to the creations of imagination. The discovery of beauty drives men irresistibly to imitate and to recreate it without asking why. The moment that the principles of beauty are grasped, the mind goes on to embody them, so imperfectly as rarely to satisfy itself, but yet so far really, that it can represent them to other minds. The poet must sing; the artist must wield his pencil; thousands who deserve neither of these lofty names, yet will reproduce whatever they have seen, and never without some attempt at creation.<sup>3</sup> True that this creation may not embody itself in physical reality; but what matters this, if only the creation reaches the mind of men? Again, and even more emphatically, I urge the marvellous testimony thus borne to the sovereignty of mind, as superior to the noblest forms of matter, as having an existence absolutely distinct from them.

<sup>3</sup> Every one knows the difficulty, except to a trained artist, of sketching only what we can actually see, without putting in what we otherwise know or fancy to exist. Every one recognises in poetic beauty or poetic justice the inevitable tendency to idealize beyond actual experience.

But is that Mind our own mind?

All reason revolts against the notion that the individual mind is thus literally the "measure of all things." The more Science shows the intimate connexion of all individual beings, the more it strengthens the instinctive consciousness that the action of the individual mind is ruled by the Superior Creative Power. What has been called the "Pathetic Fallacy,"—the attribution (that is) of our own emotions to the scenes we contemplate, enlarging them in the process, like the Brocken shadow, to gigantic dimensions—is dissipated by one touch of the colder Reason, even if it does not of itself pass on to reaction, in the sense of something unfeeling and unsympathetic in Nature, weeping when we smile, smiling when we weep.

But we may appeal even to the Imagination itself. Possibly in its shallower phases it may be merely self-conscious, fancying that it spins all its creations out of its own self-consciousness. But this is never the case in minds of the highest order. They never conceive themselves to invent their guiding ideas, or to be able in their creations to disregard them. These ideas are felt as existing independently of the individual mind—whether we call them objective "laws" impressed upon Nature, or subjective

"forms of thought," belonging to the human mind as such, it matters not. They are discovered, not invented; and, once discovered, they cannot be disregarded. The attempt at such disregard leads in contemplation to the whim or conventionality of the self-styled connoisseur, and in creation to results which we call merely "fantastic"—not perhaps without beauty, but a beauty of a lower kind, appreciable only by a few, not the treasure of all humanity, evanescent as the early tints of the morning sky, when the bright steady sunlight is brought to bear upon it. No! these ideas are the creations of a Personal Mind; but we are sure that this mind is not our own, or the mind of any child of man.

Therefore these two tendencies to idealize and to re-create, seem to me to rescue the sense of Mind in Nature from the ambiguity, in which the conflict of Theism and Pantheism involves it.

They involve the discovery in the universe of the Ideas of a Creative Mind. They involve the acknowledgment that this Mind is infinitely greater than its works, imperfectly manifested in them all. They add the consciousness that the human soul is in itself superior to the merely physical and animal beauty, which it can discover, test, and in some points reproduce. They temper this consciousness by the unreserved con-

fession that the Creative ideas, and even the visible embodiment of them, although like our own ideas, yet infinitely transcend them. The more we see, the more the Infinite touches at every point the enlarging circle of our vision: the more we labour to represent or create, the more we feel that one touch of the reality laughs our efforts to scorn. In all this there is a true witness to a living God. No man can wonder that in all ages Imagination has been the hand-maid of Religion, always having its high use, unless, like other servants, it rebels against the superior power.

VII. For this witness of the Imagination to God, if it be not one of the principal lines of witness, yet has a real strength, not only in itself, but also in its singular power of knitting others together.

(a) It has a close relation to the Theology of the Intellect. It is like it, because in the universe it recognises first Power and then Mind. But it is unlike, because, where the understanding proceeds by slow, gradual inference, the imagination darts on, by a swift intuition to be verified only by its deductions and results. By likeness of conclusion, and by unlikeness of method, the two witnesses strengthen each other.

It leads on to the moral lines of witness, of

which we have to speak, because it prepares for the task of passing from the acknowledgment of Power and Wisdom to the perception of Moral Attributes. But, while the Conscience testifies of God's Righteousness and His Love in their bare solid majesty, the Imagination reaches them through the conceptions of Beauty and Glory—attaching, indeed, to Power as Power, still more to Wisdom as Wisdom, but most of all to Moral Attributes, as of man, so also of God.

Perhaps even more clearly it leads on to the Theology of Love. Not without cause is Beauty called “ Loveliness ;” for the very sight of that which is beautiful and glorious tells marvellously on the emotions ; some awe, perhaps, mingles in the soul with adoring love ; but, provided that a true Personal Presence is realized, “ perfect love ” eventually “ casts out fear.”

This Theology, then, of the Imagination bears on all the other laws of Natural Theology. As has been said already, we cannot let it supersede them. Woe be to the religion which is a religion of mere imagination ! But yet, though in less degree, it is woe to us to be wholly without it. The other forms of Natural Theology, indeed, can stand without this, while it without them has no backbone of solid strength. Yet if in them we discern the grand outline, it is much

that, through the imagination, that outline should be so coloured, as forcibly to impress the mind, and still more forcibly to come home to the heart.

(b) But to this its value, as a link between other powers, or accessory to them, we add two points of distinctive power which we trace in it.

Less than almost any other line of Natural Theology is it crossed and weakened by the sense of an evil power warring against the good. I do not deny that here also there is some sense of a blight in Nature—traced not only in imperfection of beauty, but in what seems to us positively ugly, grotesque, horrible. There mingles at times a gleam of serpent-like fascination with the smile of Natural Beauty. But, at any rate in its stronger and more positive form, this impression of disorganization either passes away before the more steadfast gaze of thought, or is felt as altogether secondary, almost trifling. It becomes a common saying that everything “has a beauty of its own,” fitting in, like an apparent discord in music, with the general harmony of the whole. Even if this be not discerned, yet certainly the discord is felt to be so exceptional and comparatively so insignificant, as to be lost in the overpowering impression of beauty. The imagination is therefore spared the



severity of the trials which the sterner powers of reason and conscience have to bear and conquer.

But, besides this, the very sense of imperfection is enlisted for the task of witness. It has a meaning indicated by the instructive connexion of the two parts of the text. To the idea of "beholding the King in His beauty" is added the prophetic vision "of the land very far away." The imagination is, by its very power to idealize, the parent of hope—hope of a time when the defects of the present shall be over—hope of a knowledge of God, not as He is in His works, but as He is in Himself. The one book of the New Testament which appeals most to the imagination is that Apocalypse, which most unveils Heaven, and most looks on to the future. We grant that hope is not the solid food of this present life. We accept the rebuke, "Why stand ye gazing into Heaven?"—whether it come from angel denizens of that Heaven, or the earth-bound philosophies, which deny that there is any Heaven at all—so long as it simply urges to work instead of gazing. But hope is a power in life, "often doomed, yet fated not to die." A real and effective power can scarcely be found in what is a simple delusion. If earthly life, taken alone, be a series of delusions of hope and disenchantments of experience, the natural conclusion is, not that

hope is a mere delusion, but that this life is not our all. Such a conclusion even a cold and sceptical philosophy has in our own days not refused to draw.<sup>4</sup> We cannot accept this inference as the whole or the main statement of the ground of our faith. But we do not refuse it; and we value the Theology of the Imagination, which so emphatically places it, where alone it can be safe, in God.

This form of Theology, then, has its place and its function. It is not accidental that religion has in old times clothed itself in the earliest forms of poetry, and in all ages has hallowed those forms of art which most of all lay hold of the masses of men. It is not accidental that in our own days a religious revival, which desires to claim all men and all society for God, should at once have fostered, and have made use of, the revival of Art.

Its function is not perhaps to meet the great crises of life and the hardest strains of faith. When unbelief coldly and sternly questions, and when sin and sorrow assail us, then it is to the reason, the conscience, the affection that we appeal. But in the more peaceful times of life, when the mind is free to muse and to contem-

<sup>4</sup> See Mr. Stuart Mill's "Essay on Theism."

plate—when earthly beauty attracts and earthly occupations engross—it has its appointed work. That work is to turn the eyes upward to “behold the King Himself in His beauty,” and to light up this prosaic world with “the glory of the land very far away.”

# LECTURE VII.

## THE THEOLOGY OF THE CONSCIENCE.

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- I.—THE RELATION OF THE LINES OF SPECULATIVE AND MORAL THEOLOGY.
- II.—THE WHOLLY DIFFERENT CHARACTER OF MORAL THEOLOGY.
  - (a) IN THE FIRST CONDITIONS OF THE INQUIRY.
  - (b) IN PROTEST AGAINST UNLIMITED SCEPTICISM.
- III.—THE TWO ACTIONS OF CONSCIENCE—THE SYNTERESIS AND SYNEIDESIS.
- IV.—THE SYNTERESIS (OR MORAL SENSE) OF RIGHT, DUTY RETRIBUTION.
  - (a) THE EVIDENCE OF ITS EXISTENCE.
  - (b) THE METHOD OF ITS DEVELOPMENT.
- V.—ITS WITNESS TO GOD, THROUGH
  - (a) THE CONSIDERATION OF ITS ORIGIN.
  - (b) THE SCOPE OF ITS EXERCISE.
  - (c) THE BASIS OF ITS AUTHORITY.
- VI.—THE SYNEIDESIS, OR PRACTICAL CONSCIENCE.
  - (a) ITS EDUCATION BY MAN, THROUGH LAW AND TEACHING.
  - (b) THE EDUCATION BY GOD THROUGH MAN.
  - (c) THE EDUCATION BY GOD IN THE SOUL ITSELF.
- VII.—THE MYSTERY OF EVIL.
  - (a) ITS POWER TO WEAKEN, BUT NOT TO DESTROY, THE WITNESS OF CONSCIENCE.
  - (b) ITS BEARING ON THE NEED OF REVELATION.

"They show the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing one another."—Rom. ii. 15.

OUR survey of the evidences of Natural Theology has now completed the consideration of one chief group. To the investigation by pure intellect of the One First Cause, and of the Foreseeing Creator, we have added the testimony of the Imagination, first by its recognition of beauty, and then by its inherent tendency to idealize and to re-create the beauty which it thus discovers—in the world of life more than in inorganic matter—in the world of mind more than in mere organic life—to the existence of a Supreme Creative Mind. Although the imagination proceeds by a wholly different method—the method of swift intuition rather than gradual reasoning,—and although, far more than the pure intellect, it affects certainly the emotional, and perhaps the moral element of our nature, nevertheless, in kind, the Theology of the Imagination is cognate with the Theology of the Intellect, and leads us to the same general result.

I. What is that result? It is substantially the conclusion that "there is an intelligent Author of Nature and natural Governor of the

World,"<sup>1</sup> which Butler assumes in his Analogy, before he proceeds to what is really an argument of Moral Theology, examining "the moral government," which implies the moral nature, of God, and "the moral discipline," which equally implies the moral freedom and responsibility, of man. The argument of *Ætiology* leads us irresistibly to some First Cause, leaving us face to face with the great alternative of Theism and Pantheism; although, if we re-

<sup>1</sup> He says of it in the Introduction to the "Analogy," "It has been often proved by accumulated evidence; from this argument of Analogy and Final Causes; from abstract reasonings; from the most ancient tradition and testimony; and from the general consent of mankind." These are clearly evidences of a different kind. The first and second are abstract, probably what we have called Teleology and *Ætiology*; the other two are concrete, simply embodying the fact of an universal belief in God, without examining its grounds. Pearson, in his treatment of Art. I. of the Apostles' Creed, bases the belief in God, first, on the principle of Causation; next, on the Evidence of Design (in the course of which he anticipates Paley's comparison of the watch); thirdly, on the "general confession of all nations;" fourthly, on the historical records of Prophecy and Miracle, manifesting the Divine Action. To these he adds the "particular remembrancer," Conscience in each man. On this classification the same remark may be made as to the mixture of the abstract and the concrete. I venture to think that the right order is to start with the concrete, as a great fact, embodying the verdict of humanity; and then to investigate the abstract considerations, on which that verdict is pronounced.

cognise will as a true cause of action, the balance inclines so considerably to the former, that many have held this argument alone sufficient. The argument of Teleology—all but primeval, and, as I believe, unaffected in its essential power by the most recent discoveries of Science—in itself implying irresistibly a First Cause, adds to that inference so clear an indication of a Creative Mind independent of its works, that, by the confession alike of friends and foes, it must, if admitted as real, decide the contest unmistakably on the side of a true Theism. In point of fact, I suppose it has been from time immemorial the one chief intellectual evidence of the being of a God, and of His attributes of supreme wisdom and power. The argument from the Imagination, still dealing with evidence of purpose and design, connects it not with the creation of usefulness, but with the creation of beauty; and, thus approaching the Creative Mind on another side, at once gives independent testimony to His existence, and adds to His attributes of power and wisdom, the attributes of glory, beauty, majesty. It is no wonder that, although less distinct than the line of Teleology to the dry light of the understanding, this witness of the imagination should have been inseparably connected with all conceptions of re-

ligion and forms of worship, which call out the action not only of the mind, but of the conscience and the heart. There is, even in these lines of thought alone, a "threefold cord not quickly broken." Converging to one great result, they immeasurably strengthen one another. We may well say with Butler that this result is "proved by accumulated evidence." If, less fortunate than he, we are not able to add that it "does not appear to be denied by the generality" of the sceptics of our day, still we are not afraid, in appealing to the common sense of men (whenever they pass from the theories of the Schools to the actual necessities of practical life), to place the clear, solid, and definite conception which it furnishes, face to face with the vague Pantheistic theories, or the blankness of Agnosticism, which are proposed to us as substitutes for it.

II. But the line of argument, which in these lectures I am attempting to work out, does not allow me to acquiesce in this partial separation of the group of intellectual evidences from that moral group on which we are now to enter. I accept willingly this combination of the conclusions of intellectual reasoning, as preparatory to the further investigation in the moral sphere. But I would urge that there should be



reciprocity. This latter investigation may be undertaken independently; and, if so undertaken, it throws back its light on the earlier conclusions, and adds another, perhaps a still stronger, strand to the cord, which draws us from vague speculation or scepticism to a definite recognition of a Personal God. In witnessing to us what He is, it adds another ground for the belief that He is actually; in disclosing His moral nature, it implies more forcibly than ever the true personality, to which alone such a nature can be without absurdity attributed. It would be (I conceive) wrong to examine and to determine the cogency of the intellectual lines of Natural Theology, without allowing for this confirmation from the new moral ground. Hitherto our lines of thought have been closely interwoven with each other. Their mutual confirmation is that of witnesses, whose general line of evidence is the same, although all bear it independently, and each has its own peculiarities of detail. Now we call our witnesses from a wholly different line of evidence. If we gain from them any confirmation of what has gone before, it is the confirmation of a testimony absolutely independent of the other, not only in detail, but in principle.

For we pass now from the region of the in-

telleet, or "Speculative Reason," to the moral ground of the "Practical Reason." Both the lines of Theology which we have to consider—the Theology of the Conscience, and the Theology of the Affections—occupy this moral ground. They stand in the same kind of relation to each other as the theology of the intellect and the theology of the imagination; their tone (that is) and methods are different, but their result is substantially one. Both conscience and affection pronounce the "categorical imperative," with which modern philosophy has made us familiar.

(a) Let us consider at the outset the fundamental difference in the question which now presents itself to us. The intellect, in contemplating any object, is conscious, indeed, of itself and of the object; but it does not necessarily recognise any connexion or relation between the two. Truth shines like a star from heaven; the eye may gaze upon it from its solitary watch-tower on earth. If it so gaze and discover, well; if it close itself against the light, no tie is broken. The light shines on undimmed; our intellectual vision has, indeed, lost an opportunity of strengthening its insight, but it remains unimpaired. But besides this, we see that to the intellect the object contemplated may be a person or a thing, or even an abstract

principle, having no concrete reality. Since there is no tie between us and it, its nature may be wholly unlike our own. Hence, while the intellect discerns some creative power, that power may be a physical force, and not a living person; or, if a person, still one as absolutely removed from us as the gods of Epicurus, too far off or too great to care whether we recognise and serve Him or not.

But with the Conscience or Moral Sense it is not so. If it leads to the recognition of any object, that object must have necessary moral relations to us; else Conscience has as little to do with it, as it could have to do with the supposed inhabitants of another planetary world. That object must be a Personal Object; for to talk of the moral recognition of a Force or a Formula of Regularity, is simply absurd. That object must have a moral nature; for all moral obligations are reciprocal, and even to a Supreme Intelligence, if absolutely heartless, no duty on our side could attach.

In the case, therefore, of the moral lines of Natural Theology, the very first conditions of our inquiry are different. With the Intellect the recognition of some Supreme Power is all but axiomatic; the one question is, What is its nature? With the Conscience the one

question is whether it recognises the Supreme Power at all; if it does, the nature of that Supreme Power follows as a thing of course. It is possible that our moral sense may regard only our own self and our fellow-men, knowing nothing of the Supreme Power. But if this is not so, if Conscience bear any witness at all of the Supreme Power, that Power must have a personal being, a relation to us, and a moral nature. The point, therefore, which is ultimate in the investigations of the intellect, is the very starting-point in the testimony of the Conscience; and from that starting-point this testimony unfolds the idea of righteousness and goodness in God, which is but faintly indicated in the earlier investigations.

(b) I may add, moreover, that it is this line of Natural Theology, which protests most forcibly against a lifelong scepticism, or a contented Agnosticism. So long as the understanding alone is concerned, these mental positions may be defended, though it is hard to conceive how men can glory in them. But if the moral sense testifies of even the probability of any moral relations between us and God, then it is bound by its very nature to be impatient, till these relations are examined, known, and acted upon. It cannot treat it as an open

question, whether we have, or have not, a King, a Father, a Saviour. The unlimited suspension of belief, to an intellectual student far from intolerable, becomes to the servant of duty, almost as distasteful as misdirection of belief itself.<sup>2</sup>

III. The great question then is, Does the Conscience really lead us to God? To answer it, let us first ask, "What is the action or actions of Conscience itself?" This Conscience is a practical Reason. What are the principles which, as reason, it recognises? What are its deductions which by reasoning it draws from them?

The text places the subject very clearly before us. There is (says St. Paul) the "work of the Law," that is, the substance of Moral Truth,

<sup>2</sup> This is the point so gravely and frequently dwelt upon by Butler. The duty of examining and acting upon even imperfect evidence, and the fact that in some cases the performance of this duty under difficulties may be our chief moral probation, are urged by him in his "Analogy" (part ii. chap. vi.), in a chapter which has a peculiar force and interest, as apparently describing his own spiritual experience. Hence the paradox, referred to by Dr. Newman in his "Grammar of Assent," that where only two modes of alternative action are possible, the practical decision may be the same, whether on demonstrative or probable evidence, whether on a high or a low probability. The difference will lie in the amount of enthusiasm we can throw into our action, and the amount of sacrifice we are ready to make for it.

“written on the heart.” First, “the Conscience bears witness to it,” that it exists; next, in regard to special actions “the reasonings of men (λογισμοί) accuse or excuse one another,” according as such actions agree or disagree with it. These two actions of Conscience in man are clearly distinct, though perhaps all but inseparable.<sup>3</sup> Our older Moralists called them by different names. The recognition of moral principles they named the *Συντήρησις* (or “Moral Sense”), and the application of those principles the *Συνείδησις* (or “Practical Conscience”). Call them by what names we will, we must be careful to distinguish them from each other. The former is of the nature of a “form of thought” in the moral sphere, existing in capacity in the mind, but worked out into actual energy, and by the very process defined, through practical experience. It stands to the deductions from it, as an axiom to the propositions of Geometry, or (perhaps

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Sanderson, “De Obligatione Conscientiæ” (Prælectio I. 12), a book too little known and studied; for, although too scholastic in form for modern tastes, it is marked by singular accuracy and vigour. So Jeremy Taylor, “Ductor Dubitantium” (book i. chap. i. sect. 24), “The *συντήρησις*, or the first act of Conscience St. Hierome calls *scintillam conscientiæ*, the spark or fire put into the heart of man. The *συνείδησις*, which is specifically called conscience of the deed done, is the bringing fuel to the fire.”

more properly) as a physical Law to the consequences, theoretical or practical, derived from it by Inductive Science. On careful distinction between the two depends all clearness of thought on this subject.

IV. Let us examine first—what in this argument concerns us most—the former action of Conscience. What is the substance of Moral Truth which it recognises?

I answer, Right, Duty, Retribution. First, the eternal existence of right and wrong in the world of humanity; next, the inherent obligation in man, to choose the one and reject the other; thirdly the belief in a Retribution, by which obedience to this law or obligation is enforced, and which has in it something more than mere physical consequence. It does not concern us to inquire how these fundamental ideas are acquired. We need not examine any theory of their development in man from the social instincts of the brute creation, or of their acquisition in full-grown humanity from the inherited traditions of the results of an earlier experience. We need not ask how far they may be held to be innate in every man, and how far impressed upon him by the teaching and tradition of the race; or investigate their connexion with the intellect on the one side, and

the emotions on the other. All these questions are full of the profoundest interest. But they do not touch our present consideration. It is enough for us to hold that, as a matter of fact, these three fundamental conceptions of Right, of Duty, and of Retribution are recognised necessarily by the Conscience of man as man.

(a) If it be asked why we hold this, the appeal can only be made in answer, as St. Paul makes it, to the consciousness of man. I am not afraid to ask you, stranger as I am to your life and thought, to look into your own hearts. Can you get rid, if you will, of these three conceptions? Whether you contemplate your life as a whole, or consider any individual action, which presents itself to you to-day, can you help believing that in all actions there is a Right—that if you can see it, you are by the very knowledge bound to follow it—that, if you do follow it, it will be well, and if you do not follow it, it will be ill with you? Few men, I firmly believe, ever fail to grasp these simple ideas, unless indeed, they have bewildered their minds, by confusion between “the witness of the conscience” to those ideas themselves, and the subtle and complicated inferences, drawn from them by “the reasonings of men.”



But if any individual mind does deny such witness in itself, what shall we do? Why not do in this case what we do in all other cases of perverse idiosyncrasy,<sup>4</sup>—appeal from the individual to the race? In the region of sense, if a man is colour-blind, or if his ear cannot distinguish one musical note from another, we do not on that account believe that mankind is wrong in acknowledging the rich variety of colours, and the distinctive beauty of different musical sounds. In the region of intellect, if a man is so unfortunate as to be unable to see the cogency of mathematical or logical reasoning, to appreciate the evidence of Inductive science, or to feel the loveliness of Art, we do not on that account hold Logic, Science, Art, to be

<sup>4</sup> There is a close analogy between the intellectual and moral capacities of man. In both there are such things as dullness, perversion, imbecility. Nor does it seem doubtful that frequently defect or excellence in the one bears upon defect or excellence in the other. To tell "the whole truth, and nothing but the truth," for example, demands the union of intellectual and moral powers. The Scriptural conception of a "reprobate mind," which calls evil good and good evil, and has lost all faculty of moral distinction, is verified, so far as human experience can verify it, every day. How far it is inborn or acquired, the consequence of inherited evil or of actual sin, it is often hard to say. But, in any case, it is as "monstrous" intellectual madness or imbecility.

simple delusions. We appeal from individual vagary to what we call the common sense of mankind. So in the moral sphere, we may turn boldly to the testimony of the race, written broadly on the languages, the laws, the institutions, and the religions of the world. If the three principles of Right, Duty, Retribution, are not true and dominant principles, then all languages, which are full of the expression of them, just in proportion to their own linguistic excellence, must be rewritten; all our systems of Law, invariably professing to expound them, must be reconstructed; every society—whether family, or nation, or commonwealth of nations—living as it does mainly by moral conceptions, must find new principles of social life; all religions, involving in different degrees those moral principles, must be pronounced simple delusions. *Securus judicat orbis terrarum*; all these expressions of its judgment must surely be sufficient evidence of the “substance of the Law,” recognised by the consciousness of man.

(b) If we ask how that consciousness forms itself into definiteness, the answer will be, as in all other cases, by looking within and by looking without.

We look within; in the determining forces of our life, we recognise the influence of physical

forces and of human agencies upon us; we recognise the force of our own free will, seeking our own happiness; but we find another real and effective power—distinct from all physical influence, limiting the will, claiming not only power but authority—in the acknowledgment of Right and Duty.<sup>5</sup> We look to the great world without, and we trace the same powers at work. Even in the action of the great physical forces, men have been driven irresistibly to endeavour to trace Moral Government, holding this or that natural phenomenon to be a blessing or a judgment. But—putting this reasoning aside, not as necessarily false, but as beyond our power to prove whether it be false or true<sup>6</sup>—we have learnt to turn to the world of Humanity. In that world—with whatever

<sup>5</sup> This is Butler's argument in his second and third "Sermons on Human Nature."

<sup>6</sup> This is surely the position assigned to it by our Lord in the oft-quoted passage (Luke xiii. 1—5). He does not say that in the disposal of physical events there is no moral judgment; on the contrary, He seems to imply that there is, by the very words "Except ye repent, ye shall all likewise perish." But He rebukes the unauthorized and ignorant claim to know and to reason upon supposed especial instances of such judgments, without that prophetic insight which (as in the Old Testament history or prophecy) alone can sustain this claim. The rebuke is substantially the same as the condemnation of the three friends in the Book of Job.

imperfections and perversions—it is as certain that the sense of Duty and the expectation of Retribution are great moving and effective powers, as that the sun shines, or that man breathes. There is (as Butler urges forcibly) a moral government visible in the necessary action of human society,<sup>7</sup> both for its own preservation and on simple moral grounds. It has its conflicts with physical force and human selfishness: but in that conflict it never quails or gives place, and it shows tendency towards a completer victory in the future. Men (I venture to repeat) could hardly have felt doubt of this, if they had not confused—what St. Paul in the text and our old moralists kept so carefully apart—the witness to the sacredness of these principles of Right, and the application of them by reasonings of men to the actual circumstances and actions of life. In that application there is no doubt a very large variety; what is praised in one age is denounced in another; what we call virtues in civilization are branded as vices in savage life; what one thoughtful, earnest

<sup>7</sup> See the "Analogy," part i. chap. iii. This argument is clearly supplementary to the argument of his Sermons, passing from the internal to the external sphere, and in both (in accordance with the spirit of his age), proceeding inductively, from the observation of facts to the inference of laws from them.

man fights for as right, some other equally earnest will stoutly resist as wrong. By vivid representation, and by not unfrequent exaggeration, of these discrepancies, men have bewildered themselves upon a question which is wholly untouched by them. For obviously, in spite of all these discrepancies, and as the very watchword of all these conflicts, there remains the idea that there is a Right if we can but find it, and that this Right we must follow. If men ask with Pilate, "What is truth?" the very question, unless it be a mere sarcasm, implies that Truth is. If the world wearies itself in the inquiry, "Is this act right or is it wrong?" the very strife implies that there is an eternal difference between Right and Wrong, and that to act on that difference is the very life of our life. The reality of this difficulty of application of Right has an important bearing on the need and probability of Revelation. But in what we are now considering we have to do, not with it, but simply with the universal and necessary recognition of the three great Truths—of Right, of Duty, of Retribution. It is of this recognition that we ask, "Does it, or does it not, lead to God?"

V. If that question be asked as to the matter of fact, I suppose that, from a historical point of view, there can be no doubt of the

answer. The recognition of the supremacy of Right and the obligation of Duty, has been undoubtedly connected in the mind of mankind at large with the belief in a Personal God. Whenever Religion has been divorced from Morality, it has been degraded and smitten with death; whenever Morality has refused all connexion with Religion, it has failed to assert itself against the power of physical force and human selfishness. Not perhaps more really, but certainly more plainly still, the belief in a Retribution of Reward and Punishment is inseparably connected with belief in God. For Retribution can only come from a Person; and the retribution experienced at the hands of men is clearly imperfect, even when it is not perverted. The belief, therefore, in "a Judge of the whole world" has been its inevitable corollary in fact. Whatever the *consensus* of all ages and countries is worth, it can most certainly be pleaded here.

But ought these things so to be? Is this *consensus* a superstition already half-obsolete, or does it represent a true law of thought? To answer this question aright, it is necessary to consider the origin of the moral sense in man, the scope of its action, and the basis of its authority.

(a.) First, as to the origin of the Moral

Sense of man. It must, of course, come from the original Creative and Supreme Power, whatever that may be. But no one who recognises the moral element in man as something superior to all physical force, and distinct from the speculative reason, can accept any theory of its derivation from an original Power, either merely physical or even merely intellectual. Kant was surely right when, in a passage often quoted, he dwelt on the wonder of the starlit heavens (that is, of the Physical Universe) as distinct from, and at most co-ordinate with, the wonder of the moral nature of man. Unless man be himself a god, self-created, self-developed from some eternal indwelling life, the existence of the moral nature in man, the subservience of even his physical constitution to moral ends, the distinctness of the practical from the speculative reason, must argue a Moral Creator. Under the power of such a Creator we may understand how man's moral nature, like his reason, may be a supreme development from rudimentary brute instincts, or the result of long inherited experience, both in the individual and in the race. But without such a Creator these theories of the genesis of the moral sense have no substantial meaning. Whatever is in the effect must be in the cause.

I may remark that it is on the consciousness of will in us, acting under the sense of duty and responsibility, often against forces able to crush us in a moment, and against all the motives which other men can bring to bear upon us, that the most vivid sense of our true personality depends. The "*Cogito ergo sum*" is felt, if not more truly at least more immediately, in respect of the practical than of the speculative reason.<sup>8</sup> Hence it is that (as I have already hinted) it is by Moral Theology that the most trenchant decision is given against the theory of Pantheism, which must ultimately deny all true individual personality. But it does more than this. It will not allow us to recognise even a Personal God, unless He be a true and perfect Moral Being. The celebrated saying of a philosopher of our day,<sup>9</sup> that not even "the certain looking for the fiery indignation" of Hell should induce him to worship a Being not perfectly good, is—whatever its tone and application—in itself the expression of a

<sup>8</sup> Whichcote expressed this tersely. "'I act, therefore I am,' was the memorable sentence in which he echoed and answered the memorable sentence of Descartes." I quote from Professor Westcott's admirable Lecture in "*Masters in Theology*" (Murray, 1877).

<sup>9</sup> Mr. John Stuart Mill.



right moral theology. It is, after all, but a variation of the old question, "Shall not the Judge and Ruler of the whole earth do right?" Probably it is in this conviction that a Moral Sense implies a Moral Creator, that the first and simplest witness of conscience to God is found.

(b.) But we pass from the past to the present, from the origin to the daily action of that Moral Sense. What is its scope? We recognise by reason the little world of self within, the great world of things and persons without, and some Higher Power by which both came to be. Has the moral sense relation to some only of these, or to all?

Now, in the first place, the great principles of the Conscience have a practical relation to the little world within. There are, I cannot doubt, laws of Conscience, which in their perception of Right, in their sense of Duty, in their foresight of Retribution, are self-regarding.<sup>1</sup> The law of

<sup>1</sup> To say that "virtue is unselfishness" is at best a rough and imperfect definition; and the theory of what has been called "Altruism" in the "Religion of Humanity," if it be considered as exhaustive, is contradictory to human nature. The Scriptural command "to love our neighbour as ourselves" recognises self-love, and therefore duty to self, as natural; while, in accordance with what is practically most necessary, it lays chief stress on love and duty to others. Under the impulse of any great enthusiasm these self-regarding virtues sink into abeyance; but they

Temperance, restraining the animal part of our nature; the law of Purity, cognate to it, witnessed to by the instinctive sense of shame; the law of Manliness, by which I understand the resolution to assert our own freedom and claim our own sphere of action in life; the law of Energy, or Work, delighting in the exercise of our powers, whether to think or to do—all belong either solely or primarily to the inner individual life, and are, in fact, means of its growth to perfection. Even if they are exemplified in actions affecting our fellow-men, still (as we see in the spirit of Chivalry, and what men call the sense of honour,) they are primarily self-regarding; they bid men not stoop to what degrades themselves, but act "for very nobleness." If we were altogether removed from human contact, lost on a desert island, or self-condemned to the loneliness of a hermitage, still, although they would be not improbably maimed or stunted in their development by this unnatural life, they would exist. The mind itself is their kingdom. reassert themselves in the quieter course of ordinary life. If in the New Testament they are seldom enforced in themselves—if even the duty of temperance and purity is based on a higher principle—this is because in the morality of that time there was a tendency to exaggerate them, which needed to be checked rather than stimulated. But they naturally found their right place in the actual development of Christian morality and life.

But certainly this sphere of the dominion of conscience is comparatively narrow. The sphere of its fuller exercise is in the outer world. I may add that probably this self-regarding Morality is far less instinctive and original. We begin with a sense of duty to the world without us; and so, by that curious power of reflection which recognises self as having an objective being, we pass on to the duty to ourselves. Now, when we speak of the outer world in this sense, we, of course, exclude at once the inanimate world of things. To talk of any law of Conscience in relation to the physical forces of Nature, or to the inanimate world itself (unless it be looked upon as subserving some personal relations), would be a sheer absurdity. We see at once that Duty properly belongs to our relations to Persons.

No doubt we feel some duty to beings having even a faint shadow of Personality, such as the brute creatures, especially those domesticated to our service, and developed in nature by intercourse with man. Yet towards them our ideas of duty are but secondary, and constantly mingled with the consciousness of a duty to God. We seldom separate them from Him who made them. What we call "humanity" towards them has been wonderfully interwoven with, and inspired

by, the belief that they are also "God's creatures," and that "He made and loves them all."

Properly, therefore, I repeat, the categorical Imperative of the law of Conscience applies only to our relation to Persons. It has two great Laws of Righteousness and Love; and both, in different degrees, pre-suppose in those to whom they are exercised, certain natural relations to us. Where these relations do not exist, as where the rights of personality in individuals are held in abeyance by insanity or utter wickedness, or where the true relations of humanity at large are broken off by the unnatural and monstrous condition of war, these principles cease practically to influence our conduct. Where the relations to any special person are closer and more natural than to another, there the power of this twofold duty is intensified, and, in the event of necessary conflict, has a right to claim predominance. The sense of Duty is, in fact, a realization of human relations; it is an acknowledgment that man's nature is not purely individual, and that, although we die alone, and in some sense live alone, yet "no man liveth or dieth to himself."

But it is clear that man's life cannot be regarded as confined only to these two relations to self and to man. There is some Power in the

world, and over the world, greater than either. Can it be that the moral nature of man, his highest and most essential characteristic, shall practically cease to be in his relation to that Supreme Power? Certain it is that its capacities are not fully satisfied in the relation to self and to man. "Self-reverence, self-knowledge, self-distrust," is a true description of the inner life of the soul. A full self-knowledge cannot satisfy itself without both the feelings between which it is here placed; and "Self-distrust" is rightly placed as the climax; the soul looks out of itself for the perfection of its moral life. Nor are the moral capacities of our nature fully satisfied by the addition of the principles of righteousness and love, so far as they belong to brotherhood, and therefore imply equality and reciprocation. There is, if I may so express it, a large reserve of moral sense yet untouched, which implies—what self-distrust cries out for—the relation of inferiority towards a superior Being. It has its expression in reverence, loyalty, trust—qualities quite as natural, quite as ineradicable, as the self-assertion of manliness or the righteousness of brotherhood. So essential are they to the perfection of our nature, that the craving for them, if it cannot find its right outlet, manifests itself every day in morbid

and unreasonable developments. Without some right direction for these elements of our moral nature, our moral life is imperfect. But this is not all; it is also full of internal contradiction and conflict. The duty to self, and the duty to our fellow-men as brothers, cannot indeed be really inconsistent; but yet very often they cannot be reconciled, except in the light of some superior principle harmonizing both. It is not only in the religious life that men are perplexed how to "save their own souls" by seeking individual perfection, and yet to "save the souls of others," by contributing theirs here to the higher life of humanity. If Liberty in the individual life, and Fraternity in the corporate life, be considered in themselves and by themselves, on the hypothesis of simple Equality, all history shows them to be hardly capable of any perfect harmony.

The soul then ought to be able to develop that side of moral life which belongs to the relation to a superior Being. Where shall it find the opportunity? Towards individuals, no doubt, in their measure and degree—to the Father, the Teacher, the Ruler. But it is only in degree. If we lose the conception of limitation, we have practically to deify the man in whom we place unlimited trust; and then life is a series of alternate idolatry and iconoclasm. But can we

be satisfied with humanity at large, at the bidding of modern philosophy? The idea is perhaps more tolerable and more plausible, than the idea of worshipping either self or an individual man. Yet it will not bear any thoughtful consideration. For, in the first place, the conception of humanity at large is far too abstract and vague, and our relation to it far too distant. Duty to humanity, accordingly, is mostly superseded by duty to the actual society, of the family, the class, or the nation, to which we belong; for this is at least tangible in itself, and practical in the actions to which it leads. But, although an absolute worship has been from time to time paid to these narrower societies, yet in theory it is seen, and in practice found, to be an idolatry, worshipping a defective object, fierce and intolerant to those beyond the pale. In the next place, it seems to be forgotten that, if by generalization we magnify the good of human nature, we magnify equally the evil. In some points it has become proverbial that public opinion is shallower and more unjust, public action more shameless, more pitiless, more inconsistent, than the thought and action of the individuals who make up the society. In any case, humanity at large, like humanity in the individual, is a deity, full

of monstrosities and defects, incapable of claiming any absolute worship. Lastly, even were this not so, to multiply what is finite will not make the Infinite. Yet nothing which is finite can possibly claim the whole heart; there will always be a reserve of individuality, which it cannot touch. The religion of humanity, if it rise to a Christ, who is at once Man and God, is intelligible; without the Christ it is but a plausible idolatry.

What, therefore, can be more natural and irresistible than that inference—which, as I have said, men have always actually drawn,—recognising in this moral need the witness of a true relation to the Supreme Power over the world. By that recognition the Moral Nature of man finds at once the complement, and the principle of harmony, of the other two great modes of its action. Individuality and Brotherhood are both realized under the conception of a Fatherhood in God. But we observe that, the moment this recognition is accepted, all doubts as to the Nature of the First Cause, and all conceptions of a mere *Anima mundi* are scattered to the winds. The witness of Conscience, if it be relevant at all, is to a true Personal Governor of the world—One, who is Himself a Moral Being, and in whom what we know as Purity



and Righteousness and Love have their perfection—One, therefore, whose government is essentially Moral. What the understanding by much reasoning concluded, the Conscience realizes with instinctive certainty.

(c.) But we must go further still. To the witness to God from the origin and scope of action of the Moral Sense, we must add what is a distinct, and, perhaps, a plainer and more intelligible witness still—the consideration of the basis of Morality itself.

I have spoken of the power of Conscience only as one of the powers which actually rule Humanity, side by side with physical force, with the dominion of man, with the selfishness of merely individual will. So far the simplest observation can lead us. But this is, as we know, far below what Conscience claims. It has (as Butler puts it) "authority as well as power." The actual strength of appetite, driving the will to physical gratification, may be great—so great as to rule the soul like a demoniacal possession. The passions of love and hatred, hope and fear, may sweep over the waters of the soul like a strong and steady wind, or like the sudden irresistible gusts of a hurricane. The power of men over us, acting either by compulsion or by persuasion, by individual ascend-

ancy, or by the spirit of the age, is always a considerable, and is frequently a tyrannical power. But the still small voice of Conscience is recognised as entirely unlike these, not in degree, but in kind. They can at most say "You must." Conscience alone can take up the higher language of "You ought." Now what is the basis of such authority? As a rule we hardly question its reality in theory, even if we disobey it in practice. But if it be asked, "Why should I obey Conscience rather than appetite or passion, the voice of man or the dictates of self-love?"—some answer must be given; and I firmly believe that no answer can be given, which is satisfactory and complete, excepting the old answer, "Because Conscience is the Voice of God."

Glance for a moment at the teaching of the two great Schools of simple Moralists on this all-important subject.

There is the School of the Intuitionists, which boldly says, "The Voice of Conscience carries its own witness with it. Its authority is a fundamental law of your nature, recognised, as the eye recognises light, or the intellect accepts a mathematical axiom."

The answer (I cannot doubt) has a grand truth in it, but it is obviously an imperfect answer.

I cannot, indeed, think that it is open to the simple denial which some give it. A man may say "I personally cannot recognise such authority. To me it is non-existent. Even were it otherwise, I should not be satisfied with a merely individual judgment, which might be a delusion. I ask for a general answer, applying not to you or to me, but to the whole race of man." But to this objection a not unsatisfactory reply may be given (as I have already suggested<sup>2</sup>) by an appeal from the individual to the collective witness of humanity, as embodied in the languages and institutions of the world. Still the answer, though right so far as it goes, must be confessed to be imperfect. At best, it does but say this Moral Supremacy is a law of the individual nature. The question still remains "Whence comes that law, and what does the existence of such a law imply?"

Turn then to the rival School of Utilitarianism, and hear its answer, "Obey Conscience, because such obedience will produce Happiness." In olden days that answer took a selfish form, and Happiness then meant the individual happiness of the doer. In our own days it has assumed a nobler and a grander phase. Happiness now means the happiness of the race. As a prac-

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 229—231.

tical rule, perhaps, it has purchased this nobleness at the expense of some vagueness and difficulty of conception, and of the necessary exclusion of any life beyond the grave. But we are concerned now with the answer in general. Of it, again, we must say unhesitatingly, that, while it must be acknowledged as containing truth, it is manifestly an imperfect answer. For what does it mean? It means simply that the law, whatever it is, which guides the outward circumstances of the world, is in accord with the law of our individual moral nature. Why it is so in accord, and what such accordance must imply, it cannot tell.

I have spoken here simply of the theoretic imperfection of these answers. But it ought to be added that, in respect of practical efficiency, that imperfection is more marked still. The appeal to individual intuition—how hard it is to maintain it, in the face of the consciousness of our own fallibility, when strong temptation assails the soul, or when the voice of men bids us follow the multitude! The appeal to the hope of happiness, if it be our own individual happiness, can hardly fail to lower the moral tone and impair the noble simplicity of Conscience; if it be the happiness of the race, how utterly vague, shadowy, uncer-

tain, it seems, in the presence of nearer and more vivid motives !

But let us put this aside, and look at the answer simply in theory. We must see that each goes but a little way, and suggests an answer more ultimate than itself.

The conception of an inherent law in man's nature undoubtedly means a manifestation in man's nature of the working of the Supreme Power, which brought man into being. Think what this means. As the existence of the Moral Sense points (as we have seen) to a Moral Creator, so its authority, as the dominant force in our nature, argues certainly that the purpose of Creation was predominantly moral ; and can hardly fail to lead to the further inference, that among the Attributes of His Nature, so far as we can understand them, the Moral Attributes of Righteousness, Love, Holiness, are supreme. To say that the Supremacy of Conscience is an inherent law of Man's Being is simply to say that the Moral Sense is the highest expression in us of the Will of the Supreme Creator. It infers necessarily the existence of a God, who is above all things a Righteous God.

But take the answer of the Utilitarian in either phase. What is it, after all, except a partial and vague expression of the old belief

in a Retribution, a Moral Government of God? It is difficult to know why we should stop half-way in the natural inference, and in the name of philosophy substitute for the old language, which at least is intelligible, the profession of belief in an "Eternal Something, not ourselves, which makes for Righteousness." For no mere thing—no impersonal Law or physical Force—can "make for," that is, can sustain and provide for, the power which most distinctly implies personality, in the being who exercises it, and in the beings toward whom it is exercised. Hence, to say that obedience to the Moral Law leads to happiness is ultimately to say that there is over the world the sovereignty of a Personal Being, whose Will is the righteousness of His creatures, and whose government is directed to the working out of righteousness in them.

The more we use plain words, and go to the root of the matter, the more we shall find that of the two answers of the Intuitionist and Utilitarian Schools, neither excludes the other, because neither contains the whole truth. Both really meet in the Faith, which finds the basis of the authority of Conscience in the Will of a Righteous God, at once impressed on our individual nature, and worked out in the history

of the World. The answer of the Intuitionist carries on the inference already drawn from the existence of the moral sense in us; the answer of the Utilitarian harmonizes with the view which we have been led to take of the full scope of its action; and both these lead us to God.

Nor ought it to be altogether omitted that this theory of a basis of the authority of Conscience in the Will and Nature of God is a theory, which, unlike the others taken alone, will work. It comes home to the simplest instincts of the child, as it certainly satisfies the philosophic craving for what is general and absolute. It appeals to the reason in its calmest thoughtfulness; yet it can curb the wildest excitement of passion. Effectiveness undoubtedly is in itself no sufficient evidence of truth. But in a matter essentially practical, ineffectiveness may well create a presumption of falsehood. It is no slight secondary consideration, whether a theory will or will not prove itself operative on the mass of men, the many workers as well as the few thinkers. The basis of right in the Will of God has shown this power to work for centuries. No other theory has yet found strength to take its place.

Looking, therefore, to the general action of Conscience—the *Synteresis*—I cannot but think

that examination shows how true has been that all but universal inference of man, which has connected the recognition of its truth and authority with the acknowledgment of a Living and Righteous God. The three lines of inquiry into the origin, the scope, the basis of the Moral Sense, are in great degree independent: for a man may speculate on its origin without examining its scope, or he may examine the scope of its action as a real power, without inquiring into the basis of its supreme authority. But their results are identical; and so their combined witness tells on the mind with almost irresistible power.

VI. But from this—to my mind the more important branch of the subject—let us turn to the other action of Conscience—the *Syneidesis*—which is the application of the Moral Sense to the actions of daily life. It starts with the fundamental ideas of Right, Duty, Retribution, and asks of any contemplated action, “Is this right? Is it a part of my duty to do it? If I do it, will it be well, or ill, with me?” These are what the text calls “the reasonings of men, accusing or excusing one another.” In them we pass from the abstract to the concrete. It is, indeed, through these concrete experiences that the abstract principle is at once defined



and educated. For here, as in all other lines of thought, we start, indeed, with a vague instinctive sense of the general principle; but yet it is only through these special experiences that we come to a clear and definite conception of this principle itself. Now in the consideration of the particular applications of Conscience, we depart from the simplicity of universal agreement, striking out into directions, varying according to time, place, age, and individual character, with a diversity, which the actual variations of formulated laws can but faintly represent; we pass from axiomatic truths to practical deductions from them, in which lie all but infinite liabilities to error. In all these detailed individual experiences, is there, or is there not, a sense of "God with us"?

It is certain that this mental process is not self-evolved and self-contained. It is a moral "education;" and education implies at once something to be drawn out from within, and some external power which draws it out. But any power acting directly upon the Conscience must have the character of Personality. Possibly, in the expectation of Retribution, so far as it is only a vague kind of understanding that the course of Nature is so ordered to give scope for action obedient to Conscience, and to hinder or cut

short the action which defies it, we may be content with "a stream" or "a tendency." But—not to mention that this is but an inadequate description of all that the idea of Retribution implies—it is certain that this cannot be the case, in respect of the purer and higher declarations of the Moral Sense, dealing not with the consequences, but with the qualities, of actions. If we are taught or guided in them, it must be a higher Moral Sense than our own, and this can belong only to a Personal Being.

(*a.*) Now, whatever we may suppose to be theoretically possible in a human being, growing up alone on a desert island, yet, as a matter of general fact, the moral sense in each individual is in part educated by just such a personal power—the power of his fellow-men. From our first moments of consciousness that power acts upon us in two chief ways,—through the coercive power of law, and through the spiritual power of teaching, whether by word, or example, or personal ascendancy. The two powers are almost always co-existent, although mingled in different proportions. In fact, on their coexistence in right proportion the welfare of humanity depends. Law, even where it is simply coercive, implies the existence of the principles which it is the task of teaching to enforce, by pro-

fessing to be based on rights known to those under it; and, in point of fact, if we consider law in all its developments,<sup>3</sup> it is not merely coercive, but has a directive and didactic element interwoven with it. Teaching, on the other hand, seldom deals with men without some reference to a retributive power of law, to enforce attention and to avenge neglect; for, man being what he is, "discipline," which is properly the "system of learning," all but invariably implies some idea of coercion or retribution. But the two elements are mingled in very different proportions. In the early days of childhood, law predominates; and even the didactic influence, coexistent with law, is largely an appeal, not to conscience and reason, but to faith. In manhood, the work of the law as "a schoolmaster" is, or ought to be, over; the didactic power takes the chief place; only if the spiritual influence be defied, does law come in, to scourge man for his chastisement, or to take him

<sup>3</sup> The law of our domestic and educational life, for example (which, after all, tells on the mass of men at least as powerfully as the law of the civil community), always involves the didactic and disciplinary element, and often makes it the leading element of its system. The force of public opinion, while it should be a purely didactic force, is constantly a law, not unfrequently an oppressive law; yet it always professes to retain, and mostly does retain, a didactic element.

out of the way of others. By both the individual Conscience is educated; and the results of education necessarily vary according both to the capacity of the individual soul, and to the actual character of the educating influences. We are familiar, therefore, with two actions of Will, brought to bear on us from without,—the reward and punishment by law, and the presentation of truth and right to the perception of Conscience. Under both we are sensible that our freedom and responsibility remain; under both, in a natural condition of things, our Conscience is informed, strengthened, developed.

Now, with regard to this process of moral education by the conscious action of our fellow-men upon us, two questions suggest themselves,—What does it imply? Is it the only educating force?

(*b.*) What does it imply? It is evidently a law of human nature, just as truly as the existence of the moral sense in the individual; and, if so, it must be a part of the government of the world by the Higher Power, whatever it be, by which that world was made and is sustained. Butler traces in it, accordingly, a “Moral Government of God,” intended for “the Moral discipline of man.”<sup>4</sup> His conclusion, strong in

<sup>4</sup> See “Analogy,” part i. chap. iii. sect. v. His line of

itself, is brought out with still greater force, when we consider—what will be more fully brought out in the next Lecture—that this moral education is chiefly exercised through the existence of natural relations (as of parentage, brotherhood, marriage) on which the physical propagation of the race depends, and of those social relations of political or religious life, without which civilization is impossible. For this shows that it is a part of the system of the world as a whole, by which the purely physical forces of organic life and the spiritual powers of moral being are harmonized together under one supreme law. The existence of such a moral government must be surely another indication of a true Moral Governor. In and through this education by man it is He who is the true Educator.

(c.) But is this our only moral education? Clearly not: it touches man on the social side of his nature; but there is in him an individuality, never so deeply felt as in relation to moral action. What shall we say of this? It would appear that it has another education of the same

argument leads him to dwell almost entirely on the coercive side of government; but it is equally applicable to the other and more spiritual element of human influence.

twofold kind, by action of law and by spiritual action.

There is an action by law upon us, in the fact (which again Butler has pointed out) that this life, in its physical conditions, and in those actions of men which are not intended to affect us, "is peculiarly fit to be a state of moral discipline."<sup>5</sup> There is much which, through our appetites and passions, must tempt us, with a temptation apparently necessary for our moral growth. There are what common language instinctively and rightly calls "punishments" of our evil-doing, proceeding from physical conditions, from the course of human life in itself, irrespective of all conscious dealing of men with us, and from the constitution of our nature. All these indicate an education of us by a law, distinct from all human law, often acting exactly where human law fails. Now such education implies a personal agency; yet that agency is not of man. What can it be but the agency of a true Moral Governor of the world?

But we cannot stop here. There is again an experience, of which all human literature is full, which has embodied itself in the tenets of all human religions, especially in their advanced

<sup>5</sup> See "Analogy," part i. chap. v. sect. iv.

stages. It is the experience, so strikingly expressed in the 139th Psalm, of a Voice in the soul and yet not of the soul itself, "searching it out," "knowing its thoughts long before," "spying out all its ways," "trying it to the very ground of the heart," "looking if there be any way of wickedness in it." What is that Voice? I cannot do better than quote a striking passage from the lectures of my predecessor. The Psalmist (he says) "felt that an influence which acted upon him individually and personally must be individual and personal itself. Probably he had no speculative ideas as to what personality was. But he knew that it dealt with him in a way to which there was nothing analogous, except the way in which living persons dealt with him. It praised and it blamed; it was not like a law, acting without reference to his special peculiarities, but it adapted its operation with infinite variety to all the varying shades of right and wrong, of error or of weakness, within him. In a word, it was just as personal as he was. As a heart answers to heart, and the face of man to man, so did that Power, which was felt in his conscience, correspond to his own nature."<sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> See Professor Wace's "Boyle Lectures" for 1875; Lecture II. (p. 202 of first edition). I gladly take the opportunity of expressing my obligations through the whole

There are, I know, minds to which such experience is altogether unknown, and may appear fantastic. But I believe them to be exceptional; I doubt whether they are the highest minds. In any case I may claim a large experience in this matter, written in the poetry, the religion, often the philosophy of the world; and I may note that it especially belongs to the great crises of life, when the human guidance fails us, or—still worse—contradicts the conscience within. Perhaps in it, most of all experiences, we hear the voice of a present God. We do not argue about it, or speculate on it as probable; we know Him, really teaching, commanding, inspiring, as a Father His children. Again and again the words of the Patriarch rise to our lips, “I have heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth Thee.”

Perhaps it is in the craving for this Divine guidance, and the conviction that in some measure it is given, that most of all we feel at once the need and hope of what we call properly “Revelation”—a clear Word of God, to scourge what is evil in us by its terrors, to inspire what is good in us by the simple power of its truth. “Teach me, O Lord, the way of Thy statutes,” is the natural of this branch of my subject to his treatment of Moral Theology.



cry of any soul conscious of God. The New Testament tells us that it is not left unanswered. The first office of the Holy Spirit to "the world," preparatory to His fuller enlightenment of the Church of Christ, is said to be "to convince" the soul of the three great moral principles of "sin, righteousness, and judgment" as present practical realities.<sup>7</sup> Nor can we forget that in Holy Scripture the first great Revelation of God to Israel is in the Ten Commandments, enforcing on the soul the rudiments of righteousness; as the first recorded teaching of the Lord Jesus Christ in the Sermon on the Mount is designed to exalt and spiritualize the Moral Law, bringing it home to the spirit, not by compulsion but by conviction, not by fear but by love. But of this it is not yet the time to speak, except to note how the special Revelation recognises the capacity of such twofold education in the human conscience by the outward Law and by the inward power of the Spirit; and how, as always,

<sup>7</sup> See John xvi. 8, 13, "He shall convince *the world* of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment. . . . He shall guide *you* into all the truth." It is true that the conviction of the world is here viewed with a distinct reference to the knowledge of our Lord Himself, and therefore to a conversion to Him. But it is with the general method of action of the Holy Spirit on the heart, not with its special object, that we are here concerned.

it brings out, in special and supernatural clearness, the work which goes on veiled and diffused in the natural system.

As, then, in the origin, scope, and basis of the power of Conscience, so also in its practical education, we find distinct traces of a Moral Governor of the world, patent to the simplest, yet growing clearer and clearer as they are examined in thought. How they have written themselves on human language and literature, how they have embodied themselves in the religions of the world, all history shows.

VII. I believe that this witness of Conscience to God, at once in the great principles of Moral Truth, and in the application of them to the needs and acts of every day, is itself so strong, that it would be fairly irresistible, were it not for the presence of the great mystery of moral evil in the world. It is here that the real stress of difficulty lies. It is true that there is something also of perplexity in the imperfection of Retribution in this life, so constantly dwelt upon in all human literature, but nowhere, perhaps, more vividly and resolutely depicted than in the Psalms and the Book of Job. The indiscriminate action of all physical powers, the imperfect and often perverted dealings of humanity with good and evil, the apparent want in some lives of all

scope and opportunity of moral growth—all these are felt at all times to be an obscuration of the Moral Government of God; and when they touch ourselves, or those dear to us as our own soul, they become a thick darkness. Yet still they can be borne. We can confess our necessary ignorance of the whole counsel of God, which leaves us in life partly to knowledge, partly to faith. We can fall back on the belief in a perfect equity of Judgment, under which what seems indiscriminate is really discriminated, and understand that what is evil to one man is good to another. We can often catch glimpses of a Divine purpose of discipline,—“Whom the Lord loveth He chasteneth.” We can look beyond the grave to a perfect Retribution, in a life for which this life is but a brief preparation, and so think little of “the light affliction which is but for a moment.” But the one thing which is an intolerable perplexity is the existence of moral evil in the world.

The existence of an inborn tendency to evil in man is no doctrine of Christian Revelation. It is a terrible fact; which it seems strange that any one can doubt, who studies human nature, whether in the growth of a child's character, or in the history of the world at large, as it was and as it is. The shallow optimism, through which

some have tried to deny or extenuate its existence, or to refer it to mere defects of physical, political, and social machinery, vanishes before deeper thought. The idea found in all consistent Pantheism, that evil is a lower form of good—both being parts of the Divine essence, expressed in the system of the universe—is repudiated by the indignant witness of Conscience within us. These theories unhappily live in the practice which is “the way of the world.” But they cannot stand formal investigation. Speculation accordingly, now, just as in the old Gnostic days, falls back, in the effort to account for Evil, on Dualism in one or other of its forms—now taking up the Manichean idea of two rival Deities, now fancying a Creator, limited in power by some force marring His perfect work. It will not now shrink from St. Paul’s awful description of “a law” of evil within; on the contrary, it will even exaggerate its darkness. Nor will it deny that evil is in some sense “sin,”—that is, a resistance to some higher law that rules the world. But it asks, sorrowfully or scornfully, How can this be under an Almighty and All-Righteous God?

(a.) What shall we say? We shall, I think, frankly acknowledge that the mystery of evil is

to us simply insoluble. We can, indeed, see that this capacity of evil is as closely connected with the mystery of free-will, on which man's high dignity and capacity of goodness depend, as the shadow with the light. We can see that the development of this capacity of evil is a perversion of the probation, needed for the growth of the moral nature, and ordained for its growth in goodness. We must therefore resolutely repudiate the Dualistic conceptions, which seem to exchange what is mysterious for what is intellectually and morally incredible. Whatever is must fall under the "first Law Eternal"<sup>8</sup> of God's Providence, even if it contradict the "Second Law Eternal" which he gives to His creatures. But we confess it still "an offence;" we can understand how men even desire to surrender or deny freedom, in order to avoid it. We freely acknowledge that its existence weakens the testimony of Conscience, otherwise irresistible, to the All Righteous and Almighty God. It cannot be His will; how it can be by His permission even for a moment, we cannot tell. The great Apostle of the Gentiles ventures only on a "what if," of mere suggestion;<sup>9</sup> his Master and ours has revealed nothing.

See Hooker, Ecc. Pol. I. ii., iii. <sup>9</sup> See Rom. ix. 22—24.

But we shall boldly declare that, although it weakens the moral witness, it is far indeed from destroying it. For we shall first contend (as all the noblest human thought has consciously asserted, and unconsciously implied in a thousand ways) that Righteousness and Truth do prevail over evil and falsehood historically, and that their prevalence shows the force of evil to be an exceptional and disturbing power, not the true law of human life. We shall urge next, that, if this rebellion thwarts in some of its aspects the development of good, yet, like all rebellions, it tends in other aspects to bring out and intensify loyalty to good, and give it a field of triumph. We shall still more emphatically plead, that, while the existence of sin weakens the moral witness, yet that the sense of sin, as sin—present even in the hour of evil-doing, but asserting itself with tenfold power in the subsequent hours of repentance or remorse—goes far towards undoing the evil, strengthening, to an intensity which is even agony, the witness of Conscience, and investing it with the sombre majesty of an avenging spirit. For, not from theory but from fact, we believe that sense of sin as sin is ineradicable from the human soul. In its hours of deeper reflection it is not satisfied with the recognition of evil,

as "Vice," against ourselves, or as "Crime" against our fellow-men. Looking up to the Supreme Power, it cries out with the Psalmist, "Against Thee only have I sinned, and done this evil in Thy sight." Whether in so crying out it simply feels the horror of sin, or adds to this feeling the expectation of Retribution, in either case the hour of practical trial scatters the theories and doubts of leisurely speculation, and bids the soul recognise not a "Law," or a "Something," but a true Personal God. Nor shall we fail to add, lastly, that the conception of a Future Life, wherever it is held even as a probable hypothesis, invariably includes the belief that this resistance of evil is but temporary—a cloud overshadowing only the early morning of man's whole being, destined to vanish away in the cloudless sunshine of the Hereafter.

(b.) All this we shall plead, and in it we may stand, cast down but not despondent, under the shadow of this presence of evil. But we shall acknowledge that, here above all, we look for the light of a Revelation from God. If there be what claims to be such a Revelation, we shall in great degree test it by its power to grapple practically with that awful fact of sin. It may not tell us why sin is: but, if it does not tell us how sin may be conquered, both for the indi-

vidual and the race, how it is over-ruled by the great dispensation of God, we shall conclude that it is not a Gospel to such a world as this. Christianity, as I need hardly remind you, accepts and stands the test. Its power (as St. Augustine reminds us<sup>1</sup>) turns upon the fact that in it we find what the noblest philosophies cannot give us—the knowledge of the acceptance of “a humble and contrite heart,” and the invitation to sin-worn and sin-darkened souls, “Come unto Me, and I will give you rest.”

Still, therefore, the witness of Conscience to God sounds on, saddened but not silenced by the mystery of evil. Compared with the other forms of witness, of which I have spoken, it stands out in its clear, trenchant simplicity and in its wide universality. In virtue of the one it cuts like a trumpet-tone through all the din of specu-

<sup>1</sup> See the well-known passage in his “Confessions” (vii. 21), where he speaks of that which the highest philosophy lacked:—“Non habent illæ paginæ . . . lacrymas confessionis, sacrificium tuum . . . arrham Spiritus Sancti, poculum pretii nostri. Nemo ibi cantat: *Nonne Deo subdita erit anima mea? Ab ipso enim salutare meum.* . . . Nemo ibi audit vocantem: *Venite ad me, qui laboratis.* . . . Aliud est de silvestri cacumine videre patriam pacis, et iter ad eam non invenire, et frustra conari per invia . . . et aliud tenere viam illuc ducentem, curia cœlestis Imperatoris munitam.”



lative controversy, and through the clamour of passion and appetite, when the vaguer and more complex music of the intellect and the imagination would be drowned. In virtue of the other, it comes home, not to the few abstract thinkers, but to the many hard workers and patient sufferers of life. In itself that witness might seem too stern and terrible, were it not that there is added to it, in the Theology of Love, which we have next to contemplate, a sweeter persuasiveness of tone. But even in its sternness, how infinitely precious it is! Better this darkness of a Sinai, out of which sounds the voice of Law, and out of which flash the lightnings of Judgment, than the ignoble ease of a life, spent over the flesh-pots of physical indulgence or in the worldly slavery of Egypt, as if there were nothing higher, grander, more awful, for man. Better the solemn voice within, which tells of sin, righteousness, and judgment, than the silence of moral ignorance, or the bewilderment of a thousand earthly voices, calling the soul away from itself and from God.

# LECTURE VIII.

## THE THEOLOGY OF THE AFFECTIONS.

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- I.—THE EXISTENCE OF A TRUE THEOLOGY OF LOVE.
  - II.—THE PRINCIPLE OF LOVE LIKE THE PRINCIPLE OF  
RIGHTEOUSNESS—
    - (a) IN ITS DIRECTION TO A PERSONAL OBJECT.
    - (b) IN ITS ATTACHMENT TO MORAL QUALITIES.
  - III.—THE PECULIAR CHARACTERISTIC OF LOVE IS ITS WIT-  
NESS (THROUGH SYMPATHY) TO UNITY OF NATURE  
BETWEEN THE SUBJECT AND OBJECT.
  - IV.—THE WITNESS TO GOD OF THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE  
OF LOVE IN RESPECT OF—
    - (a) ITS ORIGIN.
    - (b) ITS SCOPE.
    - (c) ITS BASIS IN UNITY OF NATURE.
  - V.—THE SIGNIFICANCE IN THIS RESPECT OF—
    - (a) LOVE TOWARDS MAN.
    - (b) LOVE TOWARDS GOD.
  - VI.—THE THEOLOGY OF LOVE IN RELATION TO THE MYS-  
TERY OF EVIL.
  - VII.—THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE PROVISION FOR THE  
EDUCATION OF LOVE, THROUGH MAN, AND DIRECTLY  
BY GOD.
  - VIII.—SUMMARY OF RESULTS.
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He that loveth not, knoweth not God; for God is love.”  
—1 JOHN iv. 8.

We pass from the consideration of that Moral Sense, which declares Righteousness, to dwell on that second Moral Sense, which expresses itself in Love. I interpret the text in what seems to me a plain deduction from its literal sense—as declaring to us that the Natural Theology, through which the soul feels after and finds God, is so imperfect as hardly to lead to anything deserving to be called knowledge, unless to the intellectual witness of the Understanding and Imagination, we add, not only the Theology of the Conscience, but also the Theology of the Affections. “He that loveth not,”—although he may think deeply on Truth, and thirst earnestly after Righteousness—“knoweth not God.”

I. But, before we investigate the points of resemblance and contrast between what I thus designate as the two lines of Moral Theology, it may possibly appear necessary to inquire, whether there is such a thing in the abstract as a true Theology of Love?

I can easily imagine how readily the idea may suggest itself to the mind, that while Love is a potent element in the practical life and sentiment of religion, and in the knowledge which is gained thereby, it can contribute little or nothing to the abstract witness of Theology.

Affection, indeed, is often thought to be too vague, too blind, too merely instinctive, to bear any such definite witness of God, as may stand the examination of reason. There are, therefore, many who maintain that Love should be utterly banished from the mind, as a dangerously disturbing influence, until by painful and thoughtful search of Reason, God be found and known—with the compensating promise, that, when He is known, then Love shall be recalled from exile, and allowed to pour out the whole soul at His feet. It is my first object, therefore, to protest against this tendency to ignore or to deny the claim of the affections to aid in the search after God. Surely analogy itself suggests that we should at least pause, before we reject that claim. In the process of the knowledge of man, love plays a most important part. Sympathy undoubtedly gives a certain insight into human nature, denied to a passionless intellect and even to a cold stern sense of duty. Accordingly if the maxim, "He that loveth not, knoweth not man," is the verdict of all true Science of Man, there may be some reason to accept the maxim, "He that loveth not, knoweth not God," as the verdict of all true Theology.

Our conclusion on this subject must depend on our view of the true character of the prin-

ciple of Love itself. Modern thought—probably (be it remarked in passing), under the guidance of Christianity—has certainly outgrown the old Pagan notion of Love, as a merely instinctive and irrational force in man. It is (for example) almost a commonplace to remark that the philosophical language of the Greek and Latin moralists has no adequate expression for the abstract principle of Love, so well known to us in all modern schools of morality.<sup>1</sup> It is even more than true that, the appreciation of Truth, the feeling of Beauty, and the sense of Right, it begins in mere instinct; and that this instinct is plainly akin to the instinct of brute creatures, and may assert itself without any

<sup>1</sup> Of the words *ἔρως* and *φιλία*, for example, the one involves the idea of individual passion, the other the idea of personal friendship. The word *Ἀγάπη* is not a classical word. The utter absence of any recognition of Love as a cardinal virtue in Plato's "Republic" is well known. The greatest blot on that noble work is connected with a degrading view of personal love, as a mere appetite, subservient to the physical propagation of the race. In what has been called proverbially "Platonic affection" it is most instructive to notice how the highest idea of harmony of kindred souls trembles constantly on the verge of the exhibition of the basest passion. The regeneration of the "old commandment from the beginning" to become "a new commandment," exalted, enlarged, and defined in principle, is unquestionably an achievement of Christianity.

relation, or even in a relation of antagonism, to the dictates of Reason and Conscience. It is probably true, that, even more than the other co-ordinate principles of human nature, Love grows in man by practice rather than by theory. Nothing is more certain than that beneficence is at once the effect and the cause of benevolence : perhaps in no respect is the influence of habit so remarkable, as in its power to deepen and intensify either love or hatred. But while these things are true, yet it is equally true, that Love is capable of being so impregnated by reason, as to assume the form of a settled rational principle in the soul, and to prove itself one of the strongest and most continuous of the forces which rule society. On the most sacred of all authorities, we hold the Love of our neighbour to be like the Love of Self. Hence, as in Self-Love there is an instinct of self-preservation and self-gratification, capable of being developed by reason into a settled rational desire of our own true happiness ; so the Love, which looks beyond self, may begin in the instinct of natural and social affections, but is capable of rising, as it does rise every day, into a lofty rational principle.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> It should be almost unnecessary to refer to Butler's Sermons on this subject—the first Sermon on "Human Nature" and the Sermon on the "Love of our Neighbour."

Men may perhaps doubt whether it is as an instinct or as a principle, that it acts most effectively to balance or overbear this natural love of self. But it is as a principle that it throws light on the great problem of Being; it is as a principle that it enters into the field of Theology.

II. Now, as we examine the principle of Love, we shall be struck at once by a similarity in its main characteristics to the principle of Conscience, which argues for it a right to be considered as a true Moral Sense.

(a.) Thus, first, in all its forms it tends only to a personal object. Except by association and symbolism, we cannot love a thing: except by metaphor, we cannot be said to love an abstract principle. It is curious to observe that, even in these cases, the growth of affection leads instantly to personification, and to note how the tendencies to love and to personify live and die together, whether we watch the play of a child with its toys, or study the bursts of poetic enthusiasm over the glories and wonders of Nature. It is notable that, as we approach actual personality, Love shows itself more and more dis-

But, while the "Analogy" is constantly studied, the Sermons, which are closely connected with it, and in some cases introductory to it, do not receive the attention they deserve.

tinctly. Even the semblance of life in the tree or the flower stirs in us a rudimentary affection. Towards the brute creatures love becomes real and even passionate, just in proportion as we trace in them any likeness of human personality. The prisoner in his solitary confinement has often discovered that likeness, and welcomed it with affection, in creatures which to the ordinary man seem uninteresting or repulsive. But Love in its true and proper development belongs only to personal relation. It is a witness, stronger even than the sense of duty, and incapable of being either silenced or misunderstood, that man's life cannot be self-sufficing and self-contained, but needs some contact with personality without.<sup>3</sup>

(b.) Then, in the next place, if we inquire to what element in personality Love attaches itself, we must answer (although at first sight the answer may seem strange), that ultimately it can attach itself only to a moral nature. Intellect as intellect, or power as power, may be

<sup>3</sup> It is here that the Stoic *ἀντράκεια* (with its modern ascetic counterparts) so utterly breaks down. So far as it indicates conquest over appetite, that is, rises above the world of things, it is noble. So far as it crushes affection, that is, dissociates man from the world of persons, it is inhuman. By what monstrous forms of Nemesis the exclusion of natural affection avenges itself, we know too well.



admired or feared, but can never be loved. Beauty has, indeed, a wonderful power to kindle Love—a power half-sensuous and even half-physical—which (if modern naturalists may be trusted) must be believed to have its counterpart in the brute creation. But Love, although it may be first kindled by the sense of Beauty, can never content itself with this alone. If it is to endure, it always connects that beauty, in fancy or in reality, with some mental and spiritual qualities. It fastens on what we call the “higher beauty of expression” (that is), it worships an ideal beauty of soul, shining through the visible beauty of the face. And whenever Love passes from a merely passionate form into a settled principle, which is to endure and to rule in life, its attachment to the moral element in man becomes more distinctly marked. Every one knows, and smiles to see, how the most instinctive of all affections—the affection of a mother—is never satisfied with its merely instinctive character, but insists on defending itself by the belief that her children are clever, beautiful, and good. It is a favourite theme of satire to note how the most passionate of all affections—the affection of a lover—invariably clothes the object of his idolatry with an ideal vesture of purity and goodness.

The instinct, however men may smile at its direction, is still in itself a true instinct. The love, which is to stand the wear and tear of life, must have some moral basis, in the lover and the loved. Whatever mental attitude it assumes—whether of inferiority towards a father, a teacher, or a leader; or of equality towards a friend, a brother, or a wife; or of superiority towards a child, a disciple, or a subject—still in every case it must have, or seem to have, such qualities on both sides, as Truth, Honesty, Parity, Loyalty. Else it cannot last. The power to love, as it requires a moral nature in him who feels it, so also implies a moral nature in the object towards which it is directed.<sup>4</sup> Unless it be sustained by some higher influence, the conviction of utter baseness, falsehood, selfishness, in that object will probably destroy it utterly, even in its most natural forms, exchanging it, either for the blank of mere indifference, or for the reaction of indignant hatred.

III. In these two points it will be observed

<sup>4</sup> This truth is embodied in that idea which Cicero represents in a well-known passage (*De Off. I. 5*). "*Formam quidem ipsam, et tanquam faciem, honesti vides; quæ si oculis cerneretur, mirabiles amores (ut ait Plato) excitaret sui.*" For this passage at once recognises the moral basis of Love, and the necessity of personality, (here a visible personality,) in its object.

that the action of the Affection is exactly similar to the action of the Conscience. So far the sense of Love follows precisely the same line as the sense of Duty. But in the third characteristic of the action of Moral Sense—the sense of necessary ties or relations between itself and its object—the principle of Love agrees with, but certainly goes far beyond, the principle of duty.

For Love implies that sign of likeness of nature and character, which we call Sympathy. Ultimately, I suppose that love cannot endure without some actual reciprocity. The capacity of love, in the normal growth of the soul in childhood, is first called out and developed by the experience of love. “We love him, because he first loved us,” is the natural expression of the experience of children in relation to their father. Even when the capacity has been developed into energy, though it may last long without return, and may endure to the end without adequate return, it is (to say the least) doubtful, whether any love (unless it be sustained by some higher principle), can say to the end, “I will very willingly spend and be spent for you, although the more abundantly I love you, the less I be loved.” But, at any rate, it needs sympathy,—that is such likeness of souls as may enable each to appreciate and un-

derstand the other. Where no such sympathy is, love cannot last. After vain and often pathetic attempts to imagine sympathy, it will sink into despairing indifference, or perhaps turn into contempt and hatred. The slightest sign of returning sympathy may induce it to forgive seventy times seven times. But there is a limit; and that limit may undoubtedly be reached. In this respect love seems unlike truth and righteousness, which, although in their action they may be partly dependent on reciprocity, yet do not seem to require the existence of mutual sympathy.

Now this need of sympathy in Love has a most important significance. It implies that Love is a witness to some unity of nature, between him who loves and him who is loved. This connexion of Love with such unity is most plainly shown in the dependence of all forms of natural affection on what we call significantly the "natural ties." The effect of these ties is often actually visible in that form of sympathy which we call likeness of family or national character. But in any case the mere fact that men are allied—in family by blood, in nations by community, partly of race, partly of laws and rights, in all mankind by "the touch of nature which makes the whole world kin"—as it secures

unity of nature, so is acknowledged to be a natural ground of love. To ignore it is said to be "unnatural" and "inhuman"—is branded (that is) as a disobedience to a Law of Humanity as profoundly natural as the right of freedom and the sense of duty themselves. But the same connexion is shown in a different way in that other great class of ties, which we form for ourselves, and yet having formed, cannot at our mere will break. The tie of friendship, sometimes closer than brotherhood; the tie of voluntary association, social, political, religious; the tie, above all, of love, consecrated in marriage, voluntary in its origin, yet superseding all national ties—these also imply a true likeness of nature (not perhaps usually the simple likeness of unison, but the subtler likeness of harmony) shown by the pursuit of common objects, the belief in common truths, the love of common principles.

Love, therefore, implies not only necessary relations to one another in actual life, but a certain unity of Nature. In this witness it undoubtedly goes far beyond the sense of duty. For duty may exist without sympathy. It involves a sense rather of likeness than unity of nature. Love not only bears witness to this unity, but makes such witness a primary, even an absorb-

ing, idea. Duty, first recognises our own individuality, and our own freedom, rights, and powers; and then proceeds to ask, "What ought I to do with them? What do I owe to others?" Thus the sense of Righteousness and Truth is the guard of man's proper individuality, in his relations to his fellow-men. On the other hand, the natural impulse of Love is to forget, to sink and (in the true sense of the word) to "deny" self.<sup>5</sup> It asks, not "What ought I to do, or what must I do?" but "What may I do for others?" In proportion as any consciousness of self is present to the soul, even in craving return of affection, Shakespeare has shown us in his "King Lear," how the bloom of love is faded, and its glow is chilled. Love, therefore, is the witness of unity against excessive individuality. It is not a little instructive that Plato's celebrated definition of Righteousness is the *τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν*,—the doing by each man of the part which he sees to be his own, in the confidence that all others will do the like

<sup>5</sup> It is singularly unfortunate that the word "self-denial, which our Lord makes the test of discipleship (Matt. xvi. 24), should have been, in common parlance, lowered from the idea of self-sacrifice to the idea of mere self-discipline and self-control. Like all errors of phrase, it has avenged itself by bringing in error of idea as to the leading principle of Christian life.

towards him ;<sup>6</sup> St. Paul's definition of Love is that it *οὐ ζητεῖ τὰ ἑαυτῆς*—"seeks not her own things," and "looks" (as it is elsewhere expressed) in every man "upon the things of others." Righteousness bids "each man bear his own burden;" Love adds, "Bear ye one another's burdens," for another's burden is really your own.<sup>7</sup> The temptation of the merely righteous man is to hard self-concentration; the temptation of Love is to an officiousness in doing good, which may even sap responsibility and sacrifice the true individuality of the person loved. We talk of the ties of Duty and the ties of Love. But they are of a different kind. Duty is as a golden cincture, keeping many separate units in mutual contact, and so in mutual action. The ties of Love are like the net-work of a living organism, by which one single life throbs through many members.

This witness to unity is the true significance of the great principle of Love in man. It is well called "the bond of perfectness." No Society can well live without it. If a family is merely kept together by the tie of common interest, or even of mutual duty, its common

<sup>6</sup> See Plat. Rep. iv. p. 433 :—τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστὶ.

<sup>7</sup> See 1 Cor. xiii. 5; Phil. ii. 4; Gal. vi. 2. 5.

life wants warmth and beauty, and eventually is likely to be broken up under any severe pressure. If a nation loses the glow of patriotism and the inspiration of loyalty, history tells us how its tone is coarsened and degraded, and the first seeds of its decay are sown. If our action towards human kind is guided only by the recognition of mutual advantage, which is the soul of Commerce, and the cold sense of duty between man and man, we know too well how little what we rightly call "humanity" can stand against selfishness and passion. A Power, which is so integral and essential a factor in the history of the world, must surely have a profound significance in all that concerns the highest life of man.

IV. What is that significance, when in thought we pass, from the world of self and the world of Humanity, to the consideration of the Higher Power, which is above both?

To answer this question, we must follow in great degree the same line of thought, which was our guide in the consideration of the Moral Sense of Righteousness. We must dwell, first, on the origin, the scope, and the basis of the abstract principle of Love in itself; and, next, on the process of its education in its concrete forms.



(a.) What shall we say of its origin? The power to love is one of the highest attributes of man. In harmony with the sense of Right, and clothing the firm skeleton of Duty with living flesh and blood, it is perhaps the best means of softening, purifying, ennobling the moral nature of man. Its enthusiasm is often the surest safeguard against the debasing temptation of appetite, and the hardening influence of selfishness and pride. Even for the perfection of the individual nature, what can be an adequate substitute for the spirit of love? But, besides this, we recognise the energy of love in its various forms as probably the deepest and strongest of all the influences, which actually rule the world as a whole. We observe that the whole network of physical relationship and of social polity subserves it, and is held to fail in its object, unless it supplies an organization through which the currents of love may flow. Love, therefore, is a high spiritual law in the individual nature and in the society of humankind. Whence came it? The Supreme Creative Power must be the source of it, as of every power in the world. Of it, therefore, as of Conscience, we ask, "Is it possible for us to imagine this high spiritual capacity of love developed out of physical force or mere animal

life?" Both these powers are, no doubt, pressed into its service; both may supply its lower elements; both may at times, like other servants, rebel against their true master, and either overbear his right authority by brute force, or travestie themselves under his likeness. But the power of love is itself a spiritual and moral power. The mind revolts against the idea of tracing it to a physical parentage, as monstrous and incredible in theory, as destitute of all evidence in practice. Yet, if this be so, what must the Supreme Power be? The answer must be the answer of the text, "God is Love;" and the human love in all its varieties is but the shadow of the Divine. Yet in that answer is not the whole of a true Theology involved? If we once give it, then we know God as a true Divine Person—as perfect in the two great Moral Attributes of Righteousness and Love—as implanting those moral powers in us, in order to impress on our nature the image of Himself.

(b.) But let us pass from the source of Love in man to the scope of its exercise. What shall we say here? We must say, as we said of the Conscience, that it cannot be satisfied, either in the little world within, or in the world of men; and that as Love, like Duty, is one of the highest faculties of our nature, it would be strange

indeed, if it had no scope in our relation to the Supreme Power. But we may (I think) urge both these considerations here with even greater force. Love, even less than Duty, can find full scope, if it ignore God.

For, first, it is clear that far less than duty has it any reference to the little world within. The phrase, "the love of self," can hardly be understood in the strict literality, in which we can speak of duty to self, self-respect, and the like. To be absorbed in the thought of self—to gaze with passionate enthusiasm on our own beauty, physical or moral, to delight ourselves in our own intellect or character, to be devoted to our own self-culture and our own happiness—is rightly held to be akin rather to vice than to virtue. It is a madness and an inhumanity, in which (as the old fable of Narcissus teaches) the soul will pine by a moral atrophy and die. Love by its very nature looks without: if it be introspective, it is diseased.

Then, again, if we look to the world of humanity, it is an acknowledged truth—to which both the individual consciousness of every full-grown life, and the collective verdict of human literature bear witness—that man's capacities of love are at once educated by human relationships, and unsatisfied by them. For Love

undoubtedly needs for its continued life, the conviction of the beauty and goodness of the object on whom it rests, and of the existence of some reciprocity of love in him. Now, so far as it assumes the attitudes of superiority and equality, it may possibly find on earth the scope it needs, although even in these it is constantly baffled, wounded, and disappointed, by the proof of the defects, and by the experience of the ingratitude, of its objects. But it has its attitude of inferiority, on which such disappointment especially throws it back. Its deepest consciousness, by which, indeed, it is properly and naturally educated in the first instance, is that of loyalty and worship of a superior being. Can it here find full scope of exercise, in relation either to the individual or to the society of men? Even less (I repeat) than duty. Personal affection has its idolatries; but, with a shock affecting our whole moral being, it awakes to find that no human being is wise enough, good enough, loving enough, to deserve unqualified devotion of love; and that even if such a being existed, yet the imperfect mutual knowledge of man and man, which never penetrates to the inmost depths of being, would prevent us from being able fully to recognise, and therefore adequately to love him. Men (I know), offer us, as a sub-

stitute for the acknowledged imperfection of personal affection, loyalty to a family, a sovereign, a nation, or enthusiasm for humanity at large ; but all these equally fail. Here, as in the last Lecture, we must remark that the sum of finite affections will not make a true infinity. The spiritual defects, which forbid absolute devotion to each individual, are not obliterated, but intensified by aggregation ; the unity between the individual and society is less perfect than between man and man, and, in consequence, the extension of the area of affection simply dilutes its power ; the devotion to the various societies to which man belongs—the family, the nation, and the race—are constantly liable to a conflict, in which it is hard, if not impossible, to decide between the intensity of the narrower, and the grandeur of the wider unity. But besides this we must add—what concerns Love in virtue of the law of needful reciprocity,—that the want of an adequate return of love from society itself is fatal to its claims on our allegiance. The ignorance in society of its true benefactors is proverbial ; the capricious fickleness and perversion of popular gratitude have been felt by all who have sought to serve their fellows ; tardy repentance, paying to a man's senseless body or to his memory the tribute which it denied to the

living man, is the favourite theme of satire. Duty may stand up against this. But although some transcendental philosophers hold it essential to an enthusiasm for Humanity that it should equally endure, it is at least doubtful, whether in the absence of all reciprocity love can remain for ever, unless through men it looks to God, and for the sake of the Father loves His children.

For all these reasons we urge that no enthusiasm for humanity can have a right to "all the mind, and all the soul, and all the strength." There is much that we cannot render to the Cæsar, whether of individual royalty, or of collective humanity. In every soul, which realizes its own individuality, there must be still a vast unoccupied residuum of the capacity of Love. Men in all ages, as all religions and many of the noblest philosophies show, have believed that it belonged of right to the Supreme Power, and that (as St. Augustine long ago expressed it) "God had made the heart for Himself, and therefore it was unsatisfied till it found Him." Have they been wrong? They looked to the world of things, and traced on it the lines of foreordained usefulness and beauty, obscured, indeed, but certainly not obliterated, by the mystery of evil. In their own action they

knew that to produce these things for others, was the first instinct of Beneficence, and the highest delight of Love. Such action they found to be one of the most effective ways of being fellow-workers with the Supreme Power, ruling the world. When they looked at the works of Nature, then of the lower creatures they believed, and of the race of men they knew, that all was ordered to minister to happiness; they saw that, if only man's own sin could but be rooted out, this world would be even now a Paradise; they readily believed what Religion taught again and again, that all the blight which rests on it now is simply the poisonous miasma of sin. There went up from the souls of men, involuntarily and perpetually, a Hymn, not only of wonder and admiration, but of thanksgiving and praise. Surely it would need much to make us believe that it went up to the deaf ear of Physical Force or Impersonal Law. This unceasing homage of Love, even in regard to the world of Nature, is surely witness to a living God.

But if this be questioned in relation to that world (chiefly by those who dwell on exceptional evil, till they allow it to obscure the normal good), what shall we say of the world of persons? In this, as I have said, the soul has always felt itself at once stimulated and unsatisfied. Look-

ing through all human relationships, it fixes on Fatherhood as the one primeval and imperishable relation of superiority, implying Wisdom, Power, Protecting Love. From the finite and imperfect fatherhood of the world, it ascends to "Our Father which is in Heaven," as a truer and more ultimate title of the Supreme Power, than even the Universal Creator, King, and Judge. There and there only it finds the rest which it needs, for the understanding in thought, for the conscience in allegiance, for the heart in love.<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Hooker's treatment of the subject is singularly beautiful and profound. In the Ecc. Pol., Book I. chap. v. he argues that the perfection of man is his chief good; that all things which conduce to it are secondarily good for us; but that, since all perfection is but a shadow of the Divine perfection, "all are said to seek the highest, and to covet more or less the participation of God," which he explains to be likeness to God, in "continuance," in "constancy and excellency of operation," in "the knowledge of Truth," and the "exercise of virtue,"—that is, of energy. In chap. xi. he goes on to argue that we desire or love good things in proportion to their goodness. But "Nothing may be infinitely desired but that good which is indeed infinite. No good is infinite but God, therefore is He our felicity and bliss. Moreover, desire tendeth to union with that which it desireth. If, then, in Him we be blessed, it is by force of participation and conjunction with Him. Again, it is not the possession of any good thing that can make them happy that possess it, unless they enjoy the thing wherewith they are possessed. Then are we happy



(c.) But let us next pass, as before, from the consideration of the origin and scope of Love, to consider the ground of its sacredness, through which it is different in kind from an appetite or passion, and has, like Conscience, an authority as well as a power. Here also, as before, we shall have to pass from the answer of the Intuitionist or Utilitarian to an answer which rests on God. With the one we shall hold that Love is a supreme law of our nature; with the other that its working is a tendency essential to the supreme good of Humanity. But we shall add that we cannot understand such a law without a Personal Creator to write it on the heart, or such a tendency without a Moral Governor. In all this we have but *mutatis mutandis* to retrace the ground which we have already trodden in the previous lecture.

V. But if we ask, "What is the true basis of Love," in the sense of asking, "What is its significance as to our nature and being?"—then we shall find out what is its peculiar function in the witness to God.

(a.) Its existence in the soul shows that the individual nature is not self-centred and self-

therefore, when we fully enjoy God, as an object wherein the powers of our souls are satisfied even with everlasting delight."

sufficing—that it must have some spiritual unity with another nature like its own. Hence, first, the existence of love to man implies what we call “a common humanity,” in spite of all individual peculiarities, and all the local and national peculiarities, which outward circumstances and past history have impressed on men. The intensity of love varies with the closeness of the unity between man and man, either by blood or by sympathy. We may love all men; but to love all equally is unnatural and impossible. There are “kindred souls,” whether by natural kinship or the kinship of harmony of character, in whom the common humanity is most vividly realized, and therefore love most vividly felt. Whence comes that common humanity? At first sight it may seem reasonable to reply that it comes from a common human parentage, developing its effects through that series of natural ties, of the power of which we have experience every day in hereditary peculiarities, in family likeness, in national character. But this common parentage, however true historically, does not account for the whole of the facts. For in each man there is also an individuality of character, in respect of which he is more or less than his parentage, and which, unsatisfied with natural bonds of unity, shows itself (as I

have said) as creative of a new unity, by the origination of that other series of voluntary ties, which co-exist with and at times supersede the other. In virtue of this, each soul is independent of human parentage, and is (so to speak) in direct connexion with the source of spiritual being.<sup>9</sup> The unity, therefore, which exists between all these distinctly individual natures is something more than the mere existence of a common human parentage would account for. Whence (again we ask) can it come?

There can be but one answer—that, both in the origin of the race, and in the birth of each individual soul, there is impressed upon human

<sup>9</sup> The co-existence of these two elements of common nature, and distinct individuality, is the ground of the old controversy of Traducianism and Creatianism (of which a brief sketch will be found in Liddon's "Elements of Religion," Lecture III.). It applies certainly to man's nature as a whole, for it is impressed on the body as well as the soul. No one who has studied human nature, in the whole width of society or in the narrow limits of family life, can possibly be either a mere Traducianist or a mere Creatianist. Just as under the Darwinian theory, no one doubts the transmission of characteristic properties, and yet no account (except the belief in a Creative Will) can be given of the first individual variations, from which the differentiation of species starts; so in human nature, especially in the spiritual nature of man, there is a co-existence of unity and individuality, which nothing but the same belief can account for.

nature one eternal type by the hand of Him who made it; and (as we have already said) that type, being of a moral and spiritual nature, can be impressed only by a moral and spiritual Being. Thus the unity between man and man, which human love implies, must have its source in the Creative Will of God. The knowledge of it, therefore, leads us up to a Moral Creator of Humanity. Even in this witness it carries by implication the inference of a likeness between Him and us.

(*b.*) But we have already urged that, over and above the love of man to man, there is a love of man to God, not only possible to man, but universal in man; and in this alone the soul can sink the individuality, which always rightly limits the capacity of love to men. What can this love indicate except a real unity of nature between God and man? The type, which we have already concluded to be impressed on all human creatures, alike in the origin of the race, and the birth of the individual soul, must, we now see, have a likeness to the Creator Himself, must be "the image of God." In one of the greatest Epistles of St. Paul,<sup>1</sup> we are taught that the

<sup>1</sup> See Ephes. v. 22—vi. 9. The characteristic of the Epistle is its tendency to deal with human nature as a whole, as regenerate in Christ, and hence to dwell on the

three great relationships of human society—father and child, husband and wife, master and servant—are sacred, as shadows of the relations of God to man in the Lord Jesus Christ. No such completeness of view can be gained by mere Natural Theology; but the very witness of love to God leads up at least to some conception of a true Fatherhood of God, under which the brotherhood of all men is realized, and which at the same time has a close relation to each individual life, guarding its freedom and sacredness.

It is in this that the peculiar force of the Theology of Love consists. It agrees with the Theology of Conscience in recognising in the Supreme Power a true Personal God, a Moral Creator, a Moral Governor. So far the two witnesses simply coincide. But, while Conscience tells of man's individuality before God, Love witnesses to a true unity of nature and a communion with God, on which we may rest "all our heart and all our mind, all our soul and all our strength." That witness is not lost in the conception of God's greatness and our own littleness; it is not destroyed, though it is obscured, even by the sense of sin and judg-

relations which underlie society as natural, and to bring out the doctrine of that society supernatural, which we call the Catholic Church of Christ.

ment. On the contrary, in the communion of the soul with God, Love is the element which grows and gradually supersedes the elements of simple wonder and fear ; just as in the conception of God we accept as the ultimate truth, not "God is Power," "God is Light," "God is Righteousness"—although all these be true—but "God is Love."

VI. Yet I must add that there is one other point, in which this witness of the affections has a peculiar beauty and power of its own in such a world as this. We have had to speak again and again of the awful mystery of the existence of evil—physical suffering, intellectual blindness, moral sin—as the one great disturbing influence along all the lines of conviction which lead up to God. We cannot deny that it crosses us here also. We ask in wonder, "How can God, who is Love, create beings, who can be so wretched, blind, sinful, that it were better for them had they never been born?" To that question, as to the parallel question of the Conscience, no full and adequate answer can, from the nature of the case, be given. Nor, again, is it doubtful that, just in proportion to the existence of moral evil in the soul, the love of God is exchanged for a fear, "hiding itself among the trees of the garden;" and, just in

proportion to the actual power of moral evil to desolate the world, the belief in God's Love, as well as His Righteousness, is shaken. Sin therefore, weakens this moral witness, as it weakens the other moral witness, to God. Were it not so, their combined testimony would be absolutely irresistible.

But still it is through this conception of Love that we have the brightest gleam of light from Natural Theology to penetrate the darkness of sin. For, in the first place, love being the measure of unity with God and likeness to Him, we feel that, so long as we have any love in us, our nature cannot be quite estranged from Him or utterly degraded. There is the Divine Image in us, showing itself both in love to man and in love to Him: we cannot but hope that it will conquer all that obscures it and fights against it. But more than this. In the conception of God's Love there is an undying hope. For love, as we know, even in ourselves, contains, in relation to those who sin against us, the quality of Mercy; and we hold that this quality belongs necessarily to superior being.

It is enthroned in the hearts of kings,  
It is an attribute to God Himself.

Accordingly, we know that towards erring and

sinful children an earthly father shows mercy, almost as a thing of course, carries not out the strict law of Righteousness against them, but delights to wipe away their tears of penitence, and to swallow up in the gladness of reconciliation all the suffering of the past. If God be Love, we have hope that He will be better than an earthly father to His prodigal sons, that thus the sin of man will be pardoned, and all the cloud of evil vanish away. We hope this: without Revelation I dare not say that we know it.<sup>2</sup> For even the Love of God cannot destroy the responsibility of man.<sup>3</sup> Sin must be atoned for; there must be repentance, if there is to be pardon. Yet every day in this life we seem to see souls utterly hardened and reprobate, dead to all sorrow for sin, and all desire of righteousness. If there is always pardon to the penitent, can there be always penitence for the sinner?

<sup>2</sup> On this solemn subject, see Butler's weighty and unanswerable remarks in the "Analogy," part ii. chap. v.

<sup>3</sup> Note the profound teaching of our Lord in John xii. 47, 48, in which His will for salvation and the inevitable responsibility of man are contrasted. "If any man hear My words, and believe not, I judge him not: for I came not to judge the world, but to save the world. He that rejecteth Me, and receiveth not My words, hath one that judgeth him: the word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him in the last day."



We cannot be sure, that, beyond a certain point, human souls may not be utterly and eternally estranged from God. But we have hope—a hope that has expressed itself in every religion—and that hope comes not from the Reason and the Conscience, but from the Affections. Its very existence is a signal proof of the truth, that “he who loveth not, knoweth not God.”

VII. I have spoken hitherto mainly of the principle of Love in the abstract, corresponding to what we call the *Synteresis* in the Moral Sense of Righteousness. But it is far more difficult here to distinguish the abstract principle from the concrete application of it. For since the sense of Righteousness bids us first realize our own individuality and then the duties, which, in virtue of that individual responsibility, we owe to others, it is possible to consider the principle of Duty in its abstract purity and grandeur, as we stand face to face with it in the great question, “For what purpose am I what I am?” Love, on the other hand, being essentially relative and self-forgetful, it is all but impossible to realize it, except in its concrete forms, in close and necessary connexion with the external objects to which it tends. The distinction, therefore, which in the examina-

tion of Conscience was natural and necessary, is somewhat artificial here.

But still there must here also be a similar consideration of the need of education of the principle of Love, and the inferences to be drawn therefrom.

That the capacity of Love, like the capacity of Righteousness, needs to be educated, and that provision is made for its education by the existence of human society and natural relationships, is too obvious to need proof or enforcement. The only difference is that in the education of Love the lower or coercive element of law has no place, and that the spiritual element is not so much the power of direct teaching, as the magic of example and personal influence. The growth of Love must necessarily be free. It is stimulated by the power of example, begetting an inevitable reciprocity—with a power stronger here than even in respect of Duty; for it is an all-sufficient ground for loving men that “they first love us.” It grows with singular rapidity and certainty by its own action; for it is well known that we love most those for whom we have had the opportunity of doing most, fully understanding that “it is blessed to give rather than to receive.” It may be added that the culture of the Imagination and of its delight

in the beauty, which we rightly call "loveliness," plays a more important part in the education of Love than in the education of Duty. But these differences do not touch the main point of similarity—that the affections, like the Conscience, need to be educated, and are in part educated by man.

From this, therefore, exactly as before, we go on to two inferences,—First, that this education by man, being a law of human life, is a part of the moral government of God, and that, therefore, of His nature Love as well as Righteousness is a chief attribute. Next, that there are depths in the capacity of Love, which no human power, either of the individual or of society, can reach, or, indeed, ought to reach. For these there is an educating power which must reach them from on high.

Not in this case the power of Law. In the sense of Law—that is, of God's Will enforcing and avenging itself—lies the source of fear, whether it be the lower fear of punishment, or the higher fear which is akin to reverence. "Perfect love casts out fear;" it cannot, therefore, be fostered by Law. We fall back entirely on the voice of the Spirit in the soul. As He is the awful Spirit of Righteousness, so is He also the sweet Spirit of Love. As by the presence

of a Divine Righteousness, in rebuke and judgment, He trains the Conscience, so also by the sense of a Divine Love, in its beneficence, its sympathy, its mercy, He trains the capacity of Love.

It may indeed be noted that, in accordance with that less introspective and more expansive character of love, on which we have already dwelt, the Voice of God in the soul seems here, more than in its appeal to the conscience, to make use of impressions from the outer world. Thus it tells marvellously on the soul through the imagination by the sense of the beauty of Nature. In that relation, even a Christian poet calls it "Nature's Voice," whether he hears it in the bright freshness of the morning, or the calmer peacefulness of the evening, in the silence of the quiet valley or the grandeur of the mountain storm. But it is really a voice within the soul; and the most prosaic mind knows well how at times it melts the heart to tenderness, and fills the eyes with the tears of an adoring love. It is the voice of a true Personal Being; for none other can call out a real answer of love. Nor can we doubt that the very atmosphere of human affection—in itself, as we have already seen, a powerful educating influence—suggests the existence behind and

through it of a higher love of the God who ordained it as one of the great ruling forces of humanity. What Keble again says of the sense of human sympathy in the hour of repentance—"They love us: will not God forgive?"—is true of all the various forms of human affection. As by it we first learn to conceive of the love of God, so through it we afterwards learn to feel that higher love; for in it the voice of the Divine Spirit of Love speaks to us through human voices.

But yet that Voice, perhaps oftener still, comes home to the soul directly. It breathes first the conviction of God's goodness and especially His mercy; it suggests next the yearning of the soul for Him and for His likeness; it calls out lastly the answering current of a conscious love. By the testimony of individual consciousness and of all human literature, we know that this Voice, thus speaking directly, is heard in the secrets of the soul,—generally the more clearly in proportion to the greater sensitiveness and purity of that soul itself. In the education of the capacity of love, as in its origin, its scope, and its basis, we know a present God.

VIII. Thus, it would seem, the Theology of Love completes the harmony of the many voices which testify of God.

Closely parallel to the Theology of Conscience, yet certainly coming from an independent faculty in the soul, it testifies by the convergent force of coincidence to a Personal, a Moral, a Loving God. Of the two great truths correlative to each other—the spirituality of man, and the Being of a true God, having communion with man—we may hold that the sense of Righteousness is the chief guardian of the one, the sense of Love the chief witness to the other. But the two truths must stand or fall together; and the two lines of Moral Theology, perhaps in different proportions, testify of both. Their witness, after all, is more powerful than any other; for it comes home with a direct and vivid force to the individual Conscience, stirring it not only to know, but to do; and it tells more or less upon all, not needing research into the past, or abstract reasoning on the first principles of Being, but dealing with the present realities and the present needs of life. Their witness is more fruitful than any other; for it discloses to us in its measure and degree, not only that God is, but what He is—unfolding to us the Moral Attributes most clearly belonging to Personality, and most intimately affecting our own life in relation to Him. Therefore it is that our Lord promises the blessing of “seeing God,” not to keen-

ness or subtlety of intellect, but to the "purity of heart," which grows out of the "hunger and thirst after righteousness." Therefore it is that, as the crowning perfection of Gospel teaching, it is declared that "he that loveth not, knoweth not God," and that they who are "rooted and grounded in love" shall "know what passeth knowledge, and be filled with all the fulness of God."

# SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT.

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I.—(a) SUMMARY OF THE GENERAL POINTS OF THE ARGUMENT.

(b) THE RELATION OF BELIEF IN HUMAN PERSONALITY TO BELIEF IN GOD.

(c) THE GREAT ANTITHESIS BETWEEN THEISM AND PANTHEISM.

II.—THE TWO GROUPS OF SPECULATIVE AND MORAL THEOLOGY: THEIR MUTUAL RELATIONS AND COMBINATION.

III.—THE ULTIMATE CONCLUSIONS—

(a) THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD.

(b) THE INDUCTION OF HIS (RELATIVE) INFINITY.

(c) THE CONCEPTION OF THE ABSOLUTE.

IV.—THE RELATION OF NATURAL THEOLOGY TO REVELATION.

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## CONCLUSION.

THE brief outline of a great subject is now completed. It remains to sum up the leading conclusions, to which the course of the argument has led.



I. (*a.*) We start<sup>1</sup> from an all-important fact, which must in some way be accounted for—that the belief in a Personal Godhead is all but universal over the field of humanity, both in space and in time. With the one great exception of Buddhism—which is itself unable really to maintain its Theoretic Nihilism, and which yet, in virtue of that very Nihilism, is incompatible with any activity or progress of man—no belief which excludes a Personal Deity is able to maintain itself as a practical belief, fit for the wear and tear of life; and no belief in a Personal Deity fails (after perhaps a brief halt in some theory of Dualism) to assume, explicitly or implicitly, the form of a belief in One Eternal God. The evidences of our Natural Theology have, therefore, to maintain a vantage-ground already our own against assailant forces, rather than to win for the faith in God a new position in human thought and faith.<sup>2</sup> Their office, indeed, is to

<sup>1</sup> See Lect. I.

<sup>2</sup> In strict accordance with the laws of human nature, Holy Scripture (1 Pet. iii. 15) directs us to be able to give on inquiry “a reason for the hope which is” already “in us,” wrought out in the soul, not by abstract reasoning, but by our own instinctive faith and by the teaching of men, which God has ordained on all lines of knowledge to be the two influences of actual education. The command applies to the evidence both of Religion as such, and of Chris-

draw out, into explicit forms the principles implicitly involved in the universal and instinctive belief of mankind.

But what is the true character and province of Natural Theology?<sup>3</sup> In itself, when it proceeds beyond the bare demonstration of the existence of a First Cause, it is, and from the nature of the case we maintain that it must be, an Inductive Science—proceeding (as all other Inductive Sciences proceed) by observation, generalization, verification, and resulting at last, not in demonstration, but in moral certainty. If it leads us to a Personal Being, then, although our powers of observation are enlarged by sympathy, yet all analogy shows us that, for anything like adequate knowledge of Him from Himself, some Self-Revelation is needed, complementary to the searchings of Natural Theology, taking up its various lines and carrying them on to the central Unity. To the knowledge of Science, therefore, must be added the knowledge of Faith. It is important accordingly at the outset to consider what is the force, and what the limitation, of Natural Theology. Those who believe in a Revelation, Supernatural but not

tianity itself. It shows us clearly the true function of Evidence in relation to Faith.

<sup>3</sup> See Lect. II.

Preternatural, will be prepared at once to estimate that force, and to expect that limitation.

To these preliminary considerations we next add<sup>4</sup>—what it is the special object of these lectures to enforce—first, that there are various lines of Natural Theology, corresponding to the Intellect, to the Imagination, to the Conscience, and to the Affections of man; next, that no one of these various lines can be considered alone, or expected alone to bear the whole stress of proof: thirdly, that, in virtue of the Law of Convergence, so well known in the estimation both of scientific evidence and of human testimony, the aggregate result of these various lines of Theology is infinitely greater than the mere sum of their separate evidences; lastly, that, since each has at once its points of agreement with the others, and its peculiarity of some exclusive witness, this confirmatory power of Convergence applies, primarily, indeed, to the points in which all agree, but secondarily also to the testimony which each bears alone.

From these main considerations we proceed to work out more in detail each of these lines of thought, as defending the fortress of instinctive Faith.

(b.) But before doing so, it is important to

<sup>4</sup> See Lect. III.

notice what are the principles of that defence. Everywhere the belief in God, and the consciousness of all that makes a true Personality in man, are in the closest connexion with each other. No Theology is possible apart from the recognition of a free will in man, guided by Reason, speculative and practical, and in some mysterious way harmonized with the Supreme Power. The converse would probably be found to be true—that, without belief in God, the believer in man's true personality will find it all but hopeless to understand how this needful harmony can be possible, and so will hardly maintain his own conviction, as a living and acting power. But with this we are not at present concerned. The point, which must be clearly represented to our mind, is this, that we start in the search after God from the conviction, so deeply engraven on the individual consciousness and on the whole history and literature of the world, of a true personality in man. With those who deny this we have no common ground. But wherever it is acknowledged, we believe that the evidence of Natural Theology is fairly irresistible. On the premiss itself, we appeal at once to the first principles of our inner consciousness, and to the exigencies of the outer life in which "we are treated as if we were free." We have no fear that any imperious

demand for logical comprehensiveness of system, or any impressions, however powerful, of the Majesty of Law, will ever rob mankind of it.

(c.) When we have thus considered the principles of our defence, it is well to glance, next, at the character of the attack.

The great issue to be decided is between Pantheism and Theism—that is, between the conception of a pervading Soul of the Universe, and the faith in a living Personal God. For a pure Materialism is, I believe, as a real faith, impossible, because it utterly fails to account for all the spiritual phenomena of life. Nor is it probable that what men call “Agnosticism,” in respect to God—the denial of all possibility of a true knowledge of Him, and the endeavour to frame a system of life and thought without it—will be much more than a theory of the closet. It cannot meet even the intellectual necessities, much less the moral and spiritual necessities, of life. If there be a God, it is an untenable position; if there be no God, it must find something to supply His place: and till it does, it must acknowledge itself to be a mere pause and halting-place of thought.

The one great enemy, then, against which

Religion has to hold its ground is Pantheism.<sup>5</sup> The various evidences of Natural Theology must be ultimately marshalled with a view to its attack, now pressed on with special vehemence by the purely Physical Philosophy of the present day, often fascinating the Intellect, and enlisting in its cause the force of the Imagination.

II. Now, as we thus marshal them, we find that they fall naturally into two chief groups—the Intellectual (or Speculative) Theology of the Reason and the Imagination, and the Moral Theology of the Conscience and the Affections. These two groups, while in the component elements of each there is a close similarity of main principle, hold towards each other a relation chiefly of independence, differing in the very principles of their method. It is, therefore, not unusual for men either to dwell wholly on one or the other according to their tastes and

<sup>5</sup> In this respect our position materially differs from that of the great Evidence writers of the eighteenth century. But it seems clear that the Deism, with which they had to deal, was stimulated by not wholly dissimilar causes, viz. by the great development of Physical Science, and by the prevalence (in the school of Locke) of a mental and moral philosophy of a kindred spirit, starting from sensation, decrying abstract ideas, and impatient of mystery. Hence there is much in these great writers, especially in Butler, which may be applied *mutatis mutandis* to the *a priori* infidelity of the present day.

sympathies, or to derive certain results from one considered by itself, before proceeding to investigate the other. Against this practice I have ventured to protest, as, dividing what ought not to be put asunder. It seems but reasonable that these two groups of evidences should be examined together, and their testimonies viewed as converging towards a common truth. When this is done, what is (so to speak) rudimentary and imperfect in one is likely to be brought out into definiteness and conclusiveness by the other. Proceeding, as we have seen, by independent processes, they partly coincide in certain common results, while each goes on to bear a peculiar testimony, to which that coincidence nevertheless gives trustworthiness and strength. When they are so examined, what is their verdict on the great question at issue?

We turn to the first group. By Reason surveying the Universe in all its great provinces of Being, we ascend along the line of *Ætiology* demonstratively to the existence, and inductively to the nature, of the First Cause, and examine by *Teleology* the evidences of Design. The former line of thought<sup>6</sup> brings out at once the great alternative, and places us face to face with

<sup>6</sup> See Lect. IV.

the conflict between Theism and Pantheism, inclining, however, if will be recognised as a true Cause, to the side of Theism. Still there might be doubt. There is ultimate Mind. Is it a Mind in the Universe, or a Mind over the Universe?

We turn to the second line of Reason, and to the line of Imagination.<sup>7</sup> Their methods are independent, and in some respects opposite to each other. The understanding proceeds by analysis, separating the whole into its parts by gradual reasoning of Science, the Imagination by synthesis, conceiving the whole as a whole in one swift intuition. But their results distinctly coincide, in recognising an independent creative and sustaining Mind. The Understanding, both in the Universe as a whole, and in the separate kingdoms of Nature, traces the evidences of Design, altered in form but unchanged in essence by modern Science; and the Imagination shows its power to discern Beauty, to idealize and to re-create. Both by different paths lead us not to a mere *Anima Mundi*, but to a Living God, in whom they clearly recognise Power, Wisdom, Glory, and may perhaps infer Righteousness and Love.

<sup>7</sup> See Lect. V. and VI.



To many minds the combined evidence of this group has seemed decisive ; either as sufficient in itself, or as a starting-point for an inquiry, not into the Being, but into the Moral Nature of God. Probably they are right in the abstract ; certainly they are right as to the effect produced on the mind of humanity at large. But let us suppose that, standing alone, the result of these lines of Speculative Theology be questioned. Let us grant that the speculations of pure Science and the imaginations of merely speculative Poetry have tended and still tend, now in one direction, now in another. Sometimes their deities are only Nature and Humanity ; sometimes behind both they recognise the form of a Living God.

Then, if this be so, we turn to the other group of witnesses. We examine the testimony of the Conscience and the Affections.<sup>8</sup> The whole aspect of the question is at once changed. There is no question that, if they bear witness to any object, that object must be a Personal and Moral Being, having (so says Conscience) necessary relations to us, and having (so Love declares) an Unity of nature with us. Hence the one question is, whether these faculties, acknowledged to

<sup>8</sup> See Lect. VII. and VIII.

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be the highest and the most powerful faculties of our nature, have any relation whatever to that Supreme Power, of which Reason and Imagination tell us. To solve that question—allowing on universal human testimony the existence of the great principles of Conscience and Love—we examine, first, their origin, their scope, and their basis in general; and, next, the process of their education to the particular applications of daily life. Everywhere we find that they do lead up to the Supreme Power, and that, without such an ultimate object, their whole character is defective, if not unintelligible. This being so, we hold that this group of witnesses interferes in the great strife, which the intellectual Theology but partially determines, with no indecisive voice. Against the Pantheistic alternative, the Moral Theology protests in the name of the individuality of man, of his sense of the eternal difference between Right and Wrong, of his capacity of infinite Love. It must destroy them, or they will destroy it. In its view all other being vanishes, except the Being of God and the being of our own soul. In fact, did we listen to its witness alone, the conception of God might be even too narrow and too limited in its intense Personality, failing adequately to bring out the all-pervading influence of His Providence

in the world of things, and of His Spirit in the world of souls.

But let us take both groups of witness together; then the witness of Natural Theology grows upon us in all its depth and power. Were it not for one great disturbing cause, it would be fairly irresistible. But that disturbing element undoubtedly exists in the great Mystery of Evil—in the lesser forms of apparent waste and failure, and of physical suffering, seeming to obscure God's Wisdom—in the greater and more terrible form of moral Evil, seeming to discredit His Righteousness and Love. It is, be it frankly acknowledged, a mystery which in different degrees weakens every line of Natural Theology; yet it has power, we unhesitatingly maintain, to destroy none. Even allowing for its interference, we still find their convergent force so strong that, if we relied on it alone, we should not wonder that the belief in a living Almighty and All Righteous God should be in possession of all the field of human thought, and express itself in all the religions and languages of the world.

IV. What is precisely its ultimate result?

(a.) I believe, first, that it leads us to the existence of a Personal God, with all the force of moral certainty. By instinctive consciousness,

by the inferences of practical experience, by the convergence of many lines of deliberate thought,—by the process (that is) through which we gain knowledge of any Being—the soul ascends to Him, refusing either to turn aside to other objects, or to stop contentedly half way.

(b.) Next if it be asked how far we know what He is, the answer must be that every line of Induction leads us to what we may call relative Infinity, that is, to attributes transcending our own power perfectly to conceive. The Theology of the Intellect and Imagination invests Him with attributes of Power, Wisdom, Glory, in relation to which our advancing thought perpetually enlarges our vision of their greatness, and yet shows more distinctly how they stretch immeasurably beyond. The soul breaks out into the cry, “O the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom, and the knowledge of God! How unsearchable are His judgments and His ways past finding out!” So again the Moral Theology brings out to us in God Righteousness and Love—like our own, but indefinitely transcending our own—by a knowledge which increases with the perfection of our moral conceptions, with the consciousness of our own moral needs, with the actual growth of our own moral life. The result is, perhaps, not so much the

excitement of an adoring wonder, as the kindling of a deep and reverent love, "thirsting for God, yea! for the living God." But, beyond these conceptions of Infinity the mind in itself cannot go. Infinity necessarily is to such investigation what it is in Mathematical reasoning—the result of the indefinite accumulation of finite quantity, compared with which, nevertheless, no finite quantity bears any appreciable proportion. The conception of God, like the Love of God, demands all the minds and all the souls of all men, and having filled them to the measure of their capacity, overflows infinitely beyond them all. To suppose that they can grasp His absolute Nature is a contradiction in terms.

(c.) But, while Inductive reasoning can go no further than this, we must add, thirdly, that we find in each line of thought the notion of the Absolute, as that which we must conceive to be, though we cannot conceive how or what it is in itself. Such in Speculative Theology is the conception of a First Cause, itself uncaused, which, while we may differ as to its nature, and acknowledge that nature to be imperfectly comprehensible, seems nevertheless to be a necessity of thought. Such in Moral Theology is the conception of an Eternal and unchangeable Righteousness, belonging to the First

Cause, so arguing a true Personality in Him, and underlying the nature of all things, of which it is impossible to conceive that it ever was not, or can ever cease to be. These two conceptions are not relative to us and to our capacities, but absolute. They lie beyond the induction of relative Infinity; they supply to the thought the goal towards which those Inductions are perpetually approaching. Barren in their own absolute majesty, they are clothed with vividness of beauty and life by these inductions, till they glow, like the everlasting hills under all the changes of light and shade. The First Cause is invested with all the perfection of Wisdom and Glory, which we discover on every side, and we believe that these Attributes rise beyond our conception to an Absolute Infinity. The Eternal Righteousness is brought out to us by all the evidences of an actual Moral Government of the world, which we can discover, while it is acknowledged that they are but indications of an absolute Moral Perfection which is far beyond our powers of discovery. The Ideal Consciousness and the actual Induction meet together. The one gives us the unchangeable Form, the other supplies the colouring, which impresses that Form upon the mental vision.

It is thus that Natural Theology ascends towards the Infinite Being. The meeting-point of the Absolute Conception, and the various lines of Induction converging to it, lies behind the veil. Nevertheless its existence is invariably assumed. More or less vividly it is realized by all forms of Theism, whether they do or do not accept the belief in any special Revelation.

IV. It is with this acceptance and the grounds of it that we have had to do. But yet we cannot but remind ourselves, in conclusion—as in the course of the argument we have reminded ourselves from time to time—that we Christians, while we thank God for this Natural Theology, hold that in His wisdom it has not stood, nor was it intended to stand, alone. Accordingly, we protest in the strongest terms against the assumption, too often made on both sides of this great argument, of any true antithesis between Natural and Revealed Religion. We hold that Revelation, in the sense in which we use the word, is natural—that is, we believe it to be a part of the dispensation of God to man, on which, as complementary to the searchings of Natural Theology, the knowledge of God diffused through the world actually rests. Over and above the witness to God, through which He reveals Himself to every individual heart, we hold it as a

historical truth that He has, "in sundry times and in divers manners," specially revealed Himself to men, and through them to the whole race, in a Revelation which finds its ultimate perfection in the Lord Jesus Christ.

In two ways we hold this Revelation to be complementary to all those natural forms of the knowledge of Him. First, in the strict sense of completion, coming forth from behind the veil, to meet all these converging lines of thought, and to bind them in one perfect unity to the Throne of God. Next, in the sense rather of supplement, as giving us the only solution of that great Mystery of Evil, which everywhere (as we have said) weakens and obscures the light shining along each line of Natural Theology, and weighs like a terrible burden upon the souls of men. To this twofold relation of Revelation to Natural Theology we shall endeavour to direct our thoughts hereafter. But meanwhile we must remember, that this is the view of the knowledge of God which Christianity maintains, and that, because it does so maintain it, it is recognised as the true strength of Theism, so that by it, and by it alone, the main battle of Religion has to be fought.

Such is the general outline of the argument.



However imperfectly it may have been worked out, I believe that it is essentially true.

There are two principles universally recognised in human life. The first is that every conviction, which is to rule humanity, must appeal not to one faculty of our nature, but to that nature as a whole, in the harmony of all its various faculties. The second is that every such conviction, speculative or practical, unless it rests on absolute demonstration or absolute faith, is wrought into the soul by many converging evidences, each possibly in itself inadequate, all in their combination irresistible. I have simply urged that these acknowledged principles should be applied to the highest inquiry—the inquiry after God.

The knowledge of Him, from whom our complex nature proceeds, if it is really to come home to us, must embrace understanding and imagination, conscience and affections alike. The knowledge of Him, who necessarily is beyond our full comprehension, must be reached by many lines of thought, each giving but an imperfect witness, and all together rising but to a moral certainty.

So embraced by all our faculties, so impressed on us by the combined evidence of all, we believe that it is ordained by Him to draw us towards the

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shrine of His Presence. But from that shrine, opened by His hand, we believe that there have shone, in all ages, beams of His own Divine Light, beyond our own power to discover: yet even these veiled and imperfect still, till by the coming of the Son of God the veil was rent in twain, and the way into the Holiest place opened to us for ever.

THE END.